

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW



JULY 1959

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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, United States Senator from Minnesota since 1948; member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations * * * **HENRY A. KISSINGER**, Associate Director of the Harvard Center for International Affairs; author of "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy" * * * **G. F. HUDSON**, Fellow of St. Antony's College, Oxford, in charge of the Center of Far Eastern Studies; formerly on the editorial staff of *The Economist*, London; author of "The Far East in World Politics" * * * **ALBERT RAVENHOLT**, member of the American Universities Field Staff stationed in the Far East; newspaper correspondent and specialist in that area since 1939 * * * **ANTOINE PINAY**, Minister of Finance of France; former Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs * * * **WARREN EASON**, Assistant Professor of Economics, Princeton University * * * **GALO PLAZA**, former President of Ecuador; Chairman, Working Group on the Latin American Regional Market of the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America; Ecuadorean Ambassador to the United States, 1944-46 * * * **HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG**, Editor of *Foreign Affairs* * * * **JACQUES SOUSTELLE**, Minister Delegate to the Prime Minister of France, in charge of Saharan affairs; Governor-General of Algeria, 1955-56; member of General de Gaulle's French National Committee during World War II * * * **MARGERIE PERHAM**, Fellow in Imperial Government, Nuffield College, Oxford; former Reader in Colonial Administration, Oxford; member of the Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies, 1939-45; author of "Africans and British Rule," "Lugard: The Years of Adventure" and other works * * * **LEO SILBERMAN**, a British student of Colonial affairs, now at the Research Center in Economic Development and Cultural Change at the University of Chicago * * * **GEORGE C. LODGE**, Assistant Secretary of Labor for International Affairs, United States Department of Labor * * * **FREDERICK HARBISON**, Professor of Economics and Director of the Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University; author, with Ibrahim A. Ibrahim, of "Human Resources for Egyptian Enterprise."

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The Editors.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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THE SENATE IN FOREIGN POLICY

By Hubert H. Humphrey

WHAT is the role of a Senator in the formulation of United States foreign policy? The answer to this question depends upon the character of the times, the issues at hand, and the Senator himself. This essay is concerned with the continuing international crisis of our times, a period for which the term "total diplomacy" was appropriately invented. The issues at stake in the present crisis are almost beyond human calculation. Will a tension-ridden coexistence be catastrophically resolved in a nuclear war? Will Western culture and values be swept under by the rising tide of Communist imperialism?

The United States Senate today is a heterogeneous body reflecting the richness and diversity of the American people. It takes all types—conservatives, liberals, dreamers and practical men—to make a functioning Senate. There is no simple formula for taking its pulse or resolving its will. Its decisions emerge from a continuous process of criticism and analysis on the one hand and the necessity for action on the other. A great nation, like a man of action, cannot tarry for perfect answers. It always has to settle for the best it can get under less than optimum circumstances.

The Founding Fathers regarded the Senate as a council of elders which would deal largely with domestic political concerns. Its unique value, said Madison, is that it proceeds "with more coolness, with more system, and with more wisdom than the popular branch." Federalist Paper No. 64 said "the Constitution provides that our negotiations for treaties shall have every advantage which can be derived from talents, information, integrity, and deliberate investigations, on the one hand, and from secrecy and despatch on the other." Integrity and deliberation were virtues associated with the Senate while dispatch and secrecy were the qualities of the Executive Branch.

Foreign policy was an occasional and tangential function of the Senate in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Today the mind and will of the Senate are never free from the burdens of the United States in the vast realm beyond the borders of its legal jurisdiction. The old distinction between *domestic* policies and *foreign* policies has given way to a new concept of *national* policies, each of which bears upon the course of events at home and abroad. The understanding of our national character and purposes abroad is deeply affected by laws dealing with immigration, civil rights, tariffs, subsidies and other "domestic" matters. Our capacity to lend substance to our stated goals is determined to no little extent by tax and budget laws.

II. THE BREADTH OF DIPLOMATIC ENCOUNTER

The interpenetration of the domestic and foreign realms in national policies today is only a reflection of the increasing degree and variety of interpenetration between all nations. Four or five centuries ago the peacetime contact between Western states was largely political in character. Mutual interests were affirmed and conflicting interests adjusted through classical diplomacy or, in the final resort, by war. The aims and policies of states were interpreted to one another by official emissaries. The commercial revolution of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries provided an additional channel for nations to know one another through the face-to-face contacts of international trade.

Our Founding Fathers saw distant England and France almost exclusively through the eyes of diplomats and traders. In the nineteenth century a new pair of eyes was added, those of the missionary, upon whom we were largely dependent for our picture of the exotic lands of Asia and Africa.

The technological revolution of the twentieth century vastly increased the speed, volume and scope of the manner in which nations impinge on and interpenetrate each other. Today nations know one another not only through diplomats, traders and missionaries, but also through soldiers, correspondents, tourists, students, community leaders, intellectuals, artists and members of Congress. Among the Americans officially representing their Government abroad are agricultural experts, labor attachés, journalists and a great variety of other specialists. Direct contacts are supplemented by official and unofficial films, books, periodicals and short-wave broadcasts.

This is a far cry from the time when sovereigns, personally vested with full authority, commissioned ambassadors plenipotentiary to transact their business with other states. The autonomy of the classic diplomatic function has been broken down by the rapid communication and transportation provided by the technological revolution. The old diplomacy, indeed, is as obsolete today as the divine right of kings. And I have few regrets, although I do admit that we in the United States might well give more attention to the central virtue of the old diplomacy—the ability to conduct confidential negotiations confidentially.

The term total diplomacy refers to the new breadth of the diplomatic encounter, which reflects the diversity of interest of entire peoples, as well as to the inclusive nature of the struggle between the Communist world and the free world. In an era of total diplomacy there must be at least some understanding between the various cultures involved if international intercourse is to be fruitful. Cultural interpenetration will not by itself dispel the major political conflicts which divide nations, but it can help to clear the atmosphere of some basic misapprehensions and lower the level of hostility. It can help us define more accurately where our interests are mutual and where they are in conflict. Functional coöperation between American students, educators, scientists, doctors, civic leaders and legislators and their counterparts behind the iron and bamboo curtains can therefore have great political significance.

In a world of total diplomacy where every important political decision at home has an impact abroad and where the picture of our national will and purpose is transmitted to other peoples in a thousand ways, negotiation itself is broader than anything imagined under the classic rules and inescapably becomes involved in the interaction of national egos and purposes rooted deeply in national character and behavior.

III. TREATY-MAKING AND PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS

The advent of total diplomacy and the new position of the United States in the world have increased the Senate's role in the formation of foreign policy far beyond what had been envisioned by the framers of the Constitution, who regarded participation in treaty-making and consideration of Presidential appointments as its two chief functions. Although still crucial, these two respon-

sibilities today constitute quantitatively only a small part of the Senate's foreign policy responsibilities.

The great increase in the Senate's work in the field of foreign policy is absolute rather than relative to that of the Executive Branch. If the Senate's responsibilities have increased ten-fold, the international responsibilities of the Executive Branch have increased a hundred-fold. The President's power inevitably increases in times of crisis, and we are living in a period of continuing crisis. Furthermore, history has thrust the United States into the forefront of a mighty struggle against a formidable adversary. A century ago it was said, "When Paris has a cold, Europe sneezes." Today Barbara Ward is not far wrong when she says, "America's foreign policy is everybody's destiny."

The power vested in the President to enter into legal contracts with other sovereign governments "with the advice and consent of the Senate" is one of the far-reaching prerogatives of his office. A treaty with another country takes precedence over domestic law if there is a conflict between the two. Under our system of checks and balances, the President shares this treaty-making power with the Senate. Sometimes the Senate has been called the "graveyard of treaties" because of its failure to give its consent to the Executive will or because it compromised the Executive will with restrictions and reservations. Since the Senate's rejection of the League of Nations, and especially since Pearl Harbor, our Presidents have attempted to keep Senate leaders fully informed on negotiations with other nations. In laying the groundwork for the United Nations, the Marshall Plan and NATO, the Executive Branch went beyond informing the Congress, and actually involved the leaders in both Houses and in both parties in extended consultations. These three historic developments gained the overwhelming acceptance of the American people in part because of the close partnership between the Executive and Legislative branches.

The power of the Senate to reject a Presidential appointment for ambassador has never been invoked, although on several occasions Senate opposition was sufficient to induce the President to withdraw his nominee. A growing awareness of the vital importance of our representation abroad, coupled recently with some unfortunate patronage appointments, has produced in the Senate a new interest in scrutinizing Presidential nominees. Many Senators were shocked when a candidate for a Latin Amer-

ican ambassadorial post gave as his chief qualification the fact that he spent his winters in Florida, and there was an outcry when another Presidential nominee could not name the Prime Minister of the country to which he had been assigned. Later it was learned that he did not even know what NATO was. Appointments of unqualified amateurs, which have been made by both Republican and Democratic Presidents as a reward for party contributions, reflect not only upon the President and his party, but also upon the Senate for its failure to establish and enforce minimum qualifications for confirmation.

An Embassy is fundamentally an executive office which coördinates the political, economic and military policies of the U. S. Government. We need ambassadors who combine administrative gifts with the capacity to understand the social and political forces of the area to which they are assigned. No member of the Foreign Relations Committee believes that a patronage appointment is automatically bad, or that the appointment of a career officer is always to be preferred. A list of our most effective ambassadors in recent years would include men from both categories. On balance, however, the trend toward more career appointments to top posts is to be commended. In 1924, career men headed only about one-third of the U. S. missions abroad; the ratio was 18 to 33. On April 1 of this year career appointees held almost 70 percent of the ambassadorships; the ratio was 51 to 23. But statistics do not tell the whole story. Of the 15 choice diplomatic posts in Western Europe, only six are now held by career officers—Athens, Lisbon, Luxembourg, Oslo, Stockholm and Vienna. One reason is that only men of independent means can afford to occupy posts where entertainment requirements exceed government appropriations for that purpose. In 1957 several of my colleagues and I urged Congress to double the \$600,000 appropriated for representation allowances at American posts abroad.

It is not democratic, and it does not make for good morale and efficient performance, to bar qualified foreign service officers from the top posts in their profession by requiring that they have the private means to underwrite the necessary expenses of properly representing the United States in one of the large capitals of the world. No qualified American should be barred from serving in a top post abroad because he is rich; no qualified professional should be barred because he is not.

Under exceptional circumstances it is possible for the Senate to go beyond its "advice and consent" function in dealing with Presidential appointees. The recent confirmation of Secretary of State Christian A. Herter is a case in point. Moved by President Eisenhower's failure to say anything good about his nominee, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee took extraordinary measures to shore up his prestige on the eve of his critical talks with our allies on the Berlin crisis. Breaking precedent, the Committee unanimously voted to suspend its own six-day rule and then unanimously referred the nomination favorably to the Senate. In presenting Mr. Herter's name, Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson said: "I want the world to know that this nation is united behind the Secretary of State whose nomination is about to be confirmed."

IV. A SENATOR AND HIS LARGER CONSTITUENCY

In the twentieth century a Senator represents not only his state but also the nation, and under certain circumstances he operates directly in the international arena. If he loses contact with the interests, fears and hopes of the people from whom he draws his power he forfeits his moral and political right to represent them. This does not mean that he should be like a weathercock following the shifting winds of public passion. As Edmund Burke put it, "Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion." A Senator must at times lead, inform and even educate his constituents.

Informed public discussion is made difficult when the atmosphere is clouded either by cynical or optimistic illusions. When a Senator accuses his opponents of "twenty years of treason" or refers to the Korean conflict as a "Truman war," he poisons the channels of useful debate. On the other hand, if a Senator exaggerates the potential benefits of summit diplomacy (or any other single instrument of foreign policy) he makes the very difficult task of negotiating with the Russians even more difficult. Some of us who recalled the psychological backwash in the wake of the oversold summit conference of 1955 warned our people against expecting too much from new summit talks, at the same time insisting upon the importance of continuous negotiations.

The role of the Senate in dealing *directly* with international problems is severely and properly limited by the Constitution,

which vests in the Executive Branch exclusive power to conduct foreign relations. Even in its restricted role of giving advice and consent to the President, it is limited by lack of adequate information and an understandable disposition to overlook what Charles Burton Marshall has called "the limits of foreign policy."¹ Some members of Congress, says Mr. Marshall, accustomed to dealing with domestic problems by passing laws, tend to forget that the "vast external realm" beyond the limits of our national jurisdiction is not subject to the parliamentary will or Executive fiat. In the international field a national policy objective often is highly restricted or may be entirely frustrated by external forces over which even the powerful United States has little or no control. The effectiveness of our foreign policy is limited by the power, purposes and unpredictability of other nations, whether hostile, allied or uncommitted; by the weight of tradition and precedent; by the facts of international economic life; and by the vicissitudes of history generally.

One of the best ways for a Senator to comprehend both the limits and possibilities of foreign policy is to have direct contact with the leaders and peoples of other nations. Since the end of World War II approximately half the members of Congress have had this opportunity. Well planned trips abroad have given our legislators a more profound and sympathetic understanding of the "vast external realm," and have helped the officials and people of other nations to get a more accurate picture of our national character and aspirations.

My own understanding of Middle East problems, for example, was greatly enhanced during an intensive 40-day study mission to that area several years ago. I talked with prime ministers and foreign ministers, and exchanged views with intellectual, business and labor leaders. Also invaluable to me was my tour of duty as a delegate to the United Nations and my trip last year to Western Europe and the Soviet Union. I believe such face-to-face contacts lead to mutual understanding, which always includes, of course, a more precise awareness of the differences between the United States and the host country.

I benefited greatly by my visit with Premier Khrushchev, and I believe he gained a clearer understanding about the unity of the American people behind the essential elements of our foreign policy precisely because I was a politician and a member of the

¹ "The Limits of Foreign Policy" (New York: Holt, 1954).

loyal opposition. A member of Congress is primarily a politician and not a diplomat; he sees things abroad through a different set of lenses and what he sees can make an important supplementary contribution to what an ambassador reports. Visits with foreign officials which do not confuse *contact* with *contract* do not presume upon the exclusive Presidential prerogative.

V. FOREIGN RELATIONS WITHIN THE SENATE

Since Hitler's march into Poland two decades ago, foreign policy has been the dominant concern within the Senate itself. The primacy of the Executive Branch in foreign affairs in no way lessens the moral and legal responsibility of the Congress to work for national policies which come to grips responsibly and realistically with urgent demands of the world crisis. In this connection the Senate's activities go far beyond scrutinizing treaties and Presidential appointments. Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson has correctly observed that in one "aspect of foreign affairs Congress is all-powerful. This is in the establishing and maintaining of those fundamental policies, with their supporting programs of action, which require legal authority, men and money. Without these foundations—solidly laid and kept in repair—even wise and skillful diplomacy cannot provide the power and develop the world environment indispensable to national independence and individual liberty for ourselves and others."² Parliamentary bodies cannot govern, and our Congress is no exception. But with its power of the purse, and through the right to investigate, to criticize and to advocate, the Congress does exert a significant influence on the quality and direction of United States foreign policy, and it usually does so without violating the integrity of the Executive Branch.

The body of fact and insight developed by a committee hearing or study can be drawn upon for informed criticism or for advocating new policies. A case in point was the careful study of the economic aid program conducted by a special Senate Committee two years ago, which helped to lay the foundation for our present more effective approach to the development needs of the politically unaligned nations of Asia and Africa. As chairman of the Subcommittee on Disarmament, I have often used information developed in hearings to raise questions with Administration spokesmen. Some of my questions about the relative position of

² *The New York Times Magazine*, January 6, 1957.

the United States and the U.S.S.R. in nuclear development and about the detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions proved to be of more than routine interest.

An individual Senator, apart from his committee work, can ask questions and advocate new ideas. The student exchange program is known by the name of its chief advocate, Senator Fulbright. Former Senator Bricker is known for his sustained but unsuccessful efforts to curb the treaty-making power of the President. In April of this year the Senate unanimously adopted a resolution which I introduced in support of our Government's efforts to negotiate an effective ban on nuclear weapons tests at the three-power Geneva talks then in progress.

Naturally Senators of the opposition party are more critical of the Administration than their colleagues on the other side of the aisle. This brings up the subject of "bipartisanship." Last April, Senator Fulbright insisted that "bipartisanship" is not a desirable objective in debate on foreign policy. He is right. What we need is genuine *nonpartisan* study and criticism, honest appraisal without reference to narrow partisan advantage. In recent years the slogan of "bipartisanship" has too often been invoked to muzzle criticism of Administration mistakes or to reduce the issue to the lowest common denominator to satisfy all but the extremists in both parties. The late Senator Arthur Vandenberg preferred the word *nonpartisanship*, which he defined as "a mutual effort . . . to unite our official voice at the water's edge so that America speaks with maximum authority. . . . It does not involve the remotest surrender of free debate . . . and the 'loyal opposition' is under special obligation to see that this occurs."

Senator Vandenberg's insistence on free debate is correct, but debate cannot be arbitrarily stopped at "the water's edge." When a national consensus has been reached on a vital issue, and when policies appropriate to this consensus have been initiated, it is right that we close ranks to support them. But changing circumstances produce new problems which require new consideration. Responsible debate must never cease, even in wartime, but it must be carried on with restraint and with the national interest the objective rather than partisan advantage.

VI. THE PROBLEM OF COUNTERVAILING EXPERTISE

If the "unique, deliberate—and, to me, agreeable—disarray of the American Government," to use William S. White's words, is

to function properly, the foreign policy committees of Congress must have the resources to enable them to question, review, modify or reject the policies of the Executive Branch. The information, intelligence and insight available to the Executive Branch are vast and continue to expand. This is a natural development in an era of total diplomacy. But in contrast, says Myron M. Cowen in a recent letter to Senator Fulbright, there is "a concurrent scarcity of vigorous and continuing *countervailing expertise*" in Congress. Such independent expertise is absolutely necessary if the House and Senate are to fulfill their Constitutional responsibility of surveillance and initiative. Without competent independent sources of fact and wisdom they cannot make discriminating judgments between alternative programs and proposals. Faced with an impressive case by the Administration, and unarmed with counter facts and arguments, even a conscientious Senator sometimes vacillates between giving a grudging consent and opposing for the sake of opposing.

This imbalance constitutes a serious threat to the integrity of the Legislative Branch. The main answer is more adequate staffing, particularly for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Foreign Affairs Division of the Legislative Reference Service. At present there are eight foreign policy specialists on the Senate Committee staff, five on the House Committee staff, and 16 in the Legislative Reference Service—a total of only 29 experts directly in the service of Congress in the entire area of foreign relations. If one adds the professional staffs of the two Armed Services committees, the grand total is 35. Upon them falls much of the burden of examining the complex Defense, International Affairs and Mutual Security budgets totalling \$48 billion a year. The size of this staff is out of all proportion to its enormous responsibility.

The Foreign Relations Committee needs a much larger and more specialized staff, loyal to the Legislative Branch, and equal in competence to the best talent in the State Department. My experience with the Disarmament Subcommittee convinces me that functional areas as well as geographic areas should be accorded subcommittee status, and that all subcommittees worth creating are worth an independent staff of experts. An adequate staff could perform many services now being performed poorly or not at all. It would have constant access to the facts and intelligence available from all branches of government, from organi-

zations where independent research is carried on and from special Senate studies. Adequate staffing will alone enable Congress to escape from uniformed acquiescence on the one hand and irresponsible obstruction on the other.

VII. THE PROBLEM OF FRAGMENTATION

The Founding Fathers bequeathed to us a government in which there is a separation of powers and a system of checks and balances. Some critics maintain that such a government is incapable of meeting the fast-moving demands of a technological age or of competing successfully with the dynamic, planned offensives of an expansionist totalitarian system. While I reject this view, I do acknowledge that "government as usual" is not good enough.

Our problem today does not seem to me to be primarily structural or bureaucratic so much as the lack of leadership at the top. Even a loose-fitting and overlapping governmental structure can be made to work if there is a sense of urgency and direction; and this only dynamic leadership can provide.

Even under present conditions there are some things in the area of structural manipulation which would enable us to deal more effectively than we do now with the challenges of the continuing crisis. The Executive Branch and the Congress are fragmented. There are a score of Executive agencies dealing with foreign policy in addition to the State Department and the Department of Defense. One sometimes gets the impression that the Bureau of the Budget is the most important of them all. Theoretically, the President with the aid of the National Security Council is supposed to sort out the priorities and coördinate a great variety of policies in the light of an agreed, long-range strategy. Unfortunately this rarely happens, first because the agreed strategy does not exist, second because the National Security Council is so preoccupied with day-by-day crises that it seldom has time for long-range planning.

The problem raised by the extent of governmental fragmentation is deep and pervasive and there are no easy answers. But I believe that the time has come to consider seriously the creation in the Executive Branch of a permanent research and policy-analyzing agency charged with the responsibility of thinking about comprehensive national strategy, embracing in that term all essential factors of domestic and foreign policy. This agency would relate the total capacities of the American people

—military, economic, technical, intellectual and moral—to their responsibilities of international leadership. Without elaborating my proposal here, I want to make it clear that I do not regard such an agency as a substitute for politics—as an alternative to the present responsibilities of the Executive and Legislative Branches. I am not proposing that an intellectual élite be called in to decide our fate for us, but merely that an agency along the lines described could help our Government to develop a better sense of perspective and to integrate and coördinate the many agencies and programs which now often operate at cross-purposes.

Perhaps the Congress could prompt the Executive to put its house in order by itself creating a Joint Committee on National Strategy, to include the chairmen and ranking minority members of the major committees of the House and the Senate. I have recently proposed such a Committee. Its purpose would be to look at our total national strategy—military, political, economic and ideological. This Committee, a counterpart in the Congress of what I have proposed for the Executive Branch, would not usurp the functions of any of the present Committees, but supplement them by endowing their work with a larger frame of reference. The Chairmen of the Committees represented would come away from the meetings of the new Joint Committee with a greater appreciation, for instance, of the relationship between fiscal policy and national productivity and how both factors relate to our defense posture and our negotiating position. Responsible statesmanship consists precisely in the capacity to see complex relationships in a perspective as broad as the national purpose itself.

No amount of structural manipulation can make up for a lack of leadership that is politically wise and morally responsible. But if the essential idea underlying these twin proposals were adopted, I believe it would make a modest contribution toward creating a more integrated national policy; and in the face of the Communist challenge, even a modest contribution toward better strategic planning is not to be brushed aside.

Congress was not created to govern, and it should not attempt to do so. Yet this is no time for Congress to submit meekly to the Executive will. In fact, it could not submit even if it were so inclined, because there is not one Executive will, but a number of conflicting wills which have not yet surrendered to the authority of an over-riding national purpose.

THE SEARCH FOR STABILITY

By Henry A. Kissinger

THESE lines are being written while the Foreign Ministers' Conference is still in progress. But even though its precise outcome cannot be foretold, the general nature of the diplomacy of the next few months is apparent. The West has presented a "package" proposal linking German unification to European security. This link has been rejected. The Soviet Union has insisted that German reunification should be left to the two German states and that the conference should concentrate on the issues which the Soviet leaders have defined as "soluble." It is clear, then, that the Western powers are to be tested in their negotiation skill, their creativity and, most important, their convictions. Their response will influence importantly, perhaps crucially, the future of freedom in our time.

It is hoped that the Western performance in the months ahead will be more self-assured than that in the period just past. In an alliance, disagreements are unavoidable and different approaches may contribute to the vitality of a consensus finally achieved. Since in democracies policies are dependent on popular support, they are usually developed by a public debate which stresses conflicting approaches. Even bearing this in mind, we have reason for concern. The West's reaction to a clear Soviet menace to the very vitals of the Western alliance has been tentative and irresolute. More of the debate has dealt with what could be conceded than with the goals for which we should strive. The hesitation shown in developing the Western "package" does not augur well that it will be maintained with resolution. If the proposals presented at Geneva are valid today, one wonders why we lacked the imagination to present them before Soviet pressure made them appear as an improvisation to escape a difficult situation.

Nothing is more important for the West than to become clear about the causes of the present instability and to develop real conviction about the measures which it proposes for overcoming it. These measures may or may not prove negotiable. But it would be perilous to confuse the elements of stability with the terms on which the Soviet Union may be willing to settle. In our desire for agreement we must not lose sight of the issues at stake or of the goals for which to strive.

A lasting settlement is possible only if the Soviet leaders become convinced that they will not be able to use the West's desire for peace to demoralize it. If they are serious about their desire to avoid war, they must come to realize that negotiations can be used for purely tactical purposes only so often and that, measured against the dangers of such a course, the gains they may score are paltry. We in turn should strive to demonstrate to the Soviet leaders that they have a real policy decision to make which we will do everything possible to ease: They must face the fact that the policy of applying relentless pressures on the West creates untold perils for all the peoples of the world. On the other hand, they must be convinced that they can increase their security through negotiation, that we will be flexible and conciliatory in working out reassurances for them against attack.

How valid, then, is the West's advocacy of German unification? What is the relationship of unification to European security? What measures are available to meet legitimate Soviet concerns for security?

II

It is often maintained that one of the Soviet purposes in the present crisis is to win Western acceptance of the status quo in Eastern Europe, and we are urged to yield to facts that we are powerless to change. In passing, it may be doubted that the only reasonable response to facts is to adjust to them. But in the particular instance, it is important to distinguish the problem of Germany from that of the satellite countries of Eastern Europe. There the West has long since recognized the existing governments. Diplomatic relations have been established. Commercial agreements have been concluded. Even economic aid has been extended, as in the case of Poland. Hungary proved that the West is not prepared to support domestic upheavals with force. It is therefore difficult to assign any concrete meaning to the term "recognition of the status quo" or to imagine anything more the West could do to adjust to existing conditions. The danger to Soviet rule results from the inability of the Communist leaders to obtain domestic support in the countries concerned. The only additional concession conceivable would be to collaborate in the Soviet repression of freedom by renouncing the *principle* of self-determination.

The case is different in Germany, however. Here a Communist

régime has been established in only a portion of the country, a portion that has no historical, ethnic or cultural tradition distinct from Germany as a whole. The problem in Eastern Germany is not only that a puppet government has been forced on a hostile population; a separate state there—even were it non-Communist—would run counter to the German desire for reunification. Even Khrushchev on his trip to Eastern Germany found it necessary constantly to reiterate that unification was the ultimate goal, though not until Western Germany was ready to accept the Soviet system. As long as Germany remains divided the position of the East German régime is perforce precarious.

For the East German régime is basically threatened not only by the hostility of its own population but through the existence of a free and prosperous West Germany. Any West German government must advocate reunification, however moderate it may be in the means it chooses to pursue this objective and however patient it may be in bringing it about. No West German government can accept as permanent the forcible partition of German territory without undermining its domestic support. An alliance which demanded such a price from the German people would lose its meaning in German eyes. And whatever the self-restraint of either the Federal Republic or the Western allies, the history of Europe in the nineteenth century and of the anti-colonial struggles of the twentieth demonstrates that the desire for national independence cannot be ignored by governments. Or are we to assume that the desire for self-determination and national dignity is less strong in Europe than in Asia or Africa?

The Federal Republic would suffer a perhaps irreparable blow if its allies accepted its present frontiers as final—even to the extent of not pressing for unification. The division of Germany may be unavoidable, but for the West a great deal depends on demonstrating what makes it so. An excess of “realism” about accepting the division of Germany will enable the Soviet Union to shift the responsibility for thwarting unification on us. This has already been foreshadowed by Khrushchev’s statement to a group of West German editors that the West preferred a divided Germany for economic as well as military reasons,¹ and by the acts of the East German delegation at Geneva which has taken pains to project itself as the defender of German nationalism.² If

¹ *The New York Times*, May 16, 1959.

² For example, their proposal that German become an official conference language.

the Federal Republic is persuaded that it cannot achieve reunification through ties to the West, it is likely to seek its aims through separate dealings with the East. Unification could then be used by the Soviets as a lure to end, step by step, the achievements of European integration and to encourage a race for Moscow's favor. Alternatively, there may be a resurgence of virulent nationalism. Maintaining the Federal Republic as a willing partner of the Atlantic community is important not only for the future of Germany; it is even more vital for the peace of the world.

The present Soviet purpose goes far beyond perpetuating the status quo. The Soviet Union obviously sees in the consolidation of its East German satellite not only a means to destroy the cohesion of the West but also a first step in the Communization of all of Germany. "On what foundation should Germany be reunited?" Khrushchev said in Leipzig on March 7. "Can we agree when the capitalist world proposes to achieve the reunification of Germany at the expense of the German Democratic Republic *and thus narrow down the front of socialism* [italics supplied]? We have not been and we do not live to yield to capitalism. . . . The question can also be put thus: Why not reunite Germany by abolishing the capitalist system in West Germany and establishing there the power of the working class? *But it would be unrealistic today* [italics supplied]. . . . If you want your children and grandchildren to remember you with gratitude, you should fight for the conclusion of a German peace treaty which would be an important step towards the reunification of Germany. . . ."

The Soviet draft of a peace treaty is not the end but the beginning of a process; it is a measure to consolidate a tactical base. Almost every clause in the Soviet treaty draft defines an opportunity for constant intervention. The Confederation proposed by the Soviet Union will relax tensions only until the Soviets are ready to press for a reunification of Germany under Communist aegis and in the meantime it would be used to demoralize Western Germany and to separate it from its allies. The history of coalitions in Poland, Rumania, Hungary and even China indicates that as soon as the Communists feel strong enough they will withdraw their recognition of the Federal Republic and claim that their puppet régime represents all of Germany, much as was done with the Lublin Government in Poland. This has already been foreshadowed by the violent attack on the West German government at Geneva and by Khrushchev's Leipzig

speech: "The German Democratic Republic is a republic of the working class. It is a republic of workers and peasants, the homeland of *all* German workers" [italics supplied].

In all its negotiations the West must demonstrate the cynicism of the Soviet phrase that unification should be worked out by the two Germanys. If it is to be worked out by the German people, free elections are the best method. Confederation, on the other hand, would give the East German satellite a voice in West German affairs. By adding its weight to the opposition of any existing government it could demoralize political life in the Federal Republic or at the least force it into a rigid mold dangerous to democracy. It could press for weakening West Germany's European ties by insisting that they conflicted with unification. If the Federal Republic refused to withdraw from those ties, Eastern Germany, having obtained recognition of its international status by the very fact of confederation, could leave the confederation as the advocate of German unity. If the Federal Republic accepted the Eastern overtures it would add fuel to Western suspicions of Germany and lead to even further estrangement.

It can be objected that the confederation principle works both ways. Would not the establishment of an all-German institution enable the Federal Republic to influence events in the East? This symmetry is more apparent than real. The apparatus of a police state makes the East German régime relatively immune to domestic pressure, especially if Soviet troops remain in Eastern Germany. But even in their absence little can be expected in the way of liberalization of the East German régime. The experience of Poland is a poor guide in this respect. Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Rumania have not been liberalized even though Soviet troops have been withdrawn; indeed in Czechoslovakia they were not even present when the Communist régime was established. In Poland there was a congruence of national and religious feeling supporting a liberal Communist régime to maintain national identity. In Eastern Germany these factors are not present; indeed the Communist régime is considered the chief obstacle to national aspirations.

Any negotiation on Germany thus faces two seemingly contradictory dangers: that we accept the division of Germany; or that in bargaining for unification we accept solutions which may lay the basis for the Soviet domination of all of Germany. Indeed the Western "package" plan has gone dangerously far in the lat-

ter direction. A commission of East and West German officials to expand contacts between the two parts of Germany has from the Soviet point of view many of the advantages of confederation. It is not surprising that Mr. Gromyko described this proposal as "constructive." And the proposed plebiscite on an issue as technical as an electoral law may become a device to legitimize the existing voting procedure in East Germany—all the more so as there is no provision for a prior period of free political activity.³

It thus becomes important for the West not only to advocate unification but to take its stand on issues that do not lend themselves to obfuscation. While we can offer formulas designed to save Soviet face—such as an interim period before free elections—we cannot surrender the right of the German people to determine their own fate at some reasonable stage. Once we leave the firm ground of this principle, we are in the realm of technical expedients where the opportunities for Soviet intransigence and manipulation are considerable. No voting formula, however subtle, can replace Soviet willingness to permit free popular expression. The Soviet leaders will not give up Eastern Germany through an oversight and we render neither ourselves nor the cause of negotiations a service by pretending that German reunification can be achieved by subterfuge. We can concede a great deal regarding the mode and timing of elections, but to give the East German régime a veto of unification, directly or indirectly, is either to legitimize the continued division of Germany, with dire consequences for the political stability of Western Germany, or to prepare the way for a Soviet Germany.

It is said by some that nobody really *wants* German unification. But surely it is within our control to set our own goals. If the West understands its interests, it *must* advocate German unification despite the experiences of two world wars and despite the understandable fear of a revival of German truculence. The West may have to acquiesce in the division of Germany but it cannot condone it. Any other course will in the end bring on what we should fear most: a militant, dissatisfied power in the center of the Continent. To strive for German unification is not a bargaining device but the condition for European stability.

To be sure, the Soviet Union will oppose unification on any terms short of turning all of Germany into a Soviet state. But we cannot confine ourselves to proposals which the Soviet Union

³ *The New York Times*, May 15, 1959.

has said it will accept unless we are ready to settle all issues on Soviet terms. Flexibility cannot involve abandoning the principle of self-determination. Are our principles to cease having validity wherever the Soviet Union succeeds in creating a *fait accompli*? Are we to deny in Europe what we have defended in Asia and Africa? Adjustment to facts no doubt is often desirable, but if we elevate it into a universal principle we write a prescription for stagnation. During Suez we insisted that we would uphold our principles *even* against our allies. Are we to leave the impression now that we will uphold them *only* against our allies?

Our obligation is to make responsible proposals which are designed to take into account the legitimate security concerns of all parties. If the Soviet Union is sincerely concerned about the security of its territories, the West should be very generous in its response. What, then, of the proposals on European security?

III

It has been said that the phrase "protecting Soviet legitimate security concerns" is without concrete meaning. But the experience of World War II and of a decade of cold war should give us some guide to understanding the problem. An agreement that takes into account the "legitimate" security interests of both sides must protect the Soviet Union against the danger of a resurgent German militarism and against an attack from NATO territory. But it must also safeguard the West against the risks of Soviet pressure and encroachment. It is true that the Soviet Union's experiences in this century may make it unusually sensitive to German military strength. But it is also true that for over a century the Russian Empire in one form or another has been pressing on all peripheral areas, including Europe. The Soviet Union has a right to demand protection against military attack. Yet in a society of sovereign states, absolute security is obtainable only by reducing all other states to impotence. It is the road to Empire.

The stability of an international system depends on the degree to which it combines the need for security with the obligation of self-restraint. To rely entirely on the continued good will of another sovereign state is an abdication of statesmanship and self-respect. But to seek security entirely through physical domination is to menace all other countries. For absolute security for one country must mean absolute insecurity for all others. Where

to strike this balance cannot be determined in the abstract; it is what makes diplomacy an art and not a science. But the balance must be established if the international order is to be stable.

In this sense the revolutionary quality of the Soviet Union has resided not in the fact that it has felt threatened—a measure of threat is inherent in the relations of sovereign states—but that nothing has been able to reassure it. Since the end of World War II, the Communist bloc has grown by the addition of Eastern Europe and Communist China; North Korea and northern Indochina have become Communist states; the Middle East has been penetrated; a nuclear arsenal has been created and with it the capability to menace the territorial United States; economically the U.S.S.R. is rapidly gaining ground. Yet the claim of being threatened has never abated. It is therefore futile to debate whether the Soviet Union is “really” interested in world domination. For the problem may be that the Soviet conception of security results in undermining all other states.

The prerequisite for an effective security system, then, is a Soviet policy decision to content itself with *relative* security and to forego the perilous quest of safety through Empire. At the same time, the West must overcome the confusions and evasions which have characterized its security effort. Since there is no agreement on the purpose or scale of the Western defense effort, it is not surprising that there has been lack of clarity about the elements of a European security system.

It has been argued, for example, that NATO has prevented a Soviet attack without ever meeting the force levels planned for it. Since Soviet ground strength has been preponderant throughout the existence of NATO, so the argument goes, peace has been maintained for one of two reasons or a combination of them: either the Soviet Union has never had any intention of making a military attack on Europe; or it was deterred from such an attack by the threat of a general war with the United States. A substantial capability for local defense, it is argued, could only weaken the deterrent by creating the illusion that an attack might evoke a less than all-out response. Advocates of this view hold that the importance of Europe is so great that any aggression against it must automatically trigger the American and British retaliatory forces into action.

The corollary of this line of reasoning has been that a limited war in Europe is “unthinkable.” Consequently it is quite feasible

to separate the opposing forces physically without thereby reducing the sanction available against a Soviet attack. To be sure, the Soviet Union might decide to reoccupy territories once vacated, but it could do so, in Mr. Kennan's words, "only once and only for the highest stakes: in the contingency, that is, of general war." Massive retaliation would furnish the deterrent against Soviet attack whether on the Elbe, the Oder or the Bug.

Arguments such as these have had the negative virtue of pressing home the inconsistencies of present NATO strategy: The alliance has placed primary reliance on a weapon that is under the exclusive control of the two extra-continental allies, the United States and Great Britain. This in turn has led to the demand by our European allies for a substantial commitment of United States and British troops on the Continent; their role was conceived almost as that of hostages—to insure that the Western retaliatory power would in fact be employed against a Soviet attack. Because of the reliance on an all-out strategy, our continental allies have been reluctant to make a defense contribution which would give the commitment of United States and British troops military value. They have resisted the effort to achieve an adequate local defense not only for economic reasons but because they believed that it might reduce the United States' and British willingness to resort to the all-out war which Western strategic doctrine has defined as the sole obstacle to Soviet aggression.

Thus American and British troops in the center of Europe perform not only a military but also a psychological function: they are a token of our commitment to our allies and a warning to potential aggressors. But it also explains why thoughtful people have seen the military establishment on the Continent as a bargaining counter: since it was not expected to play a significant *military* role, it could be reduced in order to achieve a *political* gain. And its symbolic function could be met by a more solemn promise by the United States to defend Europe.⁴

However, it is dangerous to assume that because the contradictions in NATO strategic doctrine have not been exploited by the Soviet Union in the past decade this will be true when the Soviet nuclear arsenal is fully developed; indeed, the challenge in Berlin would indicate precisely the opposite. And it would be a grave mistake to seek to apply the experience of the first decade of NATO to a future in which a great deal will depend on a Western

⁴ See speech by Adlai Stevenson, *The New York Times*, March 6, 1959.

adjustment to a fundamental change in strategic relationships.

One of the difficulties of the nuclear age has been that no sooner has one technological revolution been assimilated in doctrine and policy than these have been made obsolete by new developments. There have been four phases: (1) the period when the United States possessed an atomic monopoly and a monopoly of the means of delivery; (2) the period when our monopoly of weapons was ended but when we still possessed an overwhelming advantage in the means of delivery; (3) the period when the Soviet Union began to develop a substantial delivery system but we still retained a decided advantage because of our superiority in numbers and in the strategic location of our base system; (4) the period when both in numbers of weapons and in the means of delivery the capabilities of the two sides began to approach each other.

During phases one and two—during the time, that is, of our atomic preponderance—our retaliatory force could be conceived of as a deterrent to *any* aggression we chose to resist. It was a positive deterrent in the sense that we did not have to make our response dependent on the magnitude of the threat. Rather our primary concern was to decide that *some* response was called for. A policy of massive retaliation could be reasonably effective because our invulnerability gave a certain credibility to the threat of all-out war. Even then, of course, our threat was incongruous in relation to most objectives likely to be in dispute, and it did not prevent the Berlin blockade and the Korean War.

But however useful massive retaliation may have been during the period of our atomic monopoly, the threshold of provocation which would unleash the United States and British retaliatory force has been rising with the growth of the Soviet nuclear and missile capability—or so an aggressor might calculate at least. In these circumstances, the threat of all-out war will deter an ever smaller range of possible challenges. Its credibility will constantly decline, and it will so increase the inhibitions of the side relying on it that it may well produce appeasement rather than deterrence. The Soviet advances in missiles have to a great extent neutralized our strategic striking power, and the vast Soviet ground strength has thus been freed for pressure or blackmail.

Reliance on all-out war not only reduces the credibility of our deterrent, it also dooms us to a fundamentally irrational diplomacy. The threat of it can be made plausible only if in a given

crisis we act as if we were prepared to throw sober calculation to the wind—if, for example, we avoid asking the question whether Berlin is “worth” an all-out war. But such a policy in the long run cannot be maintained by status quo powers with democratic institutions.

As a result, it becomes futile to continue to rely on the strategy of the past decade. In the era of nuclear plenty, the defense of Europe can no longer rest on the threat of all-out war alone. When every increase in destructive ability also magnifies the inhibitions against resorting to it, we cannot go on proclaiming that local defense of Europe is impossible. It is not at all obvious why Western Europe and the United States, whose combined manpower and industrial potential far exceed those of the Soviet Union, should not be able to make a much more substantial and successful effort to improve the capability for local defense, particularly in the conventional field.

It is argued by many that since European bases are no longer required in an all-out war, the need for a substantial military establishment on the Continent has disappeared.⁵ But it is surely inconsistent to maintain that the United States should be prepared to run greater risks than ever for an area which has become strategically less important. If Europe is indeed dispensable in an all-out war, a greater effort to create local defense becomes all the more necessary, lest the Soviet Union believe that the change in Europe’s strategic importance will make us less ready to come to its defense.

Clearly, the Soviet effort to wreck NATO is directed against the capability for local defense. The Soviet Union must realize that a point will soon be reached where elimination of NATO would not decisively affect the over-all deterrent equation. NATO *does* represent an obstacle to the Soviet domination of Europe by means which will not seem “worth” an all-out war.

The line of demarcation between limited war and all-out war in Europe need not be determined in the abstract. The stronger the local forces of NATO, the less likely it will be that the Soviet Union will be tempted to adventure. The more effective the military establishment on the Continent, the larger must be the Soviet attack designed to overcome it. The more the required effort approaches the scale of all-out war, the clearer the challenge

⁵ See speech by the Italian Ambassador to Germany, Signor Quaroni, at the University of Frankfurt, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 1, 1959.

to our security and the more plausible our over-all deterrent. In short, as the horrors of all-out war multiply and cripple the will to resort to it, the minimum objective of the forces in Europe must be to raise the scale of the Soviet effort required to defeat them to a level that can leave no doubt about its ultimate objective. In the age of nuclear plenty a capability for local defense is required to give validity to the over-all deterrent.

The security problem of Europe may therefore be summed up as follows: (1) The Soviet Union can threaten all of Europe from its own territories. Consequently, alliances are not essential for its safety. (2) No European country is capable of withstanding Soviet pressure alone. Security for them is therefore inseparable from unity. (3) The threat of all-out war is losing its credibility and its strategic meaning. (4) The defense of Europe cannot be conducted solely from North America, because the aggressor can pose threats which will not seem to warrant total retaliation and because, however firm allied unity may be, a nation cannot be counted on to commit suicide in defense of a foreign territory.⁶

As a result, the question in security negotiations becomes whether it is possible to conceive of two military establishments on the Continent capable of defensive action but deprived through appropriate control measures of offensive power. Such a control system must take care not to wreck NATO, for this would enable the Soviet Union to bring pressure on the European countries one by one. It must not eliminate the possibility of a local defense, for this would in time isolate us and demoralize our allies. It must seek to assure the Soviet Union against attack from NATO territory. It should make progress towards German unity because this would remove the chief cause of political tension in Europe and the one most likely to produce an explosion. Can these objectives be reconciled?

The argument has been made that the Soviet Union cannot permit German unification under present conditions because it would mean the advance of NATO to the Polish frontier. But to place the frontier of NATO on the Oder need not mean that NATO *forces* advance to the Polish frontier. The Western proposal at Geneva specifically excluded that possibility. It might have gone further and offered the complete demilitarization of East Germany after unification.

A preferable solution would be to establish a comprehensive

⁶ See the author's "Missiles and the Western Alliance," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1958.

European security system along the borders of a unified Germany. It could be proposed that non-German forces withdraw the same distance from the Oder as non-Polish forces and that the size of German forces on one side and Polish and Czech forces on the other be brought into some relationship with each other, both in numbers and in equipment. For example, United States, British and French forces could withdraw to the line of the Weser while Soviet forces could retire to the Vistula. The German forces between the Weser and the Oder would be restricted to defensive armaments, as would the Polish forces between the Oder and the Vistula. To decrease the danger of an attack from German territory NATO would agree not to station weapons of more than 700-mile range on German territory. An inspection system could be established. Obviously there are many variations of such a scheme, which could be the subject of negotiation both as to the width of the zone separating Western and Soviet forces and as to types of arms to be stationed in the area.

From a military point of view such a solution would make offensive operations difficult. The German and satellite forces would be approximately equal and they would separate the Soviet Union and the Western military establishment. At the same time, there would remain sufficient strength on the Continent and within Germany not to tempt aggression and to resist it should it take place. Continued membership in NATO would help protect Germany against Eastern pressure while the deployment of NATO forces would demonstrate their defensive purpose. Such a program would remove the chief source of political tension in Europe. It would provide protection to both the West and the Soviet Union against offensive operations. It would create a zone of arms control which, if successful, should bring about a climate of confidence leading to further measures.

But before the West can negotiate effectively on this it must admit to itself that the evasions and inconsistencies of NATO may cause the Soviets to believe that they would gain no additional security from any such control scheme. Thus effective negotiations may be inhibited not by the strength of the Western alliance but by its weakness and irresolution.

IV

If, as seems quite probable, the Soviet Union rejects any reasonable program for German reunification, there is likely to be

mounting pressure for various arms-control schemes along the present political division of Europe, such as a troop freeze or thinning out of forces. The difficulty with most of these proposals is that they do not in themselves come to grips with the real security problem. They do not reduce the likelihood of political upheaval in Germany—in fact they may increase it. They do not affect materially the capability of the United States or the Soviet Union to launch a sudden all-out attack. On the other hand, since present or planned NATO forces are already totally inadequate for offensive ground operations, most schemes for troop withdrawal would merely weaken the capability for local defense of the West without providing an additional reassurance to the Soviet Union. They would improve the offensive, but not the defensive, position of the U.S.S.R. Even a troop freeze has the result of keeping NATO from adapting itself to changed strategic relationships. Unless coupled with a reduction of Soviet forces, it would perpetuate an inequality which will represent a growing invitation to Soviet adventures as Soviet long-range missiles multiply.

The most frequent suggestion is that a zone free of nuclear weapons be established in the center of Europe. Given the range of modern weapons, a denuclearized zone in Central Europe would not of itself affect the military situation decisively, assuming nuclear weapons can be stationed in the Low Countries and France. It *would* create a psychological and political imbalance, for the aggressor would retain his full nuclear arsenal, while the area most menaced would be without the ability to retaliate. In these circumstances the Soviet Union may be encouraged to threaten Central Europe and to attempt to split the Western alliance by appealing to the countries controlling nuclear weapons that the issue was not “worth” a nuclear war. Moreover, once a denuclearized zone is established, it will be difficult to deal with Soviet pressures to expand it to include eventually the entire Continent.

As long as the West bases its defense so heavily on nuclear weapons, it will be difficult for us to convince our allies that their security will not be jeopardized if they must rely on foreign weapons, stationed on foreign territory and under foreign control. After all, the British deterrent has been justified explicitly as necessary for contingencies where the United States might be reluctant to engage itself. The different approaches to the cur-

rent crisis within the Western alliance should cause us to have sympathy for the reluctance of countries even more immediately threatened than Great Britain to depend solely on weapons based far away and in the use of which they have no voice.

The question then becomes: Can one create such a sense of unity in the Western alliance that certain areas can be stripped of nuclear weapons without giving our allies a sense of impotence and without encouraging pressure by the Soviet Union? One scheme that deserves examination would be to create an E.D.C. for atomic weapons, with Germany a member. Each partner would have a voice in the use of these weapons wherever they might be stationed. Such a grouping might then negotiate about the location of its common arms in return for sharp reductions of Soviet power in Eastern Europe. The areas without nuclear weapons might feel protected by the voice they have in the control of *common* weapons.

Similar principles could be applied to other arms control schemes. For example, a ceiling could be placed on NATO forces between the Rhine and the Eastern frontiers of the Federal Republic and on Warsaw Pact forces in the East German satellite so that the two military establishments would be substantially equal in number. Or else NATO and Soviet forces could withdraw, say 100 miles, from the Elbe. A control system could be established between the Rhine and the Oder. But we must be frank enough with ourselves to admit that these schemes are in the realm of expedients and almost completely irrelevant to the real security problem in Europe. They will create a false impression of progress while leaving the basic situation unchanged. And any redeployment of NATO forces should be accompanied by a striving for greater unity expressed in concrete institutions. Verbal reassurances are not sufficient to remove the sense of insecurity of our European allies.

Would the withdrawal of foreign forces from Germany represent a means to achieve unification? It is thought by some that since the East German régime is maintained by Soviet troops, a mutual withdrawal would bring about the collapse or at least the liberalization of the East German satellite. The establishment of a zone of controlled armaments, followed by the withdrawal of American, British and Soviet forces, should be accompanied, it is said, by "some form of negotiation" between the Federal Republic and the East German satellite. This would, in an undefined

manner, bring the two régimes closer together and lead to reunification on the basis of some kind of free elections at an unspecified future date.⁷

It would seem incumbent on anyone advocating this to give some indication of the nature of the contact between the two parts of Germany and the manner in which it is supposed to reduce the gap between the two systems. As has been seen above, too much should not be made of the liberalization of Poland as a clue to development in East Germany. The East German Communists have at their disposal the apparatus of a police state. And the Kremlin has said repeatedly that it would intervene in case of an upheaval,⁸ in which case the involvement of the Federal Republic is extremely probable. At the very least, the two German governments, if left to their own devices, would find themselves under nearly irresistible pressure to subvert each other. In turn, the Soviet satellites would be tempted to exacerbate the rivalry, for to them a divided Germany will for a long time seem the best guarantee of safety. Thus many arms-control schemes that would work along the borders of a unified Germany would prove ineffective or dangerous in the center of a divided country.

If, then, reunification is of such central importance, can it be purchased at the price of the neutralization of Germany? Should the West give up its demand that a unified Germany be free to determine its own relationship to NATO and agree to the Soviet proposal that Germany be forbidden to enter military alliances?

Many in the West advocate neutralization because they believe that once Germany supplies the preponderance of the shield forces of NATO it will be strong enough to make its own arrangement with the Soviet Union. According to this line of reasoning, it would be wiser to anticipate this eventuality by offering a withdrawal which may soon be exacted from us. For if the Western alliance ever appears as the obstacle to German unification it will lose its attraction for Germany.⁹ Others argue that the Soviet Union will never tolerate the liberalization of satellite régimes as

⁷ See Denis Healy, "Disengagement and German Reunification," *The New Leader*, March 20, 1959.

⁸ To be sure, Khrushchev has qualified this by saying that Soviet troops would intervene only if called by socialist leaders or if the upheavals were inspired from the outside. Some Communist functionary can be certain to ask for assistance on the model of Kadar; and as Hungary and Tibet have proved, uprisings against Communist rule are considered by definition to be inspired from the outside.

⁹ See, for example, Fritz Erler, "The Reunification of Germany and Security for Europe," *World Politics*, April 1958.

long as there is a danger that the new government may join NATO.

Of course, the fact that German troops will soon comprise the largest element of a force which is itself too small is not an argument for weakening it even further by the withdrawal of Western forces. And if the Soviet Union's intervention in Hungary was caused by the fear that the former satellite might join NATO, then let it be proposed that Hungary rather than Germany be neutralized.

Nevertheless, a proposal to neutralize Germany in return for unification has tempting aspects, since unification would undoubtedly contribute to political stability in Europe. Even if rejected, such an offer would demonstrate once and for all that German membership in NATO is a response to Soviet intransigence. The temptation is all the greater when it is considered that were Moscow ever itself to make such an offer it would be next to impossible for a German government to refuse.

It is important to be clear, however, as to what is meant by neutralization. It could mean that Germany would leave NATO and Western troops withdraw from the Federal Republic, while Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary would leave the Warsaw Pact and Soviet forces retire from these countries. Or it could mean the departure of Soviet troops into Poland only. It could involve a limitation of German forces so severe as to render Germany defenseless; it could apply to limitations only in certain categories of forces; or it could permit Germany to maintain its defense by whatever forces it considered necessary, provided it was not part of a military alliance.

If Soviet troops retire only to Poland and if German forces are limited along the lines of the Soviet proposals in the draft peace treaty, Russia would be able to exert an enormous pressure on an independent Germany. With self-defense against Soviet attack impossible, Soviet influence would be likely to grow relative to the West even if NATO could be satisfactorily based in the Low Countries and France—a possibility which, in the absence of careful study, cannot be taken for granted. On the other hand, Germany's capability to protect herself against a Soviet attack might increase European tensions. A militarily strong Germany without the restraints of NATO would surely disquiet the Soviet satellites and drive them closer to the Soviet Union, thereby increasing the cohesion of the Eastern bloc.

The most persuasive scheme has therefore coupled the neutralization of Germany with that of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary—the original Gaitskell plan. No doubt such a scheme involves a diminution of Western military security. At the same time, the end of the division of Germany would be an undoubted political gain. A great deal would depend on the ability of NATO to maintain a substantial military establishment in Western Europe to back up Germany. For in the absence of that establishment, the defense of the Continent would rest entirely on the American retaliatory power. And it simply does not make sense to assume that a deterrent which is losing its credibility under present circumstances would serve to protect areas never part of the Western defense system or from which U. S. troops have been withdrawn. Would we have resisted even in Korea if all-out war had been our only recourse?

At the same time, a neutral belt presents difficulties transcending the purely military. The notion that Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary would constitute a single bloc under the common guarantee of the Western powers and the Soviet Union hides great complexities. The memory of World War II and its aftermath would seem to insure that the territory to be neutralized would be unlikely to think of itself as a unit. The politics of Germany on the one hand and Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary on the other are more likely to be characterized by distrust if not animosity than by coöperation. In such a situation guarantee arrangements offer endless opportunities for interference. For a guarantee defines a right of intervention as well as a means to resist aggression—indeed Mr. Erler would grant a unilateral right in order to eliminate a Soviet veto.

Soviet pressure on Germany to “safeguard its neutrality” could be prevented only by a tacit understanding which placed Germany under the protection of NATO and the East European satellites under that of the Warsaw Pact. The practical result of the neutral belt then would be either Soviet domination of Central Europe or a situation envisaged in the scheme outlined earlier: the Oder as the dividing line between NATO and the Warsaw Pact with a zone of controlled armaments on both sides to reduce the danger of surprise attack. An explicit arrangement to that effect would accomplish all the security objectives of neutralization without the political dangers of legitimizing Soviet pressure on a reunited Germany.

Moreover, the West ought to be clear about the political hazards of a decision to negotiate about the military neutralization of Germany. It may create a precedent where, under the guise of expanding the neutral belt, the United States is gradually pushed out of Europe. It may lay the basis for destroying all the achievements of European integration. The Soviet Union with its belief in the predominance of "objective" social forces is unlikely to be content with military neutralization. The Kremlin, which attacked both the Marshall Plan and the Common Market as "aggressive imperialism," has in its draft peace treaty already proposed that Germany should not be permitted to be part of any arrangement not also signed by the U.S.S.R.—a clause which spells the doom of European integration. Another danger to guard against is that the Soviet Union, having accepted the "principle" of neutrality, might gain the benefits of neutralization without paying the price of unification, simply by stalling interminably during the technical negotiations.

Finally, it is important to remember that Germany is the last country which should be encouraged to be "flexible." Germany's attempt to pursue an isolated policy in the center of the Continent has brought disaster to Europe twice in a generation. If it is once more placed in the position to make arrangements with both sides—the political expression of neutrality—it will also be capable of menacing both sides, if only by the threat of a change of front. Such a Germany would hardly be conducive to peace and stability in Europe. Western policy must seek to retain Germany as a willing member of European political and economic institutions, whatever the ultimate security arrangements.¹⁰

A neutral belt, then, is an extremely risky course. It is conceivable only in these circumstances: (1) If it is made part of a satisfactory plan for German unification on the basis of free elections. (2) If a careful study shows that substantial United States and British forces can be stationed in the Low Countries and France; for otherwise the "neutral belt" would within a measurable time become a political appendage of the Soviet Union. (3) If a time limit is placed on the negotiations; for otherwise the Soviet Union will be able to achieve the paralysis of NATO and the end of

¹⁰ Against this background the rigidity for which Chancellor Adenauer has recently been criticized may have been his greatest contribution to European stability and at worst may have reflected the defects of his virtues: his refusal to take advantage of the possibility of a policy of petty manoeuvre inherent in Germany's history and geographic situation; and his insistence on gaining Germany a reputation for reliability.

European integration merely by engaging in endless negotiations. (4) If there is firm agreement among the Western allies that neutralization applies only to military relationships and that German economic and political ties to the other European countries cannot be sacrificed and may be extended; for if German unity is purchased at the price of European integration, the West would have cast away the fruits of the most helpful and constructive policy it has conducted since World War II. (5) If the remaining countries of NATO are confident that they can resist Soviet and domestic pressures against expanding the neutral zone to include all of Europe. (6) If Germany accepts such an arrangement and does not consider it desertion by its allies.

To state these conditions is to recognize the extremely hazardous nature of the proposals for a neutral belt. Such a course might be adopted by a cohesive, self-confident alliance, but not by one divided by doubts and lack of purpose. If it is nevertheless embarked upon, it should be without illusions and without begging all the principal questions. If, on the other hand, the goal is genuine stability, then we should strive for a demarcation line on the Oder, with Warsaw Pact and NATO forces withdrawn an equal distance, leaving a buffer zone manned by balanced German and Polish-Czechoslovak defensive forces under a system of inspection.

V

Yet we face the problem that the Soviet Union is likely to reject any proposal compatible with our values and interests. In that case it is essential that we be prepared to admit failure and make neither agreement nor negotiation an end in itself. The reaction should be a closing of ranks and not a repetition of the recriminations of the past six months. The West must understand that its lack of cohesion is the deepest cause for the absence of flexibility; that the refusal to face strategic facts has created the weakness which has invited Soviet pressures; that we have relatively little control over Soviet purposes but a duty to articulate our own.

The West should not permit itself to be hypnotized by the Soviet challenge. There is much scope for creativity in the West and in areas where the sole requirements are not Soviet coöperation but our own imagination and dynamism, such as strengthening the West's internal relationships and those with the emergent nations. In particular, it seems time to examine carefully the possibility of creating some federal institutions embracing the entire

North Atlantic community, however attenuated these may be at first. For the West, which first developed the nation state, is also the area where its limitations are most dramatically apparent. No country of the North Atlantic Community can solve its problems or realize its opportunities in isolation. The Western effort in the newly independent states will be haphazard if each member of the Community develops its own program in the absence of any over-all conception. The security problem is insoluble on a basis of individual national sovereignties. For it will create constant temptations to purchase immunity by neutrality, or at least by shifting the major effort and risk to some other member of the alliance. Europe must find in the North Atlantic Community an outlet for the energy and vision that in previous centuries projected it into ventures overseas. And it can find security only if the Community thinks of itself increasingly as a unit.

As long as the West lacks direction and cohesion, the Soviet Union will be able to shift all disputes to our side of the line. The West will continue to be asked to "solve" problems which the Soviet Union creates and to applaud as a compromise a willingness on the part of the Russians to settle for something less than originally demanded. Indeed our eagerness to justify negotiations often leads us to see concessions in purely formal Soviet moves or a mere Soviet restraint from abusive language. Thus when President Eisenhower indicated his willingness to attend a summit conference, he explained that the Soviet note of March 2 had been "more reasonable," even though the note reiterated all the demands which had produced the crisis. Its only "concession" was to drop the demand for an immediate summit conference. Similarly, Gromyko's failure to insist on his proposal to seat the East Germans at the conference table at Geneva was greeted in the Western press as a "victory." In fact, the Soviets achieved their basic purpose: when East and West German delegations joined the foreign minister's conference as advisors an important step was taken towards giving the East German satellite the same international status as the Federal Republic and to lend color to the claim that unification should be settled by the two German régimes directly. In this manner, the Soviet leaders can draw a double advantage from intransigence: they can increase the uneasiness of the West by an extreme statement and then gain a reputation for being conciliatory by retreating to a position still considerably in advance of their starting point.

The confusion of negotiating technique with purpose causes the diplomatic debate to be confined to issues of maximum embarrassment to the West—issues, that is, which the Soviet Union has raised and on which the West feels obliged to negotiate because, as the saying goes, no avenue of settlement must be neglected and because the mere readiness of the Soviet to talk about anything is considered “encouraging.” Conversely, the West is deterred from raising issues of possible embarrassment to the Soviet Union because, it is said, such a course would destroy the climate of confidence. Diplomacy thereby becomes a form of Soviet political warfare. For if we can negotiate only on issues that the Soviet leaders have declared as soluble, it is not surprising that the attention of the world is focussed on the symptoms rather than the causes of the difficulties: on NATO, but not the Soviet hostility which produced it; on the all-too-inadequate Western defense effort, but not on the preponderant Soviet strength which called it forth; on the dangers to peace in case of another satellite upheaval, but not on the Soviet repression without which the danger of upheaval would not exist. The illusion is created that the cold war can be ended by proclamation.

The formalism of the Western approach to negotiations raises the question whether the real difficulty of the West is not the absence of moral assurance. Too often the laudable tendency to see the other point of view is carried to the point of refusing to make any moral distinctions. This leads to the preposterous argument that the brutalities of Stalin were due to the refusal to admit Russia into the League of Nations in 1923 and the current hostility of Khrushchev to the failure to accept the Soviet disarmament package of May 10, 1955.¹¹ NATO is equated with the Warsaw Pact; the British landing in Egypt with the Soviet repression of Hungary; our overseas bases with the satellite orbit. And in some pronouncements Chancellor Adenauer is dealt with more harshly than Mr. Khrushchev and accused of wanting German unification only as an issue but not in reality.¹²

Some of these reactions express the understandable fear that to admit claims to superior moral values would lead to the demand for a crusade and thus to nuclear war—an attitude not dissimilar to that of many serious people towards Hitler in the 1930s. “I also

¹¹ See broadcast by Philip Noel-Baker, the Norwegian Broadcasting Company, reprinted by the New England Regional Offices, American Friends Service Committee.

¹² See for example an appeal by Norman Thomas signed by a number of eminent Americans, *The New York Times*, May 8, 1959, p. 15.

agree in welcoming so far as Europe is concerned the attempt of the Government to establish contact with the rulers of Germany," a British Labor leader said in 1937. "Any attempt to separate the sheep from the goats and to have the world divided in two or more camps based upon ideological grounds would be absolutely fatal to the future welfare of mankind."¹³

Others are reacting against the popular tendency to see complicated political problems in absolute terms of black or white and to identify policy with the amassing of military force. But in attacking such over-simplification, many critics run the risk of reducing all issues to a single shade of grey. Surely we can avoid self-righteousness without falling into a fastidiousness which comes close to spiritual pride. And opposition to viewing all issues as military need not go so far as to deny in effect that a serious security problem exists. The tendency to equate our moral shortcomings with those of the Soviet bloc deprives the West of the inward assurance required to negotiate effectively. It leads to a policy of the guilty conscience.

So long as it is lacking in strong convictions, the West finds it increasingly difficult to deal with the problem of conjecture in foreign policy. Policy must always be based on an assessment of the future course of events or the intentions of other countries or even merely the limits of the possible. Since inaction may bring catastrophe, it sometimes happens that some measure must be taken even though it is based on evaluations about which we cannot be certain. And by the same token, difficult decisions can always be avoided by making the most favorable assessment of the relevant situation. Had the West stood up to Hitler in 1936, there would probably still be dispute as to whether he was a misunderstood nationalist or in fact represented a danger to world peace. "Herr Hitler's statement [offering to negotiate]," said Arthur Henderson after German troops reoccupied the Rhineland, "ought to be taken at face value. Herr Hitler made a statement sinning with one hand but holding out the olive branch with the other which ought to be taken at face value. These may prove to be the most important gestures yet made. . . . It is idle to say these statements were insincere. . . . The dominant problem is peace and not defence."¹⁴

In the months ahead the argument will be made that since both

¹³ *Hansard* 330, December 21, 1937, col. 1841.

¹⁴ *Hansard* 309, March 10, 1936, col. 1976-77.

we and the Soviets have put forward unacceptable proposals the correct solution is a compromise somewhere in the middle—even though this merely evades responsibility for judging the substance of various proposals and further encourages the Soviets to make extreme offers for purposes of compromise. It will also be urged that the West has an obligation to break a deadlock by bringing forward new proposals—even though such a principle encourages Soviet intransigence by giving rise to the belief that if Soviet negotiators hold out long enough they will elicit ever more favorable offers.

Negotiations are essential. But it is important to conduct them without illusions. We do not need to believe in a basic Soviet transformation in order to believe in the possibility of a settlement. Nor is it a prerequisite to successful negotiation to pretend that a relaxation of tensions is entirely within Western control. If the Soviet Union obtains only half of its demands on Berlin, this is not a compromise but a fundamental and perhaps fatal weakening of the Western position. The West must have a much more serious goal than to divine the Soviet intent. We do ourselves an injustice if we make an issue of the desirability of relaxing tensions or of ending the cold war. We have no time to argue about the obvious. The task before the West is not to prove the desirability of peace—which should be taken for granted—but to determine what are the possibilities of a settlement which does not hazard our security and is consistent with our values.

MAO, MARX AND MOSCOW

By G. F. Hudson

ACCORDING to Marxist theory, mankind advances by evolutionary stages along a predetermined historical road. From feudalism the way forward is to capitalism, thence to socialism and finally to Communism. The main theoretical difference between the two last stages is that under socialism each man is to receive "according to his work," whereas under Communism each will receive "according to his needs." Communism in this narrow sense cannot be the immediate goal of a Communist Party when it captures power from a social and political order based on private property, but it must become so when the Party claims to have "built a socialist society." It is the claim of the Russian Communists, announced officially by Khrushchev at the Twenty-first Party Congress in January of this year, that this has now happened in the Soviet Union and that "having built a socialist society, the Soviet people has entered the new stage of historical development in which socialism develops into Communism."

In making this claim, however, Khrushchev was careful to add that the transition was "a natural historic process which cannot be intentionally violated or bypassed." This warning was no doubt in part addressed to "some comrades" in the Soviet Union whom he represented as asking why it was not possible to move on to the Communist society more quickly; but in the circumstances of the Congress, less than six months after the official establishment of communes in China, it could be taken only as an implied rebuke also to the Communist Party of China for trying to create in advance of the Soviet Union a new institution destined to be the "basic organ" of a future Communist society. It is true that Khrushchev declared at the same time that "we are in full and complete agreement with the fraternal Communist Party of China, though its methods of building socialism are in many ways dissimilar to ours," and that Chou En-lai in his speech as Chinese fraternal delegate to the Congress spoke only of "building socialism" in China and made no mention of the wider claims which had been put forward on behalf of the communes. Nevertheless, the establishment of the Chinese communes had raised for the first time a question between the Soviet Union and China,

not of any clash of national interests, but of primacy in advance towards the common ideological goal of the two Communist party-states. It also created a situation in which the world had to recognize for the first time that Communist China was set on a course more extreme and more uncompromising towards Western democratic and liberal values than that of the Soviet Union.

When, 32 years after the Bolshevik capture of power in Russia, Mao Tse-tung set up his Central People's Government in Peking, there were many observers of Far Eastern affairs who predicted that the Chinese, with their great national pride, their sense of belonging to the origins of civilization and their awareness of being the most populous nation in the world, would soon dispense with Russian guidance and would strike out on a line of their own in the theory and practice of the faith which they had derived from Europe by way of Moscow. But the assumption usually was that the modification of Marxism-Leninism would be in the direction of making it more moderate, more reasonable and more humane than it had been in its Russian version; it was not anticipated that the Chinese would make of it something even more fanatical, intolerant and ruthless.

For a long time appearances were in favor of the view that the Chinese Communists stood for a relatively mild variety of the doctrine. Their tactics during the prolonged guerrilla phase of their movement in the rural areas caused many people in the West to believe that they were not "real" Communists at all, but mere "agrarian reformers;" later, their temporary benevolence towards the "national bourgeoisie" made them look more like Social Democrats than Bolsheviks. The appalling mass executions of "counter-revolutionaries" in 1952 were an unpleasant revelation of the régime's capacity for rule by terror, but still it could be held that this was a special phase due to the war in Korea, and from 1953 to 1958 there were developments which were generally taken as signs of a relatively liberal trend in Chinese Communism. Collectivization in the countryside was carried out apparently without any of the tension and violence which had marked its enforcement in Russia two and a half decades earlier; private commercial and industrial enterprise was liquidated by methods which seemed to involve a minimum of economic dislocation or hardship to the former owners of property; and the intelligentsia was nominally accorded rights of freedom of speech by the enunciation of the "hundred flowers"

principle. Early in 1957 Mao Tse-tung created a sensation by his speech, first made known within the Party and later published, in which he distinguished between "contradictions with the enemy" and "contradictions among the people" which were "non-antagonistic" and should be resolved without the use of coercion.

Yet the year 1958 saw a tremendous intensification of revolutionary zeal in China, with accompanying pressure on the masses of the people in the name of the "big leap forward:" a vast mobilization of labor on military lines, an unprecedented disruption of family life and a vigorous endeavor to substitute "free supply" of food and other necessities of life for the payment of wages in money. This drive for rapid increases in production was accompanied by a deluge of propaganda and exhortation, by reckless inflation both of targets and claims, and by drastic suppression of every sign of opposition or resistance. In foreign affairs the new course was marked by notable manifestations of truculence—in the campaign against Titoism, which went far beyond the renewed hostility of the Soviet government towards Yugoslavia; in the Chinese intervention which thwarted the project for a summit conference on Middle East affairs "within the framework" of the United Nations; and in the military action against Quemoy shortly after Khrushchev's visit to Peking. By the end of the year there had been a certain slowing of the tempo; the published resolution of the Central Committee meeting held in Wuhan had toned down the original program for the communes and rebuked local cadres for exceeding instructions, while the offensive against Quemoy had petered out mainly on account of the Communists' failure to win command of the air from the American-equipped Nationalists. But Communist China remained committed to the communes as a system of economic and administrative organization and to a period of superhuman effort, sacrifice and discipline for the whole Chinese people in the cause of high-speed industrialization. In this situation there also remained an element of discrepancy and potential conflict with the policies of Moscow.

II

In order to understand how this has come about it is necessary always to bear in mind the difference of generations between Russia and China as Communist-governed countries. The Russian people have been under Communist rule for 41 years since

the October Revolution—or for 38 years if the régime is dated from the end of the civil war. Thus the great majority of Russians today are men and women who have grown up under the Soviet system and been educated in its principles, who have never known any other conditions, and take their present environment more or less for granted. The same is true of the Party leaders. The “Old Bolsheviks” are almost extinct; Stalin’s purges strongly reinforced natural mortality in wiping them out, and in their place have arisen men of a new generation for whom the Soviet system has always been the established order of things and membership in the Party the one and only road to a successful career. Men who have come to the top in this way may believe in the truth of the doctrine they have been taught, they may have a strong sense of their vested interest in the maintenance of the Party dictatorship, their outlook on world affairs may be conditioned by the basic Marxist-Leninist conception of irreconcilable class struggle, but they cannot be expected to have the revolutionary passion and fervor of those who originally made the Revolution.

Most recent observers of Russia have remarked on the waning of the old fanaticism, the spread of a mood which is not discontented with the régime so much as cynically disenchanted with it. Preoccupation with jobs and incomes is in a truly bourgeois spirit. Khrushchev may talk about the revival of Leninism and the transition to the higher stage of the true Communist society, but there is little sign that the upper and middle strata of the new social order are yearning for a utopia of perfect equality and collective living; they are much more concerned with climbing the ladder of success under a system of quasi-capitalist incentives and getting the good things of life for themselves and their families. Such starry-eyed “idealists” as there may be are to be found mainly among young people who take seriously the faith they are officially taught and who do not see their elders living up to it.

By contrast to this situation, China is still possessed by the ardors and agonies of a genuinely revolutionary epoch. On the one hand, adult Chinese in the greater part of the country have not been under Communist rule for more than ten years; they require a vast amount of persuasion, indoctrination and compulsion in order to make them submit to the purposes of their rulers. On the other hand, among the Communists themselves

revolutionary zeal still burns with a hot and consuming flame; most of the top leaders and principal local cadres are veterans of the Kiangsi and Yen-an days who shared the hazards and hardships of underground conspiracy and civil war. Chief among them is Mao Tse-tung himself who has been supreme in the Party since 1935 and led it to the final conquest of mainland China in 1949. Communist China is thus governed by men of the original revolutionary generation, not by their successors; the analogy is not with Khrushchev's Russia, but with the Russia of the late twenties.

Similarly, the "big leap forward" of contemporary China corresponds to the Soviet Union's intensive economic effort under the first Five Year Plan, when the Russians, in the words of one foreign observer at the time, were "starving themselves great." The analogy is not a matter of accident; it arises from the inherent need for a Communist régime in an economically underdeveloped country to effect, within a few years of its initial capture of power, a decisive "breakthrough" in the task of industrialization. The further a country's economy has lagged behind the general advance of industrial nations, the greater the effort needed. This effort in a Communist state cannot be left to private capital accumulation, since the bourgeoisie has been either liquidated or reduced to a condition in which it has no incentives for serious saving or investment. Nor can the state rely on international capital investments and loans except from other Communist countries. The task can be undertaken only with funds taken out of current revenue, and this must necessarily involve a period of strain, sacrifice and ill-rewarded work for the whole people.

A Communist government would be ill advised to undertake too grandiose a program of economic construction immediately after it captured power; it needs time for consolidation, administrative reorganization and the training of cadres. Meanwhile it can probably assure some degree of prosperity by the mere restoration of peace and order after a period of foreign and civil war. On the other hand, it is dangerous for a Communist government to postpone its big push for too long, for this will lead either to stagnation or to a revival of capitalism, resulting in discouragement and decline of morale within the Party.

Within about a decade of its initial revolution, therefore, the Party must strive to make the industrial breakthrough. Inten-

sive propaganda is needed to persuade the people of the benefits accruing in the future if sacrifices are willingly accepted in the present. Even so there is bound to be discontent; it must be suppressed ruthlessly. Party discipline must be tightened and among all believers a militant, fanatical enthusiasm must be aroused if the objectives set by the leadership are to be achieved. Collectivization in agriculture is indispensable at this stage, not merely because of the pressure for liquidating private enterprise in all sectors of the economy, but also because of the necessity of extracting food from the peasants for the support of the urban population. What takes place in such a period is a revolution from above, not a popular upheaval; the masses are dragooned rather than led, but the revolutionary *élan* and militant faith within the Party itself is raised to the highest pitch.

III

There are two notable differences between the current phase in China and the Russia of 1928–33. The first is that the founder of the Soviet régime died before the Russian Communists had to face the crucial issue of industrialization; had Lenin lived, he might perhaps have been somewhat less heavy-handed than Stalin in collectivizing the peasantry, but the essential characteristics of the early years of industrial planning would hardly have been different from what they were. In China, Mao Tse-tung has maintained a continuity of personal leadership from the days of insurrection and guerrilla warfare in remote rural areas to the gigantic nation-wide mobilization, which was intended to transform China into a highly industrial country in the course of a few years. The Chinese Lenin has become a Stalin.

The other difference lies in the fact that the social crisis has come in China, not with collectivization, but with the establishment of the communes. But the contrast here is more apparent than real, because in China it is with the communes rather than with the preceding collectivization that the peasants have been put under the harrow, as they were in Russia at the end of the twenties. Only recently it was regarded as the most remarkable achievement of the Chinese Communists that they had carried out collectivization without provoking the widespread, violent resistance which had been met with in Russia. The Chinese had indeed been far less abrupt than the Russians in introducing the collective farm system; the peasants were pushed along from

private ownership to collectivism through a series of intermediate stages, and various inducements were provided to make the collectives initially attractive to those who were being in effect deprived of their land. But this relatively painless expropriation had the disadvantage that it did not sufficiently transform the peasant into what the grand project of industrialization required him to be—a serf working on the land at a minimum standard of living to sustain the vast industrial edifice being built over his head. The final transformation has been accomplished only with the introduction of the communes.

The communes, of course, have gone further than Russian collectivization ever did. With their merging of rural economic units with local state administration, their adoption of a form of military discipline over their members, and their assignment of labor to agriculture, industry or building construction according to the requirements of the planners, China's Communist rulers have achieved a degree of control over their labor force such as not even Stalin was able to attain. Further, the attempt to make distribution in kind the main form of payment to commune members—the system of so-called “free supply”—represents an ambitious move towards the moneyless utopia of pure Communism. Moreover, this occurs at a time when the trend in Russia is in just the opposite direction, toward larger cash incomes for collective farmers.

In all this there has not necessarily been any intention on the part of the Chinese leaders to challenge the Soviet Union or develop policies in rivalry with Moscow. But the emergence in China of forms of Communist practice different from those of Russia, and at least superficially approaching more closely the ultimate Marxist ideal, cannot fail to be embarrassing to the men of the Kremlin and disturbing to their relations with other Communist Parties.

Moreover, the policy of the “big leap forward” in China has been accompanied by an exaltation of spirit which has caused the Chinese Communists to regard themselves as the special guardians of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. This tendency is not in itself disruptive; on the contrary, it leads the Chinese to lay special emphasis on the need for the international solidarity of Communist states and on the Soviet Union's right to leadership of the bloc in world affairs—an attitude which would seem to give the fullest satisfaction to the aspirations of the Soviet rulers.

This deference to Russia, however, is conditional on Moscow's adherence to doctrinal orthodoxy as the Chinese interpret it; it is based on the assumption that Russia will actively oppose all forms of heresy, and particularly "revisionism."

IV

The Chinese campaign against revisionism since the middle of 1957 has its origins in domestic politics—the sharp turn against the "bourgeois Rightists" in China after the great proliferation of "poisonous weeds" in the period of relatively free speech. The Rightists were represented as an offshoot of the world-wide heresy of revisionism which had its headquarters in Belgrade. There were certainly admirers of Tito on the fellow-travelling fringe of the Communist Party and even among Party members, so that it was essential in preparation for the "big leap forward" to discredit Titoism and remove all doubts about the wisdom of the course that was being followed in China. It was, however, impossible to make an all-out attack on Titoism without indirectly blaming Khrushchev for the situation which had arisen in the Communist world. Was it not because of his reckless action in rehabilitating Tito without insisting on any conditions for it that the Yugoslav deviation had become respectable, Marxist-Leninist stalwarts thrown into confusion and the all-important line between the true faith and revisionism blurred?

The Chinese Communists had always faithfully followed the Cominform line on Tito since Stalin's break with him in 1948. They also acquiesced—but without enthusiasm—in Khrushchev's move for reconciliation, although they had not been consulted beforehand. When it became clear that Tito would not mend his ways as a result of Russia's forgiveness, the Chinese attitude towards him became increasingly critical. There is some doubt as to the extent of Chinese initiative in the revival of Communist-bloc hostility to Yugoslavia in the spring of 1958, but the Chinese polemic was more violent and uncompromising than the Russian. And although Khrushchev is said to have warned Tito that he would have to attack him politically if he persisted in his attitude to the Soviet Union, it was difficult for Khrushchev to admit that his policy of winning over Tito had failed. Up to the eleventh hour he kept on giving him opportunities for recantation. When Soviet publicity finally turned to denouncing Tito, it seemed merely to be following in the wake of the earlier

and stronger Chinese attack on him. Once more the line between orthodoxy and heresy was clearly drawn, and this had the appearance of a victory for Chinese zeal after a period of Soviet opportunism and indecision.

The new campaign against Tito, though involving international relations, was an internal affair of the Communist world not directly involving the relations of Russia or China with the West. But in this sphere also there were signs during 1958 that China was pressing Russia towards a more truculent and bellicose policy than the Kremlin was itself inclined to pursue. At the time of the Middle East crisis in July 1958, the language of Peking was more inflammatory than that of Moscow, and the Chinese threat to send "volunteers" to the aid of the Arabs was not endorsed by the Soviet Union. It could, of course, be argued in explanation that the Chinese, being far away from the scene of action, could afford to talk more loudly than the Russians, whose proximity to Syria and Iraq made some caution advisable if they were not to get themselves into a position from which they could not withdraw without serious loss of prestige.

Chinese bellicosity was not, however, confined to empty gestures of hostility towards the United States and Britain for alleged imperialistic aggression in the Middle East. Hardly had the crisis over Lebanon and Jordan subsided than a new one was created by the Chinese Communist bombardment of Quemoy. This began shortly after Khrushchev's visit to Peking, which, although the reasons for it cannot be known for certain, was most probably occasioned by a Chinese protest at the way in which Russia was proposing to seek a settlement of the Middle East crisis through a summit conference. India was to be included, but not China; and if the Security Council was brought into it, as then seemed likely, the Taipei government would have participated as representing China. It may reasonably be supposed that, in order to placate an angry Mao, Khrushchev promised to support a military action against Quemoy; at any rate, the Soviet government subsequently gave Communist China full diplomatic support on the issue and Khrushchev went so far as to address to President Eisenhower the threatening letter which he refused to receive. The Quemoy fighting did not develop into a major clash. It was, nevertheless, a serious military challenge, for if events had followed the course which seemed likely at the outset, Quemoy would have been entirely cut off from supplies by

sea or air and gradually softened up for capture by assault. The United States would then have had to face the critical decision whether to intervene directly to save the island or allow it to fall, with consequent disastrous effects on the morale of the Nationalist Chinese and of other Asians looking to America for protection. That this point of crisis was never reached was due to the unexpectedly effective performance of the Nationalist air force with its new American equipment and the great improvement in the supply convoy system achieved by the Nationalists with American technical advice. It should be recognized, however, that the Chinese Communists were ready to risk hostilities with the United States.

Until we see how the Soviet Union is going to behave on the Berlin issue during the next few months, we cannot say with any assurance that Chinese foreign policy in its current phase is more aggressive than Russian. But there can be no doubt that Peking at present has a greater need than Moscow for external tension as an aid to its domestic policy. Both the Middle East and Formosa crises last year were abundantly exploited in China for working up anti-imperialistic emotions, inducing a sense of national danger and rallying the people behind the government. During the crisis in Lebanon and Jordan, monster demonstrations were organized all over China, and particularly outside the British Embassy in Peking, to protest against Western actions, which were represented as part of an imperialist conspiracy threatening all Asian peoples. After the beginning of the Quemoy crisis the tension was used as a pretext for the establishment of a militia system in all the communes; the theory was to make every man a soldier for local defense against a foreign invader, but in fact the bearing of arms was normally confined to selected groups of young people regarded as politically reliable and charged with coercing recalcitrant elements in the villages. The militarization of the bulk of the peasants consisted mainly in their being subjected to military discipline for their ordinary work; they were summoned to work in the fields by bugles and marched to and fro under orders in military formation. A government decree in September expressly demanded that economic life be combined with preparation for war:

The highest state conference has appealed to all levels of the population for the mobilization of all forces as an answer to the imperialist provocation and intrigues. Our five hundred million peasants must be ready to answer this

appeal. They must create at one and the same time a strong agricultural organization and strong militia detachments for the defence of the homeland.¹

It may be held that the aggravation of external conflicts is so obviously designed to further the ends of domestic politics that it does not afford any real threat to the peace of the world. But the question of Formosa remains of vital importance to the régime because it cannot be secure as long as it continues to be challenged by another Chinese government on Chinese soil. The greater the unrest caused on the mainland by the rigors of the present phase of Communism, the greater the need for Mao Tse-tung to destroy the Nationalists in their island stronghold. There are signs of preparations for a new and more formidable offensive against Quemoy, which would certainly be followed by an assault on Formosa itself. Such a move might come at a moment of crisis in European affairs arising out of a deadlock over Berlin. The Soviet government might encourage Chinese military action in the Far East as a diversion and means of disrupting the Western powers, which are much more divided over the question of Formosa than of Europe or the Middle East. But fresh hostilities in the Far East might easily develop further than the Soviet Union intended or wished. Even if the Russians were to counsel restraint, the Chinese might calculate that Moscow would have to back them up in order to avert a defeat which might lead to the collapse of the régime.

v

On the question of the communes, Russia and China appear to have reached a *modus vivendi*, but without real agreement on the fundamental issue. The Soviet dislike of the new Chinese venture and its ideological implications was shown during the latter part of 1958 by an eloquent absence of any comment in the Soviet press, but in private or semi-private conversations Soviet leaders expressed their antipathy. Khrushchev told Senator Humphrey that the Chinese communes were "old-fashioned" and Mikoyan on his visit to the United States expanded this theme at a seminar at the University of California. He said that the Russians had tried such communes in 1918 and 1919, but had found that they would not work without an economy of abundance which even the Soviet Union had not so far attained—much less China. To some extent the Chinese Communists themselves have indeed

¹ *New China News Agency*, September 9, 1958.

been sobered by experience, as was indicated by the December resolution of the Central Committee blaming some cadres for getting "dizzy with success"—the same words as Stalin used in March 1930, during the crisis of forced collectivization in Russia. The Committee also warned against overwork and excessive interference in family life in the communes. This resolution has been described as "a substantial retreat on two fronts—practically, before the Chinese peasants, and ideologically before Soviet criticism."² The somewhat chastened mood of the Chinese leaders was reflected also in the speech made by Chou En-lai as fraternal delegate to the Soviet Party's Twenty-first Congress; there he said nothing at all provocative towards his Russian hosts. It did not pass without notice that shortly afterwards Peking was able to announce an agreement for the largest amount of economic aid so far granted by the Soviet Union to China, and it may be that this aid was made conditional on the demonstration by China of a proper respect for the more "advanced" social development of Russia. Khrushchev was able to declare at the Congress—without being contradicted—that the Soviet Union was the first country to enter the period of transition to Communism, and he condescendingly attributed the phenomenon of the Chinese communes—without referring to them by name—to China's "peculiarities in historical development." The fact remains, however, that China has established a system of economic and social organization quite different from Russia's and in some respects nearer to the classic Marxist ideal. This constitutes a challenge to the prestige of Russia as the exemplar of the world Communist movement, even if the leaders in Peking have no will to compete with Russia. It makes China a potential center of attraction to just those Communists in all countries who take their faith most seriously. As the Chinese Communists face the need for more adequate incentives to increase production, they may move closer to Russian practice and lose the fire and fury of the original "upsurge." But they can hardly drop the commune system altogether without the most serious political consequences. The decision to set up communes in China was indeed a parting of the ways, and there is no turning back.

² Richard Lowenthal, in "Shifts and Rifts in the Russo-Chinese Alliance," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1959, p. 23.

THE CHINESE COMMUNES: BIG RISKS FOR BIG GAINS

By Albert Ravenholt

WITHIN the past year Communist China has incorporated some 550,000,000 of its peasants into "people's communes." Now, after a winter and spring of "tidying up" these communes and examining their performance in the face of peasant resistance, the Communist Party has shown this is no mere experiment. The rulers in Peking are committed to them for "transforming rural society through socialism to Communism." A single commune today manages the total activity of several thousand peasant families—sometimes more. Their crops are planted, harvested and stored, or sold to the state, as dictated by the commune. Men and women in a labor platoon may shift from farming to mining coal or processing beans into soya sauce. But the decision is not theirs—it is made by Communist commune managers. They determine how long the peasant will work and his meager compensation. The commune drills him in its "people's militia," selects the movies he is to see, decides what schooling his child shall receive and the gods he may acknowledge. It likewise may tell him when to demolish his house and where he then will live. For these communes are "more than the organizers of production, they are the organizers of a new way of life."

One can hardly overestimate the importance of this monumental human enterprise to the future of Red China. The increased productivity demanded of the communes and the bitter but passive peasant opposition will determine whether the Chinese Communists can rapidly transform their ancient land into an industrial and technologically modern state. Much of the character of the "people's democratic dictatorship" that now governs nearly one-fourth of mankind can be discerned in this grim new institution. Its blueprint for the future is here most concisely delineated. Within that part of the world that takes Marxism-Leninism as its bible the communes are the chief Chinese claim to ideological inventiveness. And the balance of influence between Peking and Moscow will inevitably reflect what happens in the communes.

Neighboring Asians searching for a formula that can guarantee

them speedy progress watch this device for harnessing Chinese manpower with a certain frightened fascination; its success could offer them an example while also posing the greatest single threat to their continued national existence. For the United States and the Western world the tempo of change in Asia with which we must cope may be read in the rapid creation of these Chinese communes and their pace of evolution.

As an arrangement for mobilizing human energy, the communes recall the massive *corvées* that Chinese emperors used to dig the Grand Canal and construct the Great Wall and the coolies who in a modern day chipped the Burma Road out of mountain rock. But today China's rulers, who are digging a second Grand Canal farther inland to link the Yellow and Yangtze Rivers, have become more thorough and total in their demands. No longer is only one of two persons conscripted from each family and sent off for labor service. Rather, the entire society is organized for such performance at home. In the process the Chinese are toiling as these sturdy, patient people never have done before, despite centuries of bending their backs under the carrying pole or over the paddy field. During the past winter shock teams of peasants have labored as much as 36 to 48 hours at a stretch without sleep in furious and often desperate pursuit of production targets. Their rewards are the water conservation works they have extended, the crude blast furnaces erected in the countryside and the rich mud dredged from pond bottoms to fertilize this summer's next "leap forward" campaign in agriculture. And all of this has been done for the benefit of the state, or the "whole people" as the Peking press would phrase it.

Seldom if ever has a comparable portion of the human race experienced so traumatic a recasting of its existence in such a brief time span. The familial economic security that was the core of the Chinese peasant's social system is now denied him, although the biological family is to continue. The Chinese farmer, his wife and working children eat in a communal mess that also has taken his sow, nearly all his chickens, denied him most garden produce and commandeered the family cooking pots. Infants are cared for during the day in communal creches. Older people who now have no one to look after them at home can enter communal "respect-for-the-aged" establishments.

Although the communes are the form in which Red China's rulers say they will cast their future society, they repeatedly

emphasize that this must not be mistaken for Communism. Now only the first "germ" of Communism is available in the form of free food at the communal mess. For the peasant, the critical point is that full provision "for each according to his needs" as defined by some idealistic Communists must wait for the indefinite future. Meanwhile, the meager cash wages depend very much upon the ardor of his labor; commune workers may be classified into eight grades. They can also strive for a bonus. To emphasize this point the Central Committee of China's Communist Party last winter categorically denounced "equalitarianism," or demands for equal sharing, as a "petty-bourgeois trend" that will "adversely affect the development of socialist construction."

Somewhat obliquely the Chinese Communists admit that their cadres made a number of mistakes during the great "push" last autumn to bring up to 120,000,000 families into communes. The election in April 1959 of Liu Shao-chi to succeed Mao Tse-tung as chairman of the People's Republic of China may well be related to a desire inside the Party to tighten control and minimize the "unscientific" haste with which communes were organized. It left Mao Tse-tung, who remains chairman of the Party and the preëminent Chinese Communist, free to cope with the far-reaching theoretical implications of the communes. The younger Liu Shao-chi and his fellow Party stalwarts meanwhile are afforded a firmer hold on the administrative mechanism. The Communist leaders seem to have concluded that the success of their daring venture with the communes depends greatly upon the sensitivity of their organization to events in the countryside. They need to know quickly and accurately just how far and in which direction the peasants can be pushed, and when a bit of relaxation becomes essential. For they are taking great risks. As the peasant has been stripped of the opportunity to realize most of his old social and family values he has also lost many compulsions for performance. And the despair and indifference reported by Chinese who have worked in communes could be turned against the régime. Also, the very speed with which the cadres marshalled the rural populace into communes suggests how rapidly they can run off the track if a mistake is made at the top. China lacks the "margin for error" in untapped raw land and natural resources that cushioned Soviet Russia's collectivization during the 1930s. Instead, with her population now burgeoning by an estimated 15,000,000 annually, China still is painfully

at the mercy of nature for the crop yields that are the key to these grandiose Communist schemes.

II. WHY THE COMMUNES?

The compulsions that led Red China to create the communes can best be grasped by examining the dilemma in which the new rulers found themselves in 1957—the final year of their first Five Year Plan. By then they seem to have realized that even with Russian and East European Communist assistance they could not, at the pace they were then moving, build a modern economy in this generation. Instead, they were caught between a growing need for capital formation and the mounting demands of a population expanding rapidly because of new emphasis on mass sanitation and public health. Mao Tse-tung and his cohorts also were impatient to catch up technologically with Japan and the West. The means to accomplish this could be generated only through increased agricultural collections from the peasants and capitalization upon China's vast human power so far only partially employed. If the sacrifices exacted from the peasants were not to be compensated for by better food and some consumer goods, new and more efficient organizational devices and tighter controls would be required.

Yet, at this very time the Chinese Communists were encountering opposition in the countryside approximating in character that which had forced Stalin to compromise with the Russian peasants during his ruthless collectivization drives. The Chinese peasant's yearning for land and justice had been the motive force on which the Communists rode to power before 1949. It had also been the means through which they "turned over" the old rural society during the first years of their rule. Cadres organized the poor and middle peasants into Farmers Associations that staged "settling of old accounts" meetings, stripping landowners and other prominent families of wealth and status. These Associations managed the "people's trials" where enemies of the new régime were condemned—sometimes beaten to death, sometimes given the opportunity to "reform through corrective labor."

Once the land had been redistributed and peasants given titles, the Farmers Associations served as instruments for organizing "mutual labor teams" through which the entire community shared in planting and harvesting. These in turn became a convenient device for bringing the peasants into coöperatives where

they kept the titles while pooling their land, tools, work animals and labor, and collecting a proportionate share of the produce. In the more "advanced" communities these were converted into full-fledged collectives that owned the means of production and paid the peasants according to work points they earned. This was accomplished only through endless "explanation and discussion" meetings often lasting far into the night, constant group and official pressure organized by the cadres and a final crash program in 1955-56. And the process required six years.

Collectivization alone, however, proved not enough. The cadres, novices to agriculture, had given only erratic direction to introducing mechanization, extending irrigation and other innovations. In keeping with an early Chinese Communist inclination to throw all resources into heavy industry at the expense of agriculture, the first Five Year Plan had almost ignored the great need for building chemical fertilizer capacity. By late 1956 peasants were balking, partly in protest against the heavy state collections of grain but also in disgust with the bookkeeping complexities and jealousies the system encouraged. Some peasants simply walked out of their coöperatives. Others were held in the collectives by promises from the cadres that there would be no further reorganization of the peasants at least for a decade. While valuing the land reform, peace, order and certain other innovations which the Communists had brought, the peasants generally felt they had had enough. Peking had not succeeded in "remolding" their values.

III. THE "GREAT LEAP FORWARD"

It was in this setting that Mao Tse-tung less than two years ago launched a "thaw" period—the famous movement to "Let one hundred flowers bloom, Let one hundred schools of thought contend." When, however, the Party felt the extent and violence of the opposition thus released it clamped on controls far tighter than before. It set in motion a nation-wide "rectification and reindoctrination" campaign that reached almost every person in China, including the peasantry. It was the fierce discipline and propaganda of this movement that made possible the first "leap forward" campaign which began in the autumn of 1957. This was the start of a country-wide effort to expand irrigation on such an enormous scale that one has difficulty in visualizing it. Normally, winter has been a period when Chinese peasants rest,

repair their tools, weave cloth and earn a bit of extra income with other handicraft occupations. Now it became a time when every man and woman not urgently needed elsewhere was mustered out to move dirt. In platoons they marched out at sunrise singing or to the accompaniment of simple musical instruments. They employed the traditional Chinese methods—transporting earth in baskets, mule carts and wheelbarrows and breaking rocks by hand with hammers.

The Communists now calculate that in the year beginning October 1957, irrigation was extended to an additional 80,000,000 acres. They admit that some of the dikes were hastily thrown up and need rebuilding. Also, this figure includes renovation of ancient water control systems constructed in imperial times that had fallen into disuse or silted up. But if the achievement is anywhere near that claimed, it is an organized human effort without parallel. During the same period the Communists claim to have reforested some 66,000,000 acres of the barren mountainsides that for centuries made China a land of floods and erosion.

That winter of exhausting labor served only as an initiation to the 1958 “leap forward” in agriculture. Some 32 billion tons of manure were spread, according to Communist figures; they exhumed garbage pits, dismantled fireplaces for the ashes and ripped off old straw-thatched roofs to make compost. Peasants who were required to demolish old graves and spread the contents as fertilizer were shaken to the depths of their ancestral veneration. Massive coffin planks were sawed up for use in farm tools, for fencing and as firewood. Deep plowing and close planting became the rule. Weeding was made an honored national occupation and intellectuals and bureaucrats were mustered out of the cities to help.

The results claimed by the Communists exceed anything that experience elsewhere suggests is possible. Whereas a continuing annual increase in agricultural output of 6 to 8 percent is judged extraordinarily good in countries applying advanced technology, the Chinese Communists calculate that they boosted their output of grain and its equivalents by 90 percent in 1958. They claim a production of 350,000,000 tons of grain and root crops (tubers are converted at four tons to one ton of grain) as contrasted to 185,000,000 tons in 1957. (The figure for 1950, the first year of Communist power, was 132,000,000 tons compared to a pre-Communist maximum production of about 150,000,000 tons.)

Cotton production is supposed to have increased from 1,640,000 tons in 1957 to 3,500,000 tons in 1958. Although some of these figures appear to reflect over-enthusiastic crop estimates by Party cadres, travelers returning from the mainland late last summer agreed that China had its most bountiful crops ever. The great extension of irrigation coincided with a summer when adequate and rather evenly distributed rainfall reached most regions, and China was spared destructive typhoons at critical seasons.

The promise of this bountiful harvest gave the Chinese Communist leaders courage and opportunity to organize the peasantry into communes since it offered a margin of safety that they evidently felt would carry them through the inevitable period of dislocation. The basic decision appears to have been made by Mao Tse-tung and his associates in late July or early August. The formal move to bring the peasants into "people's communes" was made on August 29 at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The official announcement came on September 10, when the Chinese people learned of this "irresistible" development of the commune idea. The previous April the Communists had merged a few collectives into rudimentary communes, using temporary common kitchens or canteens established during the push to build irrigation works. These had served as pilot projects where organizational techniques were tested. Communist publications had carried a few articles on the advantages enjoyed by larger collectives; these, at least in retrospect, could be taken as hints of the thinking in Peking. But this was the extent of public forewarning. Even today the Chinese Communists do not buttress their decision with justifications traced to Marx, Engels or any other member of their philosophical pantheon. According to Peking, the communes are simply a "reflection of the objective law of development. . . ."

Once the word was out, the peasantry felt the consequences with phenomenal speed. For most peasants three to thirty days were required for incorporation into communes. The time depended primarily upon how conscientious the cadres were in making the move "spontaneous." "Big blooming and big contending" meetings were held day and night, with peasants encouraged to speak "frankly" of their criticisms and objections. Then cadres relentlessly showed them how mistaken were their thoughts. At the politically propitious time, to the accompaniment of "firecrackers, booming brass gongs, and the beating of

drums," a collective or coöperative "voluntarily" joined with its neighbors. By mid-November Peking announced that 740,000 coöperatives and collectives had been amalgamated into some 26,500 communes. According to the Communists, they held 98 percent of the rural population—a claim that may be nearly accurate. Within approximately two months virtually all coöperatives, collectives, state farms and remaining individual farmers, except in Tibet and among some other national minorities, were organized into communes. There is an awesome audacity about this Chinese Communist effort, suggesting their organizational resources, their capacity for venturesome innovation and their apparent feeling of near omnipotence at home.

Doubts about the permanence of the communes were resolved in December 1958, when the Central Committee met in plenary session at Wuhan, the new industrial and steel center on the Yangtze River. Evidently the meeting was devoted almost entirely to the communes, and to making clear that the move was irreversible. The resolution published following the session calls for a very gradual and experimental extension of communes into the cities, where, it states, "ownership by the whole people"—state ownership—already is well advanced, conditions are more complex and "bourgeois ideology" is still fairly prevalent among former capitalists and intellectuals. Otherwise, the Party spelled out detailed measures for correcting excesses committed by the cadres in the first rush of commune organization. It called for tightening management at all levels. This most authoritative Communist document to date describes the communes as a "morning sun" above the horizon of East Asia and possessed of "immense vitality."

IV. COMMUNE ORGANIZATION

Each commune forms an economic and social management unit with an average membership of 5,000 families; since their geographical size is determined by water sheds and topographical features, communes on the lowlands may contain up to 10,000 or more families and those in the mountains may include as few as 2,000 households. This compares to the earlier coöperatives and collectives that each held 100 to 200 families. The commune also absorbs local government administrative functions. The most common type of commune includes one or several *hsiang*, which correspond roughly to a midwestern American township

but usually are more densely populated. These are being grouped into *hsien* or county federations of communes, apparently a transitional step toward a second type of commune, one which encompasses an entire county. Since Red China today is divided into slightly less than 2,000 counties, excluding some areas of national minorities, it is probable that the number of communes may be considerably reduced from its present total of 26,500.

Within each commune the chairmanship usually is taken over by the former official of the corresponding level of local government. But the commune chief and his staff now also plan and direct agricultural production and negotiate contracts for sale of produce to state purchasing agencies. They integrate all construction of irrigation systems, roads and housing; they also develop industry, which is usually small scale and designed to meet commune needs for consumer items. Research stations, schools, kitchens, propaganda and security organs are under their control. Each commune is divided into administrative *chu* or districts designed to fit the productive functional units. Under the new system of "military organization" peasants are grouped in regiments, battalions and platoons. This is apart from the communal militia, which appears to have more political than military significance. Organized around a core of Red Army veterans, it affords the authorities an added instrument for imposing their will. While emphasis is upon integration of all functions in the commune, there are repeated admonitions from Peking to keep the Party distinct so it can retain its "objectivity." Actually, one of the chief purposes of the communes is enhanced Party control of the peasants. This is accomplished by bringing so many more of the peasants' activities under supervision of Communists working through the commune management and "seeding" Communists in at lower levels.

While the commune radically remakes the existence of the peasant, it affects his wife even more. For one of the chief Communist objectives is to expand the labor force by "freeing" women to work in the fields. To this end the communes are creating a system of creches and kindergartens. Some of these charge mothers for tending their children, but the fees are low. Originally, some cadres simply took the children away from parents and even discussed "migration of children" to neighboring counties to remove them from home influence. But parental reaction was furious. Now Party directives decree that parents must be

allowed to take their children home at night. They also stipulate that mothers should be permitted to breast-feed their infants in communal nurseries when they are working nearby. The Communists state that their eventual goal is a system of boarding schools for all children—an educational arrangement which will largely free the young from parental control.

The communal kitchens and mess halls are likewise designed to get more women to work while also enabling the régime to limit food consumption and restrict it to those serving the aims of the new society. Often established in the homes of former landowners, these messes now tend to become the new centers of community life. When the communes were organized, one of the inducements which the cadres offered peasants was the promise of free food in the communal mess for everyone, and all they could eat; in the collectives there had been frequent trouble over who was entitled to take home how much food. But in many communes sweet potatoes are the only food that has been abundant so far and the Chinese traditionally regard these as the poorest of food. They are now often served with a thin gruel made of rice or millet. This dietary emphasis may result from a deliberate Communist effort to encourage consumption of a bumper crop of sweet potatoes that otherwise would spoil. But in the peasant mind it is aggravated by the miserable vegetables that communal kitchens so often serve. When the communes were formed the messes were to take over the garden plots on which peasants grew the cabbage, turnips, squash, beans and other vegetables they dried or salted away to provide a large and vital portion of their diets. Many communes evidently ignored the care of these vegetables. The Communists now are relenting and allowing individual peasants a “small” garden. The pigs that Chinese kept as scavengers were turned over to the communal mess and remain there to be fed largely on potato peelings, dishwater and scraps. But the peasant now has been permitted to take back a few of the chickens he was compelled to surrender last fall. Since he has no fire at home and cooking pots have all been collected, such produce presumably must be prepared at the communal kitchen where others will be waiting to share it.

Contrary to some published accounts, the Communists have not generally moved men and women into separate barracks. Instead, Peking repeatedly insists that the “new” family will be kept intact and “liberated” from its old “economic” compulsions.

The marriage law introduced by the Communists eight years ago and enforced with all the fervor that organized women can generate did much to equalize status between the sexes. Now that the communes are releasing them from the homes and kitchens it can be expected that Chinese peasant women will be no more restricted than their men. Within the communes a vast construction program is in progress as entire villages are re-located in order to centralize the labor forces near production sites. In the process, many houses are torn down and some families are required to double up. They are also compelled to share household furniture and some personal possessions with fellow commune members. Since land titles and tools not already delivered to the collective now go to the communes, the concept of private property virtually has lost its meaning for the Chinese peasant.

Most acutely of all, the peasant today feels the relentless pressure to work ever harder. The day in a typical commune begins with drill at sunrise—the Communists are systematically toughening all of China's population, and city dwellers as well as peasants are required to get out for morning calisthenics. After a quick breakfast, men and women march off in platoons to work in the fields, in a primitive "factory" or on construction. There they are under the constant supervision of a commune regimental commander or other cadres. Usually these commune officials are exempted from manual labor as a mark of status. Each platoon is urged to compete with the next platoon in "labor emulation drives." The winning platoon is entitled to carry a banner and may paint a "sputnik" on its mess hall door. Sometimes there is also the promise of meat or a similar delicacy several times each month for the outstanding platoons. In the push of the "leap forward" campaigns the cadres were mustering even the children to weed or to move earth. Now the Communists have ruled that only children over nine years of age are allowed to work to "learn productive habits." One-half of each day is supposed to be reserved for schooling, although there are complaints that some cadres reduce class time to two and three hours daily. Older people also are expected to contribute their labor; women may be assigned to sewing teams or charged with baby-sitting in a communal creche while the older men are out driving the birds away from the ripening grain fields. Throughout the past year and a half the cadres have been so demanding that the Chinese

peasant, accustomed though he is to strenuous labor, has begun to give in physically. Due partly to the inadequate diet, men and women on labor platoons are reported working themselves to exhaustion. The Party has now decreed that every person is entitled to at least eight hours daily for sleep and four hours for eating and (actually largely non-existent) "personal" life.

V. THE COST OF HASTE

The disruption of rural life resulting from such a drastic reorganization was aggravated by the efforts of the Communists to reach their 1958 steel production target of nearly 11,000,000 tons—roughly twice the output for the previous year. Coincident with the launching of the communes, they realized that this could be achieved only by extraordinary measures. So in this era when "people's science" wedded to brawn and will power supposedly can do almost everything, the peasantry was ordered to erect native blast furnaces and haul coal and ore by any means available. According to Peking, these shock tactics produced the required quantity of iron and steel; little is said about the quality, although it probably can be used in commune blacksmith shops for making simple farm tools. But the agricultural costs were great. Figures released by Peking admit that peasants ordered out to make steel failed to harvest 10 percent of the grain crops. Travelers report seeing cotton standing unpicked in the winter snows of north China; and there is reason to believe that much of the crop harvested may have rotted due to improper threshing and storing. Throughout Chinese cities last winter the customary grain rationing was more stringent than before. Some urbanites were compelled to stand in queues to buy bean curd, that commonest of all protein staples. Vegetables for sale were scarce and occasionally spoiled. All reflected the disorganization of farm supply and transportation; the rail system was severely dislocated in the great push to make iron and steel.

During its spring campaign to "rationalize" the movement, the Party explicitly designated specific communes to produce vegetables for the urban market. Early talk of converting communes into "agro-industrial complexes" is being modified—there is to be less attention to iron and steel and more on cotton industries. Communes are to devote at least 90 percent of their manpower to agriculture during peak periods and must not again

leave crops in the field. But the drive to work ever harder is to go on. This year the plan calls for increasing production of grain and equivalents by 50 percent above 1958. Cotton output is scheduled to go up from 3,500,000 to 5,000,000 tons. Simultaneously steel production is to increase by another 65 percent and the Chinese are called upon to mine an extra 110,000,000 tons of coal. All of this must be accomplished primarily through the sweat of the peasants.

The very organizational mastery of the Chinese scene that enabled the Communists to engineer these profound changes also generated the opposition that now could cripple their schemes—the so far largely non-violent anger, sense of hopelessness and frustrated resentment of the peasants. Essentially, it was the character of the Chinese Communist Party that made possible what has been accomplished so far. Its top leadership had remained united, with rare exceptions, for a quarter of a century. All key positions today are held by men and women who chose the hard life of guerrilla warfare in the mountains for many years before there came the promise of official power and personal advantage. Some 5,000,000 members had been toughened and indoctrinated in the Party before they seized power. Presently, the party membership of 12,000,000 is being expanded to include more peasants and women as a means of further leavening the communes. All are schooled in the disturbing new science of “going inside of society” and shaping it to the Communist image.

So thoroughly have the Communists shattered China's old family and social institutions that the peasant has lost his former lust for life and work. The concept of “face” which once was such a powerful social prop virtually has vanished. No longer can the peasant expend himself to provide for the future economic well-being of his family or for his own old age. His children are not taught to venerate elders and the familial security and respect from his grandsons that a peasant once dreamed of achieving in his latter years now is hardly even a mirage. He knows, too, that the prospect of his descendants sweeping his grave and paying homage at his tablet in the clan shrine are minimal since all such “feudal customs” are being abolished by the state. Even the gods who were his refuge and source of support in times of personal and natural disaster are now proscribed.

Though he is denied the satisfaction of values which have been

imbedded in his culture for some 35 centuries, the peasant has not in general accepted those offered by the new order. The Communists moved too rapidly and ruthlessly. They insisted upon such total verbal conformity that prospects for genuine reëducation of this generation of peasants have not yet been realized. The result is a mass of peasantry who "labor without heart." On major construction and industrial projects where cadre supervision is most effective, passive resistance and "unseen sabotage" among the peasants may not be critical. "Civil disobedience" is hard to gauge. But the price of anything like a genuine peasant enthusiasm for agricultural performance within the communes will be a revamping of present policies, particularly those affecting the family. Unless the Party becomes more responsive to the "human element," the entire system of people's communes might be a success organizationally and yet bog down in actual performance. China's demographic dilemma and the narrow margin on which Chinese agriculture must perform mean that the consequences of a short-fall could be critical.

The forcible shifting of the Chinese peasantry into communes raises several international issues that will condition much of the future development of Asia. What will remain of the ideological bonds that tie together the nations of the Communist orbit in the face of such a divergence in internal social organization? Will the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe accept the Chinese contention that at least for Asia the communes offer the right instrument for effecting a rapid transition from socialism to Communism? How will Peking accommodate its ideological propaganda to the fears that such regimentation will surely awaken among its neighbors? China's manner of suppressing the revolt in Tibet already is convincing many Asians who have been oriented toward neutrality that the values they hold dear are far removed from those fostered by the Chinese Reds. Thinking Asians, however, are concerned by the fact that their underemployed manpower is their country's major unused capital resource. They are impressed with Red China's material achievements by the use of sheer manpower—her massive public works, her canals, irrigation schemes, roads, railways, mines and reforestation. They will be assured by Peking that the communes are what make all this possible. And there will be increasing demands in the lands bordering China for the West to produce equally effective means for them to engineer their own physical progress.

ECONOMIC REVOLUTION IN FRANCE

By Antoine Pinay

FRANCE has achieved her political revolution in an orderly manner: she has regained stability and established new political institutions to safeguard it. But without an economic renewal the political renewal of the past year would have had no meaning. Consequently, the Government of General de Gaulle has from the very beginning laid emphasis on economic and financial policies which would assure the expansion of production while maintaining monetary stability.

The rehabilitation plan has gone through two stages. From June to December 1958, the Government's action aimed to put the French economy into shape to bear the impact of the rigorous measures which were going to be necessary. The most pressing needs were to control the rise in domestic prices, to limit the balance of trade deficit and to float a large public loan. The success of the loan made it possible to replenish the State Treasury.

The patient work of the French Government during these six months in 1958 set the stage for launching the plan for economic and financial rehabilitation—the economic revolution which would be the necessary counterpart of the political revolution.

II

After a long period of expansion, the French economy seemed to level off at the end of 1958. In fact, since the preceding spring, but particularly during the latter months of the year, there had been a tendency toward reduced activity in several sectors. This development came later in France than in other Western countries, but its effects were felt at a moment when the disparity between French and foreign prices made it difficult to direct a larger share of the national product into exports. The Government thus was faced with unacceptable alternatives: either to ask for new aid from abroad, something which might have been difficult to obtain, or to cut the volume of imports drastically and deprive industry of indispensable raw materials.

The restraint exercised in drawing up the 1958 budget and the success of the loan floated in June enabled the Treasury to withstand the demands made on it toward the end of the year. But preliminary drafts of the 1959 budget revealed a deficit for the

year twice that for 1958; indeed, the difference between inevitable expenses and anticipated receipts, limited to 600 billion francs in 1958, threatened to mount to 1,200 billion.

A deficit of this size could not be covered by borrowing from savings available after the most important investments had been financed. In consequence it would have been necessary to turn to the Institute of Emission and increase the supply of money without being able to find a corresponding expansion in production. That meant inflation.

The French economy thus was subject to serious threats, both externally and internally. Moreover, it seemed obvious to many that in the long run one cannot consume more than one produces, buy more than one sells and spend more than one receives. But few Frenchmen had an exact notion of the spread between the needs and the means of a country weakened by a grave imbalance in these respects. What had to be done first of all, then, was to make the true situation plain to everyone and then to impose a régime of austerity in order to set the nation on a right course and enable it to shoulder the great tasks ahead.

The matters which it had to face and deal with included: (1) to create a modern state administration; (2) to equip the country with means of production comparable to those of other large industrial nations; (3) to undertake the long-delayed construction of housing and schools; (4) to build up the French-African Community; (5) to meet the international commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty, the Organization of European Economic Coöperation, and the Common Market; (6) to pacify Algeria, and develop it economically and socially; (7) to develop new resources discovered on European or African soil; and (8) to raise the standard of living of France's growing population.

The Government could not follow a laissez-faire policy; that would have had serious consequences for the country for many years to come. Yet the evil was of a more or less hidden and creeping character: inflation and running into debt are progressive phenomena, the seriousness of which becomes apparent to the public too late. It therefore was the Government's duty to make a prompt choice between possible policies.

III

Two methods of intervention could be considered. The first was based on the acceptance, as a given fact, of a certain dose

of inflation, with an attempt to neutralize its effect as much as possible. The second assumed a categorical refusal to accept inflation and a determination to endure the consequences of that stand. The choice lay, in a sense, between medical treatment and a surgical operation.

The first method—the medical method—consisted in bringing the budget to a more tolerable level, to something on the order of 900 billion francs. This would be done by carrying out certain budgetary restrictions and by accepting, on the other hand, some inflationary pressures.

This approach could not even pretend to avoid a series of adjustments in prices, wages and salaries growing out of economic difficulties and social conflicts. To keep such increases in check it would be necessary at the same time to maintain provision in the budget for subsidies, with the result that the investment credits allowed for in the budget would have to be reduced. In this manner economic expansion would be jeopardized in the name of encouraging production.

Furthermore, continued price rises would further aggravate the disparity between French and foreign prices and diminish the possibility of exporting French goods. The ability to export could be maintained only on the assumption that foreign trading nations would accept certain commercial advantages which we were not in a position to grant.

Nothing would have been changed fundamentally. The country would have sunk deeper and deeper into the morass. What we would have been attempting would have amounted to what in military terms is called an “elastic defense.” It would by its very nature have precluded a return to economic stability in the near future. Under the existing system of escalator clauses linking wages and prices to the cost of living index, partial adjustments would have had an impact throughout the economy. And while opinion abroad would have continued to see us as the eternal laggard, the perpetual beggar of Europe, opinion at home would have begun to doubt that we had the will to bring about the change that was so essential.

IV

The method which we found necessary to adopt was more brutal, but it also was more effective as a means of avoiding at one and the same time monetary inflation, economic recession

and external insolvency. This, the surgical method, could be applied in the context of either a closed economy or an open economy, depending on whether or not it was decided to devalue the franc. In either case, the sacrifices demanded would be severe. The results, however, would be far more satisfactory in an open economy.

Unless the franc was devalued, a series of direct governmental controls to hold down inflation would have been required. Prices, wages and salaries would have to be frozen in order to avoid affecting the value of money. If public spending was to be cut, social expenditures would have to be drastically reduced, especially as economic subsidies had proved impossible to eliminate. To secure an increase in fiscal receipts there would have to be heavy taxation of income as well as of wealth.

Some of these measures, especially the ones affecting wage and salary earners, would lead to a restriction of consumption; others, mainly the ones affecting those who save, would result in diminishing investment. There would be a risk of lowering the standard of living and jeopardizing the foundation of economic expansion in order to achieve budgetary equilibrium.

Of the two, the risk of a fall in economic activity was the greater, since a refusal to devalue, even if it did not increase the disparity between French and foreign prices, would at best leave it as it was in 1958, namely on the order of 7 to 10 percent. This would have made any coöperation within the Common Market difficult and any liberalization within the O.E.E.C. imprudent. In order to avoid the risks, France would undoubtedly have declined the proffered opportunities for international coöperation. For if she honored her engagements she would have to bear the consequences under the worst circumstances; and if she renounced them, as would have been almost unavoidable, she would have been forced into a sterile autarchy, and that at a time when almost all Western countries were taking first steps toward convertibility and were seeking new forms of free exchange. The technical measures, moreover, would almost inevitably have had political implications. For a system founded on economic regimentation requires domestic controls that have to be generalized in order to be effective; it also demands isolation from the outside, and although this begins by being economic in character it inevitably becomes political. France did not wish to follow this road.

V

It was within the framework of a free and open economy, then, that France had to carry out the task of economic rehabilitation. The three immediate objectives were to acquire a competitive commercial position, financial equilibrium and economic expansion. Three sets of decisions had to be taken simultaneously: the franc had to be devalued; the budgetary deficit had to be reduced; investment had to be maintained. None of these would have had any effect without the others.

Whatever approach was chosen, the solution consisted, in essence, of the same series of measures. If one sought first to make French products competitive in foreign markets, it was indispensable, given the disparity between French and foreign prices, to devalue the franc. However, instances when such monetary adjustments failed to have lasting results are unfortunately all too numerous in French financial history. The reason has been the failure to take simultaneously the necessary measures to prevent uncontrolled price rises from absorbing little by little the beneficial results. Consequently, it was deemed of vital importance this time to ward off any kind of inflationary pressure, however small. This implied eliminating all public deficits, which required finding additional sources of income and curtailing expenses. But to maintain the competitive position of the national economy, budgetary restrictions could not be allowed to affect public investment; on the contrary, this must be augmented, for the size of our investments largely determines our competitive position. Thus if our external balance was to be corrected, simultaneous action was needed on the rate of exchange, the budgetary deficit and the level of investment.

The same series of measures would be necessary if one began by trying to establish financial stability in order to halt inflation. Reductions in expenses and increases in revenue would both be needed. In order not to jeopardize the rhythm of productive activity, and, in consequence, fiscal returns, the reductions must not affect investment. Large increases in taxes could not help but have repercussions on prices. The disparity between French and foreign costs would consequently increase. And to compensate for it, devaluation would again be necessary. The reestablishment of financial stability would thus demand the same series of decisions relating to the elimination of the public deficit, the maintenance of investment and the readjustment of the currency.

The fundamental factor in the development of economic activity is the level of aggregate investment. The State therefore had to make available substantial public credits, significantly larger than those of the previous year, and it had to make deliberate efforts to encourage sufficient private investment by facilitating, among other things, the return to France of capital from abroad. This required first of all that inflation be stopped, for without apparently affecting the amount of allotted investment funds, inflation in reality reduces the volume of operations. Consequently, the deficit could not be maintained at a level beyond the capacity of the Government to borrow from savings.

This assumed also that France would participate in the movement toward convertibility favored by most of our European partners. The franc should not be maintained at a rate which would nullify the possible advantages for us. Furthermore, our economic expansion would require sufficient raw material supplies and market outlets for our production. In other words, the appropriate measures for the correction of our external balance had to be taken without delay, which again meant that devaluation was a necessity.

The Government's general line of attack thus was clearly laid out. A policy which sought to avoid insolvency abroad, recession at home and monetary inflation demanded at one and the same time the devaluation of the franc, the expansion of investment and the elimination of the public deficit. By the same token, this policy permitted full participation in European coöperation. It demanded great efforts and temporary sacrifices; but it opened to France the wide perspectives of a country determined to build its future on a sound basis and to face outwards to the world, not inwards upon itself. If our progress was not to hang continuously in the balance, there was no other road.

VI

Having the foregoing considerations in mind, the French Government chose measures which would obtain the internal stability necessary for the success of the devaluation and take maximum advantage of the opportunities presented by international coöperation.

We shall discuss first the measures looking toward genuine internal stability. In deciding upon them the Government set three kinds of guide lines for itself: it would make reasoned bud-

getary choices, accept limited price rises and distribute the indispensable sacrifices among all Frenchmen.

1. *Reasoned Budgetary Choices.* To conform to the plan, essential charges on the budget had to be met. Included in this category were: (1) The servicing of past loans, which the State could not repudiate; this by itself took 10 percent of the budgetary expenditure in 1958. (2) Public services; the cost of these had to be reduced, but not beyond the point at which they could perform their indispensable role in the life of the nation. (3) The carrying out of fixed national policies supported by public opinion.

For instance, the funds for national education had to be increased in order to obtain the new teachers needed to cope with the upward demographic trend. More housing and more schools had to be built. In addition, the expenses of the Algerian policy had to be met.

There could be no doubt, further, of the absolute necessity of financing the investments needed to maintain economic activity at a high level. Between 1958 and 1959 the total of credits made available for investment rose from 1,124 billion francs to 1,470 billion. Today they represent almost one-fourth of the total charges on the budget. Of the total, the expenditures for civil purposes (schools, atomic energy, public works, agriculture, equipment of Algeria, etc.) amount to 618 billion, about 20 percent more than in 1958. Investment loans granted by the State have risen from 233 to 335 billion, partly as the result of the transfer to public funds of that part of the investment in nationalized enterprises which was previously financed through medium-term credits rediscounted by the Bank of France. The investment programs of these enterprises are themselves increasing yearly by 85 billion. Authorized disbursements for the construction of medium-cost dwellings have gone from 155 to 184 billion; it has been decided to undertake an additional 50,000 dwellings in three years.

After meeting these permanent requirements, the Government's area of action seemed very restricted. It had a free hand only to deal with the remaining expense items and with receipts.

In the field of expenditures the State itself set an example by realizing important economies. Administrative expenses have been strictly limited. Taking into account the continuance of operations in Algeria, military expenditures have been reduced to the minimum compatible with the needs of national defense. In

the end, efforts had to be concentrated on reducing the expense of economic and social subsidies.

Here the Government kept in view a double objective. First, it aimed to restore the price of goods or services to the level of real production costs, thus making sure that all taxpayers would not have to bear a share of what should be borne solely by the user or consumer. Second, it aimed to avoid choosing measures which would have indirect repercussions on the budget of a sort to cancel out the over-all benefits of the new fiscal policy.

In all, 257 billions have been obtained by price increases by nationalized enterprises and by eliminating or reducing subsidies and exemptions. This has led to a rise in the price of certain food products.

Regarding social matters, the Government has evaluated the relative utility of various charges on the budget in an effort to lighten those which could be considered the least indispensable or might offer opportunities for abuses, as in the case of subventions to health resorts. The Government has also demanded new sacrifices from certain war veterans by eliminating their pensions. And it has rearranged certain excessively expensive benefits of the social security system. All in all, 75 billions have been saved by these measures—without, moreover, infringing on the essential elements of the French social security system.

On the income side of the ledger, the fiscal measures adopted affect almost all taxes, starting with those which have only a very general effect on prices, such as taxes on corporations (for which the rate rose from 47.6 percent to 50 percent) and the proportional income tax which was increased from 19.8 percent to 22 percent. The Government wished also to catch persons whose style of living is manifestly above what might be expected on the basis of their declared income. Determined to establish fiscal justice, it has standardized methods for evaluating external signs of wealth.

As a result of these measures, direct taxes increased from 36.8 percent to 39.2 percent of all fiscal receipts. But the Government could not stop here. It had, in addition, to increase certain indirect taxes, particularly those on wine and other alcoholic beverages; and it has introduced also some simplifications and rearrangements in other areas. Finally, it has eliminated certain special taxes which either have not been very productive or are difficult to collect.

In the aggregate, these measures have made it possible to re-

duce the deficit to 587 billion, as against a deficit in 1958 of 600 billion.

2. *A Limited Rise in Prices.* In their cumulative effect the financial measures undertaken led almost inevitably to some rise in retail prices. Account had to be taken also of the indirect and secondary effects of these same measures on the prices of producer goods. And there had to be added certain increases in wages and salaries in consequence of the devaluation. But it was expected that counterbalancing forces would be at work. The behavior of the consuming public, the movement of the business cycle and the liberalization of the exchange could be expected to limit the influence of governmental measures on the price level.

The Government deliberately accepted the risk of a price rise which would give major prices a more realistic level and put them more in line with the cost of each good or service. A stable and lasting equilibrium was expected to result. At the same time the Government made plain that it would put limits on the rise.

It has definitely refused to accept any escalator clauses based on general price indexes. The budgetary reform assures that no imbalance in public finances will cause inflation, hence there no longer is any need to introduce the guarantees—in practice often illusory—of automatic adjustment clauses. Such clauses, particularly for agricultural prices, have therefore been eliminated.

The Government wished also to compensate the lowest paid wage earners for the price rises that were inevitable. Therefore, it ordered a special increase of 4.5 percent in the minimum legal wage.

3. *Distributing Inevitable Burdens Widely.* The magnitude of the sacrifices demanded was justified. The Government has tried to see that they were fairly distributed. Those engaged in agriculture and those who are wage and salary earners represent nearly three-fourths of the population and provide about 70 percent of the national income. The rise in the cost of living and the reduction of certain benefits have resulted in over-all losses of purchasing power, but the régime of austerity has at least affected all classes with approximately equal weight.

Now let us turn to the measures which would take the maximum advantage of the opportunities offered by international coöperation.

The new exchange rate was designed to compensate for the price disparities existing at the end of 1958 between French and

foreign commodities and goods. It also would absorb the indirect rises which resulted from the Government's financial measures. And it would provide in addition a slight safety margin to guarantee the operation's complete success. Given these diverse objectives, the rise in the exchange rate had to be between 15 and 20 percent. The figure adopted was 17.55 percent.

In the second place, the liberalization of exchange which accompanied the devaluation should be in line with French commitments to the O.E.E.C. This made it possible to reassure France's partners in the Common Market, to satisfy the members of O.E.E.C. and to put France in a more favorable moral position in future negotiations. It also offered the possibility of influencing domestic prices through supplementary imports, in case one sector or another of the economy should get out of kilter.

VII

The first results of the governmental action described above bear testimony to its effectiveness and also to the discipline of the French public.

The rise in domestic prices has remained within the limits foreseen, without a price freeze and without artificial measures. Four months after the economic and financial rehabilitation plan was introduced, retail prices had risen only by 4 percent.

The level of economic activity is equally satisfactory. Compared to her neighbors, France has been affected very little by the recession. The number of workers drawing unemployment benefits in France is now only 32,000; in other West European countries the figure amounts to several hundreds of thousands, even several millions. In addition, the average length of the work week is between 45 and 46 hours, which means that overtime payments are being made to many industrial workers.

On the money market as well as on the financial market a relaxation has set in. The Bank of France has been able to bring the rediscount rate back by successive stages to 4 percent. As for the Treasury, though it has given authority for loans to be placed by public subscription, it has been able to avoid borrowing directly in the market. Thus industrial investments can at present be financed either through less expensive and more abundant means or in a financial market where the State itself has not borrowed heavily.

In the international sphere, the evolution has been favorable

to France. Taking into account freight and insurance charges, the results for the early months of 1959 show a tendency towards an equilibrium.

Incidentally, there has been quite a striking awakening of an export mentality among French producers. Industrialists and traders have begun to understand that success in foreign markets is not only a question of price, but also depends on organization, prospecting for customers and establishing commercial connections. For the first time since the war, the level of imports is no longer being controlled by artificial means. Import controls have been reduced to a minimum and purchases of raw materials and finished goods now correspond to the demand.

In the financial sphere, finally, the inflow of foreign exchange has continued without interruption, proving that a climate of confidence has been reestablished. It has been possible for France to decline the aid offered by large foreign banks and to restore the allocation of foreign exchange to French tourists wishing to travel abroad.

The sacrifice required from our people to put these reforms into operation has been very great, and it must continue for some time yet if the country is to audit its accounts with the past and make a definite recovery. What is particularly comforting is that Frenchmen have really grasped the meaning of the effort they are asked to make.

Above and beyond the inevitable adjustments which necessarily are part of the transition from an inflationary situation to durable monetary stabilization, the French economy has demonstrated that it remains healthy and that it intends to occupy the position which becomes it in the European Common Market.

THE SOVIET POPULATION TODAY

AN ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST RESULTS OF THE 1959 CENSUS

By Warren W. Eason

FOR Western analysts of Soviet affairs who have at one time or another in the past 20 years suffered from the dearth of official statistical information on the Soviet population, the long-awaited relief has finally begun to appear. On May 10 the Central Statistical Administration of the U.S.S.R. released selected preliminary results from the All-Union Census of Population of January 15, 1959, with the implication that there will be more to come (although how much more is not clear), following the completion of tabulation toward the end of the year.

From the data so far released one fact stands out. Soviet loss of life in World War II was far greater than we had supposed. Indeed the deaths among the male population simply stagger the imagination. Before developing this point, let us glance at the data so far released and discuss briefly their validity.

The preliminary census results show a total population of 208,800,000, together with the following breakdown:

Males	94,000,000	Rural	109,000,000
Females	114,800,000	Urban	99,800,000

In addition, we are given the urban and rural population for each of the 15 republics and their constituent administrative subdivisions (oblasts, krais and okrugs); the number of urban areas of different types, and their population; and the population of cities which are centers of administrative divisions and subdivisions as well as of cities with more than 50,000 persons. Also enumerated by the census, but not reported in the preliminary results, are the categories of age, nationality, language, education, family status, social classification, source of livelihood and occupation by branch of industry.

The 1959 census of population is the seventh planned since the beginning of the Soviet period, the sixth to be carried out in one form or other, and the fifth from which at least selected data have been published. The first All-Union Census of 1920 was conducted under abnormal conditions and the results were consequently incomplete and of generally poor quality. The urban census of 1923 and the All-Union Census of 1926 were published

in full. A census was planned for 1932, but never carried out, and a census was carried out in 1937, but the results were never published. The results of the 1939 census (the most recent prior to that of 1959) were published on a very restricted scale, allegedly because of "wartime conditions."

The statistical validity of the 1959 census is difficult to establish on the basis of the preliminary results, and a careful examination of this question must therefore be postponed. However, judging by the scale of organization and preparation and the various devices introduced to enhance the internal consistency and reliability of the results, the latest census will probably hold up well in comparison with censuses of other countries.

The additional question, often raised in Western circles, of whether the Soviets deliberately "manipulate" the published figures is extremely difficult if not impossible to answer. Since outward signs point to a certain degree of reliability of the results generated by the census itself, the possibility of "manipulation" for publication would have to be tested by a painstaking search for inconsistency with other data, and for mutual inconsistency within the published results themselves. This has not been attempted here. It has, however, been the experience of most specialists that the Soviets do not deliberately alter data in cases where categories are clearly identifiable, although the categories themselves are in many instances quite obscure; and that the withholding of data or their publication in obscure form seems to be the preferred method of operation.

II

A total Soviet population of 208,800,000 as late as 1959 reveals, as we have said, an absolutely incredible loss of life during World War II. It is true that we were alerted to this possibility through the publication of an official estimate of 200,200,000 as of April 1, 1956. This total, only slightly higher than that for 1940-41, was based on non-census sources of information which were not without admitted statistical weaknesses. A number of Soviet statisticians felt that the 1959 census would show, if anything, a somewhat higher total population, and therefore a less awesome loss of life during the war. The fact is that the total population reported from the 1959 census is approximately 1,400,000 *less* than that implied by the 1956 estimate, taking into account the natural increase of the population reported for the intervening months.

The "war losses" which the census figures suggest are difficult to measure with accuracy: first, because an effort to recreate what would have happened if there had been no war is subject to widely varying hypotheses with respect to the birth rate; and second, because the total effect of the war on the growth of the population takes several generations to have its full effect. Nevertheless, if we confine ourselves to the period of the war and the years immediately following, and make simplifying assumptions with respect to birth and death rates in the absence of war, the sum total of persons who would not have died plus those who would have been born is in the neighborhood of 45,000,000.

This staggering total of population losses stems from the following considerations:

(1) As of January 1, 1940, the population on territory comparable to that of postwar Russia but excluding persons who subsequently emigrated from the U.S.S.R., may be estimated as 194,000,000.¹

(2) Ten years later, as of January 1, 1950, the population may be estimated as 179,000,000. Thus, the population is estimated to have declined (other than through emigration and territorial adjustment) by 15,000,000 between 1940 and 1950. (The population decline during the war years themselves was more drastic, from almost 200,000,000 on July 1, 1941, to some 170,000,000 in 1945.)

(3) If there had been no war, the population of 194,000,000 in 1940 would have reached a total of about 224,000,000 in 1950. This assumes a relatively sharp decline in birth rates from the high prewar level of 38 per thousand reported for 1938—an assumption which is consistent with the actual levels reached by 1950 and also with Lorimer's hypothetical calculations based on the experience of other developing countries. Mortality rates in the absence of war are also assumed to have declined between 1940 and 1950, following the pattern of other countries.²

Compared to the actual total population of 179,000,000 in 1950, therefore, a hypothetical total of 224,000,000 implies "war losses" of 45,000,000. These may be distributed between the

¹ The purpose of excluding those who emigrated is to narrow the comparison with postwar data to the effect of changing birth and death rates. Sources and methods for these and other data in this article, other than from the 1959 census, may be found in W. W. Eason, *Soviet Manpower: The Population and Labor Force of the U.S.S.R.*, a Ph.D. dissertation on deposit with the library of Columbia University.

² The rates referred to in these assumptions are from F. Lorimer, "The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects" (Geneva: League of Nations, 1946), p. 254-255.

number who would have been born and the number who would not have died, as follows:

(1) The actual population aged 0-9 in 1950 may be estimated as 30,000,000, whereas, if there had been no war, the population in this group would have been approximately 50,000,000. This places the number of persons who were not born or who died in infancy as a result of the war at 20,000,000, and represents a decline in the birth rate and/or an increase of the infant mortality rate of more than 50 percent during the war years themselves.

(2) By subtracting the 0-9 age group from the population total for 1950, we obtain a figure of 149,000,000 aged 10 years and over, which represents the postwar survivors of the 194,000,000 persons alive on January 1, 1940. That is to say that some 45,000,000 persons actually died in the decade prior to 1950, compared to about 20,000,000 who would have been expected to die on the basis of the hypothetical mortality rates set forth above. In other words, the war was responsible for the death of some 25,000,000 persons out of the population alive in 1940, to which must be added the 20,000,000 who were not born or did not survive infancy as a result of the war.

War losses totalling 45,000,000 seem all the more staggering when they are distributed by sex. The 1959 census reports 114,800,000 females and 94,000,000 males, indicating an absolute deficit of 20,800,000 males. This may be compared to a deficit of 700,000 according to the 1897 census, 5,000,000 in 1926 and 7,200,000 in 1939. The increases in the male deficit compared to the pre-Soviet period reflect, successively, World War I and the Civil War, the period of collectivization and the food shortages of the early 1930s, and World War II.

At the same time, the amount by which the male deficit increased due to World War II is considerably beyond that which might have been expected. From several partial references and surmises, a relatively liberal allowance for the number of males *killed* in military service as a direct or indirect result of the war is approximately 10,000,000. This allows for the death of approximately one-half of the 20,000,000 men reported to have served at one time or another in the armed forces of the Soviet Union during World War II.

As shown above, an estimated 25,000,000 persons died from all causes between 1940 and 1950, over and above the number who would have died if there had been no war. If 10,000,000 died in

uniform, we must account for civilian losses of 15,000,000 (exclusive of infant mortality). From the data on the number of males and females from the 1959 census, it follows that of these 15,000,000 excess civilian deaths, some 11,000,000, or three-quarters, were males, and 4,000,000 females.

What cause or combination of causes can explain why three times as many males as females died outside the military service during and after the war, over and above the number who would have died under "normal" conditions? Since it is most unlikely that military deaths were greater than the estimated 10,000,000, the explanation would entail the following possibilities: (1) the population of areas annexed by the Soviet Union after the war included a smaller ratio of males than generally assumed; (2) the emigrant population included a relatively high proportion of males; and probably most important, (3) the various factors accounting for excess civilian deaths—military action against civilians; the general lowering of public health and nutritional standards; the use of labor battalions and population extermination by the Germans; and the use of correctional labor camps by the Soviets themselves—fell most heavily on males.

Perhaps there is a useful analogy in the experience of the 1930s. During this period the male deficit increased by more than 2,000,000—from a total of 5,000,000 in 1926 to 7,200,000 in 1939—whereas under "normal" conditions the deficit should have declined. In other words, the "excess civilian deaths" of the 1930s, at a time of mass collectivization, large-scale population migration from rural to urban areas, and the widened use of correctional labor camps, also fell more heavily on the male population.

For nearly a decade, the male deficit has been declining and, according to the census results, is now confined to the population aged 32 and older. Therefore, the problem created by the shortage of males in the labor force is already lessening. On the other hand, the effect of the war on the age group now entering the labor force is only beginning to be felt. Whereas the population of working ages has normally increased by 1,000,000 to 2,000,000 each year, during the next decade the growth will be only a few hundred thousand annually. Growing attention to the implications of this development is shown by recent changes in Soviet policies in regard to the recruitment, training and utilization of manpower.

III

The pattern of Soviet population growth which emerges from the preliminary census results, together with other data, must be examined from several points of view. If we consider the period as a whole since the start of the industrialization drive—that is, from the 1926 census to the 1959 census—the average rate of population increase is approximately 0.8 percent per year.³ This is lower than the long-run average which includes the Imperial Russian period, because from 1850 to the present, on Soviet territory, the population increased on the average by slightly more than 1.0 percent per year, and in the fifty-year period prior to 1850, on Imperial Russian territory, by slightly less than 1.0 percent per year.

One reason for the lower rate of increase over the past three decades, of course, lies in the demographic effects of World War II, described above. This is illustrated by the fact that between the 1939 census and 1959 census the average rate of population increase was only 0.5 percent per year. At the same time, the *peacetime* rate of population increase since the start of the industrialization drive has also been less than that for earlier years. In the first years of rapid industrialization (1931–1934), the decline in the rate of population growth was nothing short of catastrophic, for reasons to which we have already alluded. Although population growth recovered by the later 1930s, the impact of these few early years was severe enough to reduce the average increase for the period 1926–39 to 1.23 percent per year, or only a little more than one-half of the rate that Soviet planners had anticipated. Nevertheless, this is a higher rate than many other countries attained in these years.

The rate of population growth since 1950 has been about 1.6 percent—also less than that before the start of the industrialization drive, but the difference here is not very great; and, again, as Soviet sources emphasize, a rate of 1.6 percent per year is relatively high by comparison with most other countries. However, this relatively moderate decline in the rate of population growth under peacetime conditions conceals a relatively sharp decline in both birth and death rates since the early 1920s. Certain vital statistics published with the preliminary census results, together with data from other sources, show a crude birth rate of about

³ Territories acquired since 1939 are consistently excluded from calculations made in this article.

25 per thousand now, compared to more than 40 per thousand on the eve of the industrialization drive; a death rate of less than 8 compared to 18; and average life-expectancy of 67 years compared to 44 years. Standardization for changes in age structure compared to the 1920s would have the effect of lowering the present birth rate and raising the death rate somewhat, so that each is now about one-half that of 35 years ago. Approximately one-half of the decline in the crude death rate from 18 to 8 per thousand is due to the decline in infant mortality, which is reported for 1957 at 45 deaths per one thousand births, compared to 184 in 1940.

A crude death rate of less than 8 per thousand is below that of almost any other country and compares with a rate of less than 10 in the United States, which has a higher proportion of old people. An infant mortality rate of 45 per thousand births equals the rate in this country about 1940.

Only one recent Soviet source appears to include any attempt to explain the decline in the crude birth rate.⁴ Even in this case, the prewar dates are selected for comparison so as to minimize the extent of the decline, which is then ascribed to (1) the lower rate of infant mortality (leading, we can presume, to the need or desire to have fewer children), (2) the increase in the proportion of urban residents, and (3) changes in the sex ratio resulting from wartime population losses. In all probability these factors fall considerably short of explaining the full extent of the decline. In any event, it seems quite evident that urban and probably also rural families are getting smaller—a conclusion that corresponds to the impressions of recent visitors to the Soviet Union. Forced to speculate on the underlying reasons for this turn of events, we can at least suggest a number of factors: the rapid rate at which the educational level of the population has been raised; the larger share of work falling on women, in the cities as well as in the countryside; and the continuation of the shortage of urban housing.

As the "war babies" pass through the child-bearing age in the next decade or so, the birth rate may fall to 20 per thousand or less, even if fertility rates do not decline. In other words, the birth rate will remain constant or rise only if there is a substantial increase in fertility rates.

⁴ M. Ia. Sonin, "Ob aktual'nykh voprosakh vosproizvodstva trudovykh resursov SSSR," *Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Voprosy sotsialisticheskogo vosproizvodstva* (Moscow: 1958, p. 257-281).

IV

The data on the rural and urban population reproduced above show a larger proportion of the population in urban areas (48 percent) than would have been expected by projecting the official non-census estimate as of April 1, 1956 (43 percent urban) on the basis of reported increases in the urban population between 1950 and 1955. It would seem that either (a) the urban population has in fact increased since 1956 by almost 5,000,000 persons per year, compared to 3,400,000 between 1950 and 1955, or (b) the greater accuracy of the census total tends to render the two figures essentially incomparable. In any event, the fact that almost one-half of the Soviet population now lives in urban areas places the Soviet Union among the more urbanized countries of the world, although well below such countries as the United States (59 percent), Denmark (61 percent) and the United Kingdom (80 percent).

The Soviet Union now has the same percentage of its population in urban areas as the United States had about 1910, while it began the period of rapid industrialization with about the same degree of urbanization as the United States had in 1860. However, urbanization was more rapid in the Soviet Union during the 1930s than it was in the United States after 1860. In absolute terms the urban population doubled in about the first ten years of industrialization in the Soviet Union, but in the first 20 years in the United States. Or, expressed in somewhat different terms, it took almost 20 years for the percentage of the population in urban areas to double in the Soviet Union, but almost 40 years in the United States.

These figures are explained not only by a more rapid rate of migration of the Soviet population from rural to urban areas, but by the fact that attrition in World War II fell more heavily on former rural residents in the heavily "peasant" army. This is more than enough to compensate for the fact that in the United States during the nineteenth century a relatively large proportion of the immigrant population settled in urban areas.

The preliminary census results by administrative subdivisions serve to document more accurately the postwar population shifts toward the central and eastern parts of the country. European Russia remains the most populous part of the country, but its population in absolute terms has changed very little since prewar years. Virtually the entire increase in the total population since

the 1939 census, small though it is, has taken place in the areas outside of European Russia. This is accounted for by the eastward shift of industry and by the "virgin lands" campaign, both of which have entailed considerable migration. But it also reflects the fact that birth rates have remained relatively high in some of the eastward areas, particularly in Soviet Central Asia.

In summary, the significance of the census results so far released are two-fold. In the first place, they are important for what they reveal about a country passing through a major war and a rapid succession of economic and social developments; and because they document demographic factors which to some extent must be influencing the Soviet Government in formulating policy in labor, military and other fields. Secondly, these statistics derive importance from the simple fact that they have been released, to form a component of the flow of data from official sources which began in 1956 and shows promise of widening in the future.

FOR A REGIONAL MARKET IN LATIN AMERICA

By Galo Plaza

WE are on the threshold of a new era in the economic development of Latin America. The newly awakened aspirations for a better standard of living of a fast-growing population cannot be satisfied by our inadequate economic system, which today is as dated as the Model T Ford. In order to make more efficient use of our natural resources we must apply technicology to agriculture, develop sound industrialization and create a common market, without which any program for development of agriculture and industry would have very limited possibilities.

To understand why a common or regional market is an essential part of a master plan for the acceleration of our economic growth we must look backward for a moment. After World War II the economic development of Latin America was progressing at a highly satisfactory rate; over-all production, income and consumption showed a constant upward trend. Economic growth during the decade 1945-1954 exceeded the United States performance for the same period. In the United States the gross national product increased about 30 percent, while that of Latin America rose 50 percent. Although the population of Latin America increased by 24 percent in the same decade (compared to 16 percent in the United States), nevertheless the availability of goods and services grew substantially even on a per capita basis.

We were able to attain this remarkable rate of economic development in spite of the fact that we are mostly producers and exporters of raw materials and foodstuffs. There were two principal reasons: first, with the war came a tremendous demand for our raw materials at prices unheard of in the past; and second, we were at last—through education, sanitation and better communications—breaking away from retarding factors of a social, cultural and geographical nature that for centuries had kept our economic growth at a painfully slow pace.

Unhappily, we have not been able to maintain this rate of development beyond the first postwar decade. In 1956 the rate of economic growth slowed down and gross income increased no faster than the population; since then the trend has been down-

ward. The extremely favorable conditions for our exports have gradually changed as prices of metals, foodstuffs and other raw materials have dropped substantially. But there are other factors of greater significance that will retard our rate of development if we are to remain chiefly producers and exporters of primary commodities.

There is every reason to believe that the present rate of 2.4 percent yearly growth in population will continue. A parallel increase in gross national product will be necessary just to maintain present levels of per capita incomes. But treading water will not be enough. The postwar prosperity which made possible the enjoyment of better living conditions for a growing middle class hardly touched the great underprivileged masses, which are awakening to the fact that there is a better life and that they have a right to enjoy it.

The rapid increase in population, plus the upgrading of living standards for a very large segment of it, will make greater demands on an economic system which, even with much greater efficiency, would still be a low producer of goods and services. I have frequently asked myself this disturbing question: How can we improve the lot of all our people if there is not enough production to go around regardless of how it is distributed?

Nearly 60 percent of the total population in Latin America is dependent on agriculture, which in most cases is primitive. We could increase our production substantially by opening up new lands to production and by introducing better farming practices. Modern technology could bring us greater yields per acre, per machine and per man. Doubling our production with half the labor force would be quite feasible. Greater efficiency in agricultural production to serve a larger population would release an important segment of our labor force that would have to seek gainful employment elsewhere. The process of industrialization will be the only way to absorb this excess manpower. The following figures give a vivid picture of the problem: In 1955 the population of Latin America was about 175,000,000 and it is estimated that this figure will have increased by a further 100,000,000 by 1975. Of this number, approximately 38,000,000 will be added to the labor force. If the trends registered in the last 20 years continue, we can estimate that only 5,000,000 of these will be absorbed by agricultural activities—and fewer still if, as is greatly to be desired, technical progress in agriculture is expedited. Thus,

about 33,000,000 workers will have to seek productive employment elsewhere.

Industry in Latin America must therefore fulfill the dynamic function of absorbing surplus manpower from primary producing activities. The second task of industry is to supply all those manufactured articles which the underdeveloped countries cannot afford to import because exports of primary commodities and foodstuffs tend to increase at a much slower rate than the demand for imports.

The problem of Latin America is therefore to import what it can pay for abroad with its own resources and to meet the remainder of its growing demand for manufactured goods from domestic production. This is already being done to a limited extent. And as long as this process involved only staple consumer goods for which there is a large national market, the industrialization of Latin America in 20 watertight compartments caused no great concern. But now that our countries are entering the more complex fields of producer goods and consumer durables, involving heavy capital investment, we must have markets of wider scope than those offered by individual countries. The need for a Latin American common market is thus evident.

The establishment of the European common market has stimulated our thinking on this subject because we feel it will have important repercussions on the Latin American economy. While closer economic integration in Europe should increase the demand for Latin American products, the preferential measures which the European common market may establish for overseas territories and the technological revolution to which this project will give rise in Europe, both in agriculture and in the synthetic production of raw materials, will probably have unfavorable repercussions on our economies.

However, there is no intention on our part to imitate what is going on in Europe. Although our goals are similar, there are different conditions peculiar to each region which should be handled in different ways. The idea of a Latin American common market actually preceded the European plan. For a long time many Latin American countries have been aware of the weakness of trade between them as compared to their trade with other nations. Moreover, they realize that, besides the European common market and the British Commonwealth, the United States, the Soviet Union, China and India are in fact regional markets

of enormous magnitude. Only Latin America remains divided into 20 separate economic units.

We believe that by breaking down these watertight compartments through economic integration we will accelerate productivity, give the whole region free access to raw materials, and enable the resources of the continent to be better utilized for economic development. There are indirect benefits that may be equally important. Many governments today are aware of the unpalatable remedies needed to cure the economic infirmities of their countries, but for political reasons they are unable to put them into effect. A common market would demand from all member countries certain commitments, and the necessity of abiding by the rules of the economic community would strengthen the hands of individual governments in making needed changes in their fiscal and monetary policies.

What effect will the Latin American market have on the economies of countries outside the region? We believe that they will be favorable, because an increase in per capita income in Latin America will mean a greater demand for products—especially industrial commodities—from the other countries. Undoubtedly, world trade will benefit from the expansion of Latin American production and the new demands to which the common market will give rise. Certainly, at the beginning there will be difficulties of readjustment, but the powerful flow of international trade will eventually receive a new tributary which will swell its volume to incalculable proportions. Only the type of goods purchased will change. Latin America will cease to acquire some goods in order to buy others, which it is in no position to buy today.

Most of the great advances in international trade have followed the exchange of manufactured goods among the industrialized countries; by contrast, the share of less developed areas in total world trade has registered a continuous decline, not only as compared to the prewar period but also to more recent times. Between 1950 and 1956, it dropped from 41 percent to 31.5 percent, and the decline continues.

The Latin American countries must export manufactured goods to one another. However, in my opinion and in the opinion of well-known economists, it is quite possible to imagine Latin America competing in the industrial market with the rest of the world. It can be done through modernization and specialization of our industries.

Another argument in favor of the common market is the stimulus which it would give to foreign and domestic investment. Investors would be greatly attracted where today they are discouraged by narrow markets that are rapidly saturated. Thus the common market would not only provide opportunity for large-scale investments but investors would have greater confidence in the future of their enterprises. Such incentives are essential in order to attract foreign capital in sufficient volume.

Present conditions are not conducive to a greater flow of foreign capital to Latin America. In recent years the average of foreign investment has fluctuated annually between \$400,000,000 and \$500,000,000. Most of this money is made up of private investment from the United States and part of it is not new capital but the profits of former investments which have been plowed back. About 30 percent of this investment is designed to promote export activities, mainly mining and petroleum. This amount is quite inadequate for the normal economic development of Latin America. Investments designed to develop transportation, energy and other services which form the major part of public expenditure are very low, yet they are essential to pave the way for private investment. This is one of the most serious obstacles impeding economic development in Latin America today. Of course, it is recognized that the development of this region has to depend basically on our own resources, but they are not enough. Foreign capital is urgently needed, until national savings are adequate to sustain a significant rate of growth. We hope that the common market will lead to much more attractive conditions for investment.

The national governments concerned will have to decide on the structure of the regional market but it will be for private enterprise to give it life. The economic development of Latin America depends to a large extent on the action of the private "entrepreneur." It is essential that the Latin American entrepreneur should be given access not only to the sources of international capital but also to international technical knowledge on a footing comparable with that enjoyed by others. International technical assistance should be given to Latin American industry on the same scale that it is being extended to our agriculture. We Latin Americans realize that the main effort will have to come from ourselves. But countries which are now advanced and prosperous should remember that not one of them has been able to develop

without the help of foreign capital and technical knowledge during the initial period of their economic growth.

Economic integration within the hemisphere could be a realistic possibility once the Latin American common market is in operation. I believe that breaking down economic barriers within Latin America does not necessarily mean raising barriers around the perimeter. On the contrary, a successful Latin American common market should be able to lower barriers with the rest of the hemisphere and eventually with the rest of the world.

II

The idea of closer economic association among the countries of Latin America is not new. It has been present throughout their history, but it had little practical significance because our economies have been geared toward Europe and the United States. When World War II cut off our traditional sources of imports, the establishment of several consumer-goods industries was encouraged. This in turn served to create a consciousness of the benefits of industrialization.

A renewed and more realistic interest in integration started to germinate in 1949 when the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (E.C.L.A.) began to explore its possibilities. In 1952 the governments of Central America, with the close coöperation of E.C.L.A., began working on a five-nation system of economic integration which has achieved a large part of its goals. In November 1956 the member governments of E.C.L.A., at the first meeting of its Trade Committee, requested that studies be made of the possibilities of much broader integration embracing the whole continent. The following year the Secretariat of E.C.L.A. was requested to appoint a Working Group¹ to conduct these studies and to submit recommendations to the member governments. The Working Group held its first meeting in Santiago, Chile, in February 1958 and agreed on certain fundamental bases for a common market. At the Group's second meeting in Mexico City last February, it planned the over-all structure the common market should assume in accordance with the basic principles that had been set down the year before.

¹ The members of the Working Group invited by E.C.L.A., besides myself, were José Garrido Torres, Brazil; Rodrigo Gomez, Mexico; Flaviano Levine, Chile; Eustaquio Mendez Delgado, Argentina; Juan Pardo, Peru; and Joaquin Vallejo, Colombia. For the second meeting, in Mexico City, Carlos Lleras Restrepo replaced Joaquin Vallejo and Professor Raymond Mikesell from the United States was added to the Group.

All the members of the Group were aware of the tremendous problems involved, of the very real limitations that exist and of the need to develop a broader and more diversified economic base with a reasoned balance between efficient agriculture and sound industrialization. With these conceptions in mind we set forth the following tentative principles for a common market.

First and foremost, membership in the common market must be open to all the Latin American countries. It is therefore essential that conditions acceptable to all of them be established from the outset. This does not mean that countries closely linked by geographical proximity or common economic interests may not enter into direct negotiations among themselves. But these negotiations must be effected within the framework of a general agreement and along such lines that the reciprocal concessions involved are not exclusive and may be automatically extended to other member countries, or to such countries as may become members in the future if all do not accede to the initial agreement.

The same principle of universality must be observed as regards the products to be covered by the common market. The ultimate aim is the inclusion of all the goods produced in Latin America, although the regional market need not become effective for all such goods immediately. What is required is an agreement that will stipulate procedures and time limits for the progressive abolition of those customs duties and restrictions which nowadays hamper or prevent intra-continental trade. In other words, the agreement must be immediate but its implementation gradual.

An essential feature of the common market is that the less advanced countries must be accorded special treatment to enable them, through progressive industrialization and the over-all strengthening of their economies, to share fully in the benefits of the regional market. If this were not the case the more advanced countries would be at a considerable advantage compared to the others and in the end would achieve a favored position.

A serious problem is that of the tariff system of the common market vis-à-vis the rest of the world. It is generally desirable to establish a single external customs tariff, but in some countries the tariff has been deprived of its protectionist role and has been superseded by restrictive measures of various kinds. Hence, an interim system will have to be established to ensure the progressive abolition of such restrictions to an extent equivalent to the tariff reductions effected by other member countries.

The specialization of industry and other activities, which is one of the objectives of the regional market, must be the outcome of the free interplay of economic forces within the market area. The arrangements would not preclude national investment policies that would further the aims of the agreement. In some cases, it may be wise to give specific countries the right to establish certain industries even if this entails some restriction of free competition. Since the Central American countries already have an integration program they should be considered as a single unit, if they so desire.

In the interest of greater efficiency, the regional market must have a special system of multilateral payments which will encourage the highest degree of reciprocity in trade within the continent. It is essential that the member countries be protected against all exchange risks. The Working Group foresaw that, although basic adjustments must come through monetary, fiscal and economic policies, member countries must also have the right to impose temporary import restrictions, in accordance with agreed rules. Such measures may be necessary, for instance, to combat a large and persistent disequilibrium in the balance of payments of one country with other members of the common market. Temporary import restrictions may also be needed to reduce unemployment resulting from the adjustment of each national economy to changing conditions. If the maintenance of normal agricultural production requires it, countries may be given the right to restrict imports of some commodities, perhaps by limiting them to a certain share of the increase in consumption.

To promote the smooth functioning of the regional market, steps must be taken to avoid unfair competitive practices in exporting. Members must also refrain from discrimination and offer their exports at prices that are the same regardless of destination. The regional market must have an effective credit system and must provide technical assistance, both to stimulate intra-regional exports and to help in the establishment and development of industries. Provision is also made in these recommendations for the creation of an advisory body constituted by the member governments, as well as a system of arbitration.

Once the members of the Group had set down the basic principles which should govern the operation of the common market they proceeded to crystallize their ideas on its structure, so that nations which are already proceeding with sub-regional markets

will all play the game according to the same rules, facilitating integration into one great common market in the future. Agreement was reached on 11 points which should be briefly stated in order to complete a sketch of what has been done to date.

The agreement setting up the Common Market is designed [the statement of objectives reads] to help expedite the balanced economic development of Latin America, its progressive industrialization and the introduction of improved techniques in its agriculture and other primary activities with a view to promoting higher levels of living for its peoples, through: (a) the establishment of a preferential system for trade between Latin American countries; and (b) the growth of its foreign trade as a result of the expansion of industrial exports and the promotion of exports of agricultural and other primary commodities, both within Latin America and the rest of the world.

To administer the agreement and facilitate the attainment of its ends, a Committee on Trade Policy and Payments will be set up with all member countries represented. The judicial form contemplated in the agreement is that of a free trade zone to be transformed gradually into a customs union. In order to establish the common market gradually and progressively for all products, the agreement will be carried out in two stages. During the first stage, lasting ten years, a substantial reduction of customs duties and other taxes will take place and other restrictions will be either converted into terms of customs duties or eliminated. Intermediate steps have been contemplated during this first stage so as to reach the established goals gradually. During the second stage the reduction will continue until the organization of the common market will be complete. The rate of progress during the first stage will determine the program to be followed in the second stage.

Products are to be classified in three categories: (1) primary goods; (2) capital goods, durable goods, and other manufactures for which there is a rapidly growing demand; and (3) manufactured goods for current consumption which are in less immediate demand. During the first ten-year period duties and taxes for goods in the first category will be abolished, with certain exceptions (primarily agricultural) to be agreed upon. For products in the second category the target will be to reach the lowest possible levels in order to intensify regional trade. Reductions for products in the third category will not be as large or as rapid, so that adaptation of existing industries to the new conditions can be carried out with as little difficulty as possible.

Countries have also been divided into three groups in accordance with their development, so that they may be given differential treatment; this will serve to encourage and accelerate industrialization. The least developed nations will thus gain more rapidly the benefits of the common market than the relatively advanced nations will enjoy from the outset. Group A is composed of those countries which are the most advanced economically. Group B consists of those countries which are relatively advanced in the manufacture of consumer goods and whose production of capital goods is incipient or nonexistent. Group C is made up of countries with an incipient capacity for manufacturing consumer goods but undeveloped in respect to the manufacture of capital goods. Procedures were outlined to establish preferential treatment to countries of incipient development in Groups B and C. It was feared that if these concessions were not granted, the common market might have a harmful effect by making the poor countries poorer and the rich richer.

With certain exceptions, the most-favored-nations treatment will be in effect. Hence all the reductions in customs duties, taxes or other restrictions which a country may make unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally will be extended to all.

All the studies carried out so far have been submitted in the form of recommendations to the Eighth Session of E.C.L.A. held in Panama in May 1959. After approval by this body, the next step for the E.C.L.A. Secretariat is to prepare, in close collaboration with the governments concerned, a draft of an initial agreement for the common market in an effort to put it into effect as soon as possible.

This concludes what has been done up to now toward the creation of a common market. Latin America is experiencing the beginning of a social revolution as the needs of a growing middle class and the expectations of the masses exert tremendous pressures on an economic system which is not up to the task. Unless we can bring about an economic revolution to satisfy the demands of this social revolution, our problems will overflow into the political field, with serious consequences for the whole hemisphere. Only economic integration through a Latin American common market can make more efficient use of our resources and meet the challenge successfully.

WHERE INDIA FACES CHINA

By Hamilton Fish Armstrong

PRIME Minister Nehru gave notice to Communist China in December 1950, just after the Chinese invasion of Tibet, that the Himalayas are India's northern frontier and that an attack on Nepal would be, in effect, an attack on India.¹ What is the importance of this country which makes India's cautious Prime Minister venture to take such categorical responsibility for it?

Nepal is a border land where the civilizations of India and Central Asia meet and to some extent blend. It is guarded on the north by the towering Himalayas, including five of the world's highest peaks, but these are interspersed with passes, some 15 in number, through which at propitious seasons human-borne trade can make an arduous way from and to Tibet. Only one pass of about 9,000 feet is negotiable by yaks. On the south, Nepal joins India in a region of jungle and malarial swampland, part of the Ganges plain known as the Terai, through which a vehicular road has penetrated only since 1953. Near the center of the country, which extends east and west about 500 miles and north and south about 150, lies the small Valley of Kathmandu, the only arena until this year of Nepalese political life. The 9,000,000 Nepalese are more than 95 percent illiterate, and all but a tiny fraction of them work at gruelling animal tasks for the barest sort of living. They are divided and subdivided by tribe, caste and language. Tantrism, an erotic offshoot of Hinduism with animistic inheritances from dim times past, has been fused here with Buddhism and with the main strains of Hinduism; as a result, the pagodas and shrines which dot the country so profusely as to give the impression of outnumbering the population, offer a bewildering and horrifying assortment of deities and demons.

Politically speaking, Nepal is not at all the same today as it was when Mr. Nehru took it under India's wing in 1950, presuma-

¹ These were Mr. Nehru's actual words: "Our interest in the internal conditions of Nepal becomes still more acute and personal because of the developments across our borders, to be frank, especially those in China and Tibet. . . . The Himalayas lie mostly on the northern border of Nepal. We cannot allow that barrier to be penetrated because it is also the principal barrier to India. Therefore, much as we appreciate the independence of Nepal, we cannot allow anything to go wrong in Nepal or permit that barrier to be crossed or weakened, because that would be a risk to our own security." (Speech in the Indian Parliament, December 6, 1950.)

bly with China's acquiescence (as of that moment, anyway) in exchange for his subsequently sharply criticized recognition of China's hegemony in Tibet. For on February 12, 1959, King Mahendra promulgated a new Constitution which turned his country away from its centuries-old autocracy and in the direction—though still at a long distance—of democracy. And six days later, before the contents of the new Constitution had become really known, much less understood, the Nepalese people began their experiment with new-fangled procedures by voting for the first time in history for representatives in a national Parliament. The close juxtaposition of the two events was perhaps a wise precaution, since it prevented the Constitution itself from becoming an issue in the electoral campaign.

The Constitution considerably modified in principle the hitherto absolute rule of the monarch by establishing a democratic structure, strictly limited in scope and subject to arbitrary control from above, but for Nepal, none the less, unprecedented and revolutionary. There now are two houses of Parliament, a House of Representatives of 109 members popularly elected, and a Senate of 36 members, half elected by the lower house, half named by the King. The King appoints and dismisses Prime Ministers, though the Constitution provides that he shall choose a person able in his opinion to command a majority in the House of Representatives "either immediately or at the meeting of Parliament after the next general election." The upper house has in some cases the power to delay legislation passed by the lower house. But this provision seems unimportant compared to the fact that no legislation can become law unless it receives the King's assent. The King thus retains final control of the legislative process, and presumably will continue to do so until habits of responsible government have had time to mature in what is now a nearly complete political void and until some administrative machine can be built and manned to supplant the personal and usually corrupt régimes which succeeded one another following the overthrow of the feudal Rana oligarchy in 1950.

The problem facing the King in the years since 1950 was to find a base for his rule that had real roots in the Nepalese people, who were and are devoted to the institution of kingship personified in him, a reincarnation of the god Vishnu. How was he safely to escape from dependence on a succession of self-proclaimed leaders of untested popularity who swayed this way and that in

demagogic appeal and in attachment to foreign countries as self-interest suggested? Obviously there were considerable risks in allowing a free expression of opinion by the heterogeneous, scattered, illiterate and politically inexperienced Nepalese people—tribesmen in remote mountain fastnesses, traders and artisans in the Kathmandu Valley, inhabitants of the Terai, some of them akin to their neighbors in India, some of them jungle denizens. Although most of the Nepalese politicians had been clamoring for elections, when the King announced that they would be held they began to develop doubts. Some of them tried to influence the King to put the elections off; and so did some of the King's advisers and members of the former Rana ruling clan who realized that a popularly-elected Parliament would reduce their land holdings and further restrict their financial influence.

In the summer of 1958, King Mahendra took a trip abroad, visiting the Soviet Union, Scandinavia and Western Europe. In Moscow he was advised not to abandon personal rule and risk the chaos of anything even faintly resembling Western parliamentarianism: the object of such advice being, obviously, to retard social and political development in Nepal and thus provoke discontent in which Communism might flourish. Similar advice was given him, though of course from different motives, in Gaullist quarters in France. He returned to Kathmandu in September disposed to postpone the elections. But advised there by wiser diplomats, and himself sensing the monarchy's need to find a broader and more stable basis for the régime, he decided to make the experiment of leading the Nepalese people a long step forward into the modern world. As he said to me, "It was a risk, but sometimes risks must be taken."

The results confounded those who had prophesied radical excesses and riots and those who said that the people would be apathetic, not understanding the most elementary meaning and uses of the ballot. There was intense interest, excitement even, but no disorder. In a few places in crowded areas over 90 percent of the eligible voters, male and female, went to the polling places; in remote Himalayan valleys, where communication with any sizable settlement may be a matter of weeks, the proportion of voters fell as low as 15 or 20 percent. For Nepal as a whole, participation was about 35 percent. To secure this result, the Election Commission (which had been making preparations since 1952 when the intention to hold elections was first announced)

sent out agents to enroll voters and, later, instructors to explain the mechanics of voting. They were provided with diagrams and pictures detailing the whole novel process—how the male and female voters would form in separate queues, mark and fold the ballots, drop them in the box and afterwards make an orderly exit by a different door, as shown on the diagrams with arrows, and wend their way peacefully home. When the boxes were opened many were found to contain not only ballots but also money and flowers.

The parties had campaigned on issues and personalities under various symbols—the Nepali Congress, an offspring of the Congress Party in India, under the sign of a spreading tree such as shelters wayfarers where their dusty trails cross a stream; the reactionary Gorka Parishad, supported by many of the Rana family, under the sign of a village hut; the Independents under the sign of an elephant and the Communists under a corn cob and sickle. The returns trickled in during two months and were complete just when I was in Kathmandu in April. The Nepali Congress won an overwhelming victory, with more than two-thirds of the 109 seats in the House of Representatives. Thus it will be in a position not merely to pass legislation without hindrance but even to vote amendments to the Constitution—subject in every case, of course, to a possible royal veto. The next party, the Gorka Parishad, trailed with 19 seats, followed by the National Democratic Party with 5 seats, the Communists with 4, and a few miscellaneous to make up the total. Not merely were the ranks of all the parties except the Nepali Congress decimated; their chief leaders were one and all defeated. Among them were two former Prime Ministers known by name and reputation abroad—K. I. Singh, once feared as a demagogue with aspirations to become dictator, and Tanka Prasad Acharya, leader of Praja Parishad and one-time head of the Communist Front. Of the two, the defeat of K. I. Singh was the more spectacular. He had been with the Nepali Congress, but he opposed Indian influence in it during the revolution, was chased by Indian troops, put in prison in Kathmandu, and escaped and fled to Peking, where he stayed in rather anomalous status for three years. When he was offered political amnesty by the King, the Red Chinese Government for undisclosed reasons permitted him to return to Nepal. There he organized the United Democratic Party and became Prime Minister for a turbulent three months.

In those days he was given to expressing great friendship for India but strong hostility to the West, in particular to the United States. During the recent campaign he tried to drum up support by accusing the United States of interfering with Nepalese economic development through its aid program. This did not avail; he suffered a severe defeat at the hands of General Subarna and took to his bed, letting it be known that he attributed his downfall to the influence of American dollars. Also defeated in the election were the leader of Nepalese reactionary forces, R. D. Subba, head of the Gorkha Parishad, and the chief Communist in the country, Kaiserjung Raimjee, the Secretary of the Party. Thus the political floor was swept clear in all directions, leaving the Nepali Congress supreme. A remarkable feature of the election was that the Home Minister, D. R. Regmi, got only 503 votes in a constituency of over 5,000 voters, and that all the 21 candidates belonging to his group lost with him. The defeat of the official in charge of maintaining public order during the election seems evidence that it was fair.

The Nepali Congress had led the 1950 revolt against the Rana oligarchy, and as was to be expected campaigned on a platform of agrarian, social and economic reform and a promise to do away with corruption in the government. Its leaders are B. P. Koirala and General Subarna, and for several weeks there was doubt as to which the King would appoint Prime Minister. Mr. Koirala, the titular leader, is a man of attractive energy, sincerity of purpose and strongly liberal tendencies. General Subarna is a "class C" member of the Rana family, that is to say, one who was not in line for any Rana office; perhaps for that reason, but as most people believe out of principle, he participated in and helped finance the 1950 revolt. He served as Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Finance Minister in the cabinet that held the elections. The King finally chose Mr. Koirala as Prime Minister, with General Subarna as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance. The new cabinet faces a dual problem. It will have to begin to satisfy the desperate need and growing demand for economic betterment and political reform, starting by breaking up the feudal estates and creating the rudiments of a proper budgetary and tax system; and it will have to do this at a speed and to a degree which will not antagonize the King by making him feel that Parliament is in the grip of people in a dangerous hurry.

One result of the elections will be that members of the Parlia-

ment will flock to the capital from all over, many of them from remote tribal areas that have never dreamed of having any voice in the conduct of affairs at the center. This will create a new sense of interdependence among hitherto isolated parts of the country, reinforcing the only other sources of cohesion—the monarchy and the age-old fact of national independence. It also will present a problem to the Nepali Congress, which will have some 74 members of the Parliament to satisfy and only 12 cabinet seats. But the general expectation in Kathmandu is that the Nepali Congress, which has in the past suffered internal dissensions and defections of rival leaders, now has such a clear mandate that it will hold together for at least most of its elected five-year term. Similarly the King, having gained his point and secured a popularly-elected government to develop his country's political and economic life, is expected to accept the main part of the Nepali Congress program and thus help it maintain its popularity against both right reactionaries and the Communists.

The new era will not bring any great change in foreign policy, in so far as Nepal can be said to have a foreign policy independent of India. The government will continue desperately to need and to accept economic assistance from India, the United States and the Soviet Union. The last-named has come into the field in strength only with the signature on April 24, 1959, of an agreement providing Russian aid to the extent of 300,000,000 rupees (about \$7,500,000 at nominal exchange rates) to be used to erect a sugar mill, a hydroelectric power plant, a hospital in Kathmandu and a cigarette factory. Russian engineers and specialists will of course assist in the program, which thus recalls the Soviet Union's entrance into the economic picture in Afghanistan three years ago. As one leader of the Nepali Congress said to me, if the Soviet projects turn out to be better "eye catchers" than some of the more fundamentally important enterprises undertaken by I.C.A., that is Washington's fault, not Nepal's; and he seemed genuinely regretful at the prospect. On this occasion, at least, the Soviet action seems to have stimulated a prompt American response. Within two months the United States concluded a long negotiation looking to the creation of an air network in Nepal. It agreed to make \$600,000 available to provide Nepal with several airplanes, as well as navigation and communications equipment for Nepalese airports.

Aid from Communist China is not being actively sought. In-

deed, since China's donation of 10,000,000 rupees in cash to Tanka Prasad Acharya's government in 1956, in return for Nepal's abrogation of certain trading and extraterritorial rights in Tibet, Nepal has not moved to secure the other two scheduled installments of the promised Chinese help—another 10,000,000 rupees' worth of machinery and other materials plus 10,000,000 rupees' worth of technical assistance in making use of them. In view of what has been happening in Tibet there seems little likelihood that these remaining installments of Chinese aid will be called for. The free gift of cash was extremely useful in tiding over a desperate financial crisis; and former Prime Minister Acharya points out with logic that in return for it he merely legitimized a change in the status of Nepalese citizens in Tibet which could not have been avoided in view of India's recognition of Chinese hegemony there.

Though the leaders of the Nepali Congress are decidedly anti-Communist, as is King Mahendra, Nepalese foreign policy will continue to be neutralist. This is in conformity, of course, with the policy of India, to which country Nepal must look for physical protection. After the uprising in Tibet the chief worry in Kathmandu was lest the Chinese terror throw a flood of refugees onto Nepal's northern frontier. It was agreed that refugees would have to be admitted, both on humanitarian grounds and because, like the Nepalese, they are Buddhists, but that any arriving with arms would have to be disarmed, lest they form pockets of resistance on Nepalese soil and make forays back into their homeland. This would give the Chinese an excuse to pursue them across the frontier and to make unpleasant demands on the Nepalese Government. The check points where the trails from the main mountain passes converge are manned not only by Nepalese troops but also by wireless units of the Indian army. The contingents in the check points were not strengthened; but additional forces were concentrated in support positions. There is still a possibility that the intensification of the Chinese operations in southeast Tibet, a stronghold of the Dalai Lama, will force cornered bands of Khampa tribesmen to seek refuge in eastern Nepal. This would present the Nepalese Government with extremely uncomfortable decisions. If nothing else, China would be able to store up grievances to excuse later demands on Nepal for revisions of the frontier (which is not well defined at some points) or perhaps for a lessening of Indian influence in the Nepalese army.

This is not to say that Nepal's independence is directly threatened at present. As Prime Minister Nehru made clear, India in effect guarantees Nepal because it forms an essential segment of the Indian defense system. But China's disregard of Tibet's rights of autonomy and religious freedom as promised in the agreement with India and underwritten by the whole system of *Panchsheel*—the five principles of coexistence—has brought home to all the leaders of free Asia, and most painfully of all to Prime Minister Nehru, that good relations with Communist China are dependent not only on their sincerity but on China's sincerity as well. Most literate and politically aware Indians, including important members of Mr. Nehru's own party, now know that when the advantages which the Peking régime sees in breaking its word become really tempting it will throw the *Panchsheel* code to the winds. The sad words uttered by Mr. Nehru after Suez and Hungary, "we seem to live in a world of unreality where profession has little to do with practice," suddenly find application much nearer home. He must be wondering whether Communist China and the Soviets any longer consider him quite so useful as spokesman of the Bandung program, leader of the Afro-Asian group in the United Nations, supporter of Communist China's admission to that body, and ardent proponent of the theory, widely accepted under his influence throughout South and Southeast Asia, that neutralism offers a safe cavern of refuge from the storms of world conflict. When the moment seemed propitious for the Soviets to subvert the Iraqi Government and turn it against Nasser's brand of Arab nationalism, they did not hesitate to jettison their protégé and brand him as a black reactionary. Has Mr. Nehru now been given warning in Tibet that his friendship, too, is expendable when something more tangible is being weighed against it?

Since India considers Nepal an indispensable salient on its front against Communist China, the security of the Himalayan kingdom comes into question mainly as part of the over-all problem of Indian security. In view of the minor importance of India's armed forces and equipment compared to those of Red China backed by the Soviet Union, the chief factor in a crisis would be the nature and extent of the support which she would receive in the United Nations, especially, of course, from the United States and other Western nations. When and if the Chinese Communists attempt to take over Nepal by overt methods, India will have

to decide whether it is a first bite into her own flesh that must be resisted by all means and at any risks. If she takes that decision, then the West's reaction will be determined not simply by the rights, needs and demands of a remote Himalayan kingdom for defense but by the pleas of India for support in providing it. The Western nations should ask themselves whether they would stand aside while an India of something like its present character faced Communist China alone, with the risk that it might forcibly be brought under its control. So long as the United States, for one, answers this question in the negative India does not stand alone. Concurrently, so long as Nepal maintains internal order, pursues her new course of political and social development and is considered by India as a reliable and indispensable element in the Indian scheme of defense, she also is secure in the same degree as India herself.

Nepal is no more secure, however, against infiltration and internal disaffection due to misery and disappointed hopes among her people than any of the other small and weak states of Southeast Asia. The promptness of American aid, its direct applicability to local needs and its immediate productivity in terms of employment will count heavily in the next year or so in helping King Mahendra and the Nepali Congress majority in Parliament push their country forward on its new course.

THE WEALTH OF THE SAHARA

By Jacques Soustelle

THE Sahara, comparable in size to the United States, is essentially a land of minerals. Plants, animals and men, all live there artificially. The vast spaces, the heat, the lack of water and vegetation have combined over the centuries to make it a desert and a virtually impassable obstacle dividing Mediterranean civilizations from the people of Black Africa. Today, however, modern techniques have enabled men to transform what was a natural barrier into an economic and social link between Europe and Africa. Why, how and by whom has this historic revolution been accomplished? My object here is to try to answer those questions.

From the Atlantic westwards to Libya, from Algeria south to the frontiers of Nigeria, the Sahara covers 1,650,000 square miles of what we call the French Community. In this vast area the average rainfall each year is less than 4 inches. What is more, the precipitation is very irregular, so that two or three years may pass without a drop of water, followed by a tropical tornado which carries away everything in its wake. The variations in temperature are among the greatest in the world: a minimum of 21° F. in Tamanrasset and a maximum of 131° F. in Timimoun. For the most part, the soil is composed of sand (pure quartz), dry crusts of marl, limestone and grit, and stones eroded by wind and varying temperatures. In the center is a huge, bare, crystalline mountain, the Hoggar; in prehistoric times, when rain fell in that region, it served as a sort of water tower. Around this mountain can still be found a cobweb of river valleys, dried up for dozens of centuries.

Such are the conditions under which, until recently, a very small population used to live—and live very badly. The Sahara is the least inhabited area on the globe except for the waste regions around the Poles.

The greater part of the Sahara belongs to the French Community and is divided into two departments, directly connected to France, and four new states: the Republic of Chad, the Republic of Niger, the Republic of Sudan and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. The 840,000 inhabitants of this huge area are ethnically either the descendants of prehistoric populations or of

former slaves (black race) or of Berber and later Arab conquerors (white race). Their languages form a very confused mosaic of Berber and Arab dialects. Their religion is Islam.

Their mode of life takes two very different forms. Some—chiefly the black populations—live in concentrated groups in oases: the number in a palm grove often reaches 450 per square mile. Their subsistence comes essentially from date palms and the cereals, fruit and vegetables that grow in their shade. Over the centuries they have developed miraculous engineering methods of using the least drop of water and of protecting their plantations from the ever-invading sands. Until the last century these people were the slaves of nomads, lords of the white race, who generally owned the palm groves. The nomads, whether Berbers or Arabs, consider manual work incompatible with their dignity. Living in tents the year round, they lead their flocks of sheep, goats and camels in search of pasturage, which springs up as if by magic in the midst of the desert after a heavy shower, or can be found on the northern or southern borders of the Sahara, where it is a cause of friction between them and the permanent inhabitants. The “great nomads”—Tuareg, Chaamba, Reguiba, etc.—roam for hundreds of miles over the desert every year in search of fodder for their camels, and their caravans traditionally constitute the only means of trade. But their main transactions were in slaves (who were put in chains and taken through the desert from Black Africa to Algeria or the Red Sea), and in rock salt (exploited in the heart of the Sahara and sold to Black African populations too far inland to receive salt from the sea).

In the last century, France put an end to slavery and has also forbidden the looting of border populations, which once was a normal source of income. Salt now travels from the sea further and further into the interior, by river, railway and road, so that this resource is also gradually disappearing. One of the problems to solve in the Sahara is that of human existence itself; for by one of the paradoxes frequently seen in underdeveloped areas, civilization often reduces local resources, while at the same time modern hygiene tremendously increases the number of people to feed.

The Sahara had to wait until the second half of the twentieth century before Westerners, helped by technology, began to have some success in overcoming the immense difficulty of penetrating the desert with modern industry and offering its benefits to the inhabitants.

II

It was only at the beginning of this century that the Sahara was explored, even in its broadest geographical outlines. Between the two world wars, prospectors saw that the geological configuration of the area gave hopes of important mineral discoveries there, but in practice it was not until the 1950s that there was enough systematic exploration to produce results. Today all the world evinces an interest.

However, as far back as the war of 1914–1918 the coal fields in southern Oran, at the northern limit of the desert, were discovered and put into production. Unfortunately, the coal from Colomb-Béchar is of mediocre quality and occurs in too thin veins to allow a high output. The fact that petroleum and natural gas are present probably means that these mines do not have a great future.

Other very interesting discoveries have been made. Something less than 100 miles south of Colomb-Béchar, in the Djebel Guetara, a lode of manganese has been found. The reserves are estimated at a million tons of ore containing 45.75 percent manganese and 1.65 percent arsenic. The yield could be at least 50,000 tons annually. Some 250 miles from the Atlantic coast and to the southeast of Tindouf, an enormous vein of iron has been discovered in a place called Gara-Djebilet. We reckon that there are two billion tons of ore containing more than 50 percent iron. Over 400,000,000 tons of 57.8 percent iron could be exploited above ground. In Mauritania, a vein of iron has been discovered near Fort Gouraud, about 220 miles from the coast. It is estimated to contain 100,000,000 tons of ore containing 64 percent iron of exceptional quality and very easy to commercialize. Also in Mauritania, the copper-vein of Akjoujt—now working on a small scale—has reserves of some 500,000 tons of ore. It is the most important deposit in the French Community. Finally, we have hardly started to prospect in the huge crystalline mountain mass of the Hoggar, but already we have signs of uranium and probably some precious metals.

Of course, from the economic point of view the most spectacular and important discoveries have been those of coal, oil and gas. *A priori*, it seemed likely that there was some oil in the huge sedimentary strata which form the greater part of the Sahara. It had to be found, one may recall, in a country of which ten years ago there was not even a geological map. The difficulties encountered

in transporting drilling material and in organizing human life in completely desert places obliged us to prospect where there was a very substantial chance of success. That is why the precision of this particular geological undertaking has never been equalled elsewhere. In previous oil history, for example, an average of 1,000 drill-soundings was needed to discover a "Class A" oil field; that is to say, one with a capacity of at least 50,000,000 barrels; in the Sahara, an average of 22 drill-soundings was enough to discover each of the five "Class A" oil fields now known. Let us look briefly at the principal areas where we found oil and natural gas.

On the boundary between the Sahara and Libya, in the area of Edjeleh, the *Compagnie de Recherches et d'Exploitation de Pétrole au Sahara* (C.R.E.P.S.), whose major capital is French, with a participation of Royal Dutch Shell, struck an oil field in January 1956 at a depth of 1,475 feet. Explorations in this region have so far shown the existence of eight fields of various depths, including Edjeleh, Zarzaitine and Tigentourine. The known reserves of this whole region run to about 150,000,000 tons.

On June 12, 1956, the first drilling at the now famous field of Hassi-Messaoud struck oil at a depth of 10,800 feet in a productive formation 460 feet thick. This oil field, of very wide extent but not yet delimited, is astride the territories of two companies, the *Compagnie Française des Pétroles* (Algérie), the capital of which is 100 percent French, with the State the main shareholder, and the *Société Nationale de Recherches de Pétrole en Algérie*, with exclusively French public capital. At the present time the reserves of the Hassi-Messaoud oil field total 500,000,000 tons.

More recently, in the region of Laghouat, oil was discovered at Bordj Nili; the potentialities on this northern border of the Saharan platform are important. Finally, some 50 miles south of Hassi-Messaoud at El Gassi, the *Société Nationale des Pétroles d'Aquitaine*, the capital of which is almost entirely French, with the majority owned by the State, discovered an oil field which yielded 10,600 cubic feet the first day. Following this promising result, three new drill-soundings to take place before the end of 1959 will help establish the importance of this field.

As for natural gas, the first important reserves were discovered in March 1954 in Djebel Berga, near In-Salah. Unfortunately, because this field is 625 miles from the coast, its exploitation is impossible for the time being. As a matter of fact, enormous and more accessible gas reserves have been discovered in the northern

part of the Sahara. In Hassi-Messaoud itself, each ton of oil yields over 7,000 cubic feet of gas. Predictions for the near future are an annual output of 10,000,000 tons of petroleum in Hassi-Messaoud, plus 70.6 billion cubic feet of gas. Of course, the gas will be used first. Finally and most important of all, a great field of humid gas has been discovered in Hassi-R'Mel, in the region of Ghardaïa. The proven reserves in this pocket of unknown size amount now to almost 30,000 billion cubic feet and will probably far exceed this figure. (Incidentally a cubic foot of this gas produces 335,500 calories, which is the equivalent of three and a half pounds of coal.)

All these discoveries result from a very incomplete exploration of the wealth in the Saharan subsoil. The total wealth will be known only after further and more accurate investigation.

III

The first technical problem to be confronted, once petroleum and gas have been discovered, is obviously how to transport them to the market. And here an official of the French Government can take pride in the fact that French technology has broken all records. In the past, at least ten years have always elapsed between the discovery of an oil field and the time when it could yield 10,000,000 tons a year. France will get that amount from Hassi-Messaoud in 1961, only four or five years after the first actual sounding.

Extraction of oil is progressing very fast at Hassi-Messaoud. A 24-inch pipeline 415 miles long is now being completed, in spite of the difficulties of surmounting a pass more than 3,600 feet high. The two pumping stations provided for initially will start functioning early this fall. In the last quarter of 1959, therefore, oil from the Sahara will arrive in industrial quantities on the Algerian coast, where we are building loading docks in the harbor of Bougie. At the start, this pipe will deliver 4,000,000 tons a year. We plan to add two new pumping stations and gradually bring the output to 14,000,000 tons in 1962 at the latest. At that time, it will supply half the consumption of the whole French Community.

About a year later oil from the region of Edjeleh will be carried through a pipeline of similar size and capacity running towards the Gulf of Gabès, in Tunisia. Thus without taking into account possible new discoveries, the Saharan petroleum

output may be estimated for the next few years as follows: 1959, 1,500,000 tons per year; 1960, 8,000,000 to 10,000,000; 1961, 16,000,000 to 20,000,000; 1962, 18,000,000 to 25,000,000.

The pipelines now being built will have a maximum capacity of 28,000,000 tons, but already we count on doubling them with new installations. In all, with the prospects of additional fields to be worked, we hope that the Saharan output will reach 50,000,000 tons by 1965.

Naturally such important discoveries have involved considerable expense, even though the precise work of our geologists has cut down costs remarkably. Investment amounted to 69 billion francs in 1957, 63 billion in 1958 and will amount to 122 billion in 1959 and 130 billion in 1960.

Logically enough, the State bore by far the greater part of the expense at the beginning; but it has gradually been replaced as private investment was more and more attracted by the results already obtained. In 1957, for example, public capital provided 60 percent of the investment made in Saharan petroleum activities. In 1959, however, the State had only a 9.4 percent share; private investment amounted to 29 percent, loans to 53 percent and foreign capital to 8.6 percent. These figures show clearly that, certain propaganda reports to the contrary, the wealth of the Sahara is, and will remain, in the hands of the French people who discovered it and have brought it into production.

I do not mean to imply, however, that France intends to transform the Sahara into a private "game preserve" where foreign companies will not be allowed to carry on legitimate activities. The proof is that at present foreign interests hold 24 percent of the permits which have been issued to conduct exploration in particular areas, and of the total, several American companies together hold 5.5 percent. This does not take into consideration the research permits requested by Standard Oil of New Jersey for an area of 7,700 square miles, presently under consideration. Permits to search for petroleum in the Sahara are granted in the same way to all companies, regardless of nationality. However, the French Government has seen to it that the capital of concessionaires is always at least half French.

The holder of a research permit who strikes oil may ask for a working permit, and will then get a 50-year lease. Profits will be divided fifty-fifty between the State and the grantee—the pattern generally prevailing. Because our lawmakers want Saharan

petroleum, from the time of discovery to final marketing, to be smoothly integrated into the world system of petroleum production and distribution, they have provided that it is to be sold at international market prices.

IV

The reader must certainly have been struck by a double contradiction in my story up to this point. First, the contradiction between the evident poverty of the Saharan people and the latent natural wealth of their territory. Secondly, there is the contradiction between the tremendous quantity of highways, airports, railways, tele-communications, domestic housing, etc., needed for the fantastic development of the petroleum industry and the lack of all such facilities under the limitations imposed by natural conditions. It was to solve this double contradiction little by little that the Organisation Commune des Régions Sahariennes (O.C.R.S.) was created early in 1957. In the first article of the law setting it up, its essential task is clearly defined: it is to develop the latent natural resources of the region in order to advance its economic and social development, to raise the standard of living and promote the social progress of the people native to the Sahara, taking their traditions into account.

The zone of interest of the O.C.R.S. includes the Saharan departments, the Saoura and the Oasis, which are administered by the central government. It further is authorized to conclude agreements, as sanctioned by the French Government, with the four states of the Community—Chad, Niger, Sudan and Mauritania—in order to establish its proper participation in the Saharan territories belonging to those states. As I write, several agreements are being favorably studied by all parties. Since these states of the Community have complete internal autonomy by virtue of the Constitution approved by the referendum of September 28, 1958, the administrative personnel is completely under the control of each state government.

On the other hand, the two Saharan departments, the Oasis and the Saoura, are French departments, but of a particular type. Instead of being under the authority of the Minister of Interior, as are departments of Metropolitan France, they are under the Minister of Saharan Affairs, who is a member of the Government of the French Republic. Gradually these departments will come to be administered in the same way as those of France. The popu-

lations of these two departments elect their deputies (three for the Oasis and one for the Saoura were elected in November 1958), senators and town councillors. Elections of the town councillors took place in 93 communes in March 1958. In 68 of these communes, a mayor is elected; sometimes he is helped by an administrative councillor. In the 25 remaining communes, owing to their lack of civic evolution, the mayor is still appointed provisionally, but as soon as possible he will be replaced by an elected official.

The participation of the local population in carrying out the plans of the O.C.R.S. in economic and social matters is making steady progress. In the general interest, alike of the people and the petroleum technicians, new cities are rising from the desert and camel tracks are being replaced by roads, many of them with macadamized surfaces of international standard. At the same time, irrigation projects have bettered and extended the traditional palm groves, created new centers of civilization and extended and stabilized pasturelands, thus laying the basis for a permanent rise in the Saharan people's standard of living. Also, the number of Saharans working as unskilled or skilled laborers—some, even, as specialists in industrial centers—is steadily increasing as a result of large-scale vocational training. As the number of those employed increases, the amount of wages being paid of course increases also. I want to emphasize that this social improvement will be financed essentially by the royalties collected by the French State on the profits of petroleum exploitation: and the State intends to assign these to the needs of the local population.

v

The American reader will certainly ask how such a tremendous development is possible when the men and materials involved must cross Algeria, now torn by conflict. How can personal security be given to the prospectors, drillers and operators? Above all, how is it possible before the end of the Algerian conflict to assure the arrival of Saharan petroleum on the Algerian coast at a given date? I have no intention of dodging this problem, which is real, but I want to reduce it to its proper proportions. For as a matter of fact, the development of the wealth of the Sahara is not interfered with by the fighting in Algeria and will become one of the foundations for a future and permanent peace there.

Actually, in the Sahara there have so far been only rare and unimportant incidents due to activities of the Front of National Liberation (F.L.N.), because we have taken the necessary steps to minimize them; and here I must pay tribute to the soldiers of the French Army who efficiently maintain order and security in the region, both for the local people and the technicians.

In spite of the conflict, we have already proven that we can get the oil out to the Algerian coast. Since the beginning of 1958, a small pipeline has carried oil from Hassi-Messaoud to Tougourt, and from there tank cars take it to Philippeville on the coast. The F.L.N. had sworn that no trains would pass by, but they did. Once, at the beginning of this year, the F.L.N. did succeed in blowing up a few cars, but in the last 12 months more than 17.5 million cubic feet of oil have crossed to the Algerian coast. It will continue to flow in ever-increasing quantities. Some of it will be refined on the coast to help Algeria to industrialize. But even more important to the economic development of North Africa will be the natural gas of Hassi-Messaoud and Hassi-R'Mel.

Without waiting for the end of the Algerian conflict, General de Gaulle announced the enactment of the "Constantine plan," the first stage of the industrialization of Algeria. Under this plan a very important steel industry will develop within five years in the region of Bône. Saharan gas will provide the power required to make steel from the iron ore found in the important veins of Ouenza. This gas will be sold to Algerian industries roughly at cost, that is to say, at the lowest price in the world.

The industrialization of Algeria will mean a wider distribution of wages, a rapid increase in the standard of living, and, finally, the end of the social crisis which has been one of the main causes of the conflict. It is in this sense that the discovery of considerable new sources of energy in the Sahara may be said to be an essential factor in achieving peace in Algeria.

However, maximum development of Algerian industries will by no means absorb all of the resources from the Sahara. When the Hassi-Messaoud field is pumping 14,000,000 tons of oil per year through the pipeline now under construction, it will also yield 82.7 billion cubic feet of gas. Hassi-R'Mel can easily supply over 700 billion cubic feet per year, which will be carried to the Algerian coast by the projected feeder line.

Since this quantity of gas will need to find a world-wide market, or at least a European one, French technicians are already

developing new methods for transporting it overseas. Possibly it will be taken to Europe in liquid form, carried in specially built tankers of great capacity. Our engineers are also studying the possibility of using trans-Mediterranean pipelines—either floating submerged or resting at the bottom—to carry gas at least as far as Spain. Finally, there are plans to transform the power produced by gas into high voltage electricity which would be transmitted to Europe by submarine cables.

It is not daydreaming to talk about these long-range plans; technology always discovers a way to utilize available raw materials, however great the obstacles. We may foresee that in years to come not only France but also a great part of Europe will find in the Sahara the cheap power it so much needs for rapid industrial growth. If the O.C.R.S. can come to agreement with the Black African states bordering on the Sahara, then the discoveries made in the desert can also benefit other parts of Africa and help them to develop. Thus the Sahara, which for thousands of years was an obstacle between white men and black, will have been transformed at last into a link enabling them to meet on grounds of common prosperity.

Are we not right, we Frenchmen, in saying that—thanks to our technicians, administrators and soldiers, as well as to all the European and Moslem workers who have helped and will help to develop this wealth—we can make a most important contribution to the struggle of a vast region of the world to reach a higher standard of living? And may we not rightfully take pride in contributing in this way to the maintenance of world peace?

WHITE MINORITIES IN AFRICA

By Margery Perham

WE ARE becoming used to the acceleration of political movement in our world. But surely all records of the pace of change have been broken in the continent of Africa during the last few years with the sudden emergence of one state after another from colonial control, or the promise of such emergence in the near future. Whereas the period of "colonialism" for Britain's major white and Asian dependencies could be measured in one or two centuries, her black ones, admittedly immeasurably more backward in every aspect, have run the course from annexation to independence or its threshold in little more than half a century.

As the tide of independence rises until it covers almost the whole of Africa, with some parts clearly on the edge of submergence, certain islands of European control catch the eye. The great majority of the 5,500,000 Europeans who live among the 220,000,000 "native" peoples of Africa are in the two temperate extremities, Algeria in the north, South Africa in the south. Here are long-established European populations which are determined not to allow the indigenous population to take control. Algeria is still under metropolitan rule and there the political settlement waits upon a military decision and upon the mind of General de Gaulle. In South Africa the Nationalist government seems to be sternly marching against the ideas and experience of nearly all the rest of the world, defying economics as it goes, and is apparently bound for disaster. But not yet. The unwavering resolution of a small and lonely nation, which can see no alternative between domination and disaster, may long hold down a black majority which so far shows few signs of being competent at revolution.

The patches of African political landscape which seem to be in the most immediately equivocal position lie in the British territories between South Africa and Ethiopia. Here are small areas of white settlement, containing some 300,000 people, by no means all true settlers, scattered amongst an African population of more than 20,000,000. Will this small minority be able to control the rate of the rising flood of Africanism? Will they float buoyantly off, still a secure and influential minority, even

if the tide should flow over their present position? Will they be submerged? Or will they be swept back to Europe? These are not academic or distant questions. During the last few years and, especially during the last few weeks, as this is being written, we have seen conflict, both physical and political, in this region.

The purpose of this article is to endeavor, not, indeed, to offer confident answers to these difficult questions, but to put together some of the material out of which these answers must be constructed. The region is too vast and disparate for any detailed description and only generalizations and impressions can be offered. But we must at least chart its main features.

This part of Africa is no monolithic slab of the continent. It is all in the British Commonwealth, but that inclusion seems to encourage diversity rather than uniformity. The area contains six states: Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda, Southern and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, all, of course, entirely the creation of European pioneers and diplomats who pegged them out on the obscure and plastic surface of tribal Africa about 70 years ago. Each differs from the other in size and in the natural physical and human character it possessed before demarcation, while European government and economic development and, above all, European settlement have subsequently imposed new layers of difference.

Constitutionally, the territories are confusing. The first three in the list, the northern three, have each a different status. Kenya is a Colony, Uganda a Protectorate, and ex-German Tanganyika a Trust Territory. In spite of these distinctions they are administered by British governors, responsible to the Colonial Office. But all three have Legislative Councils upon which local representatives of all races, elected and nominated, play an increasing part, though the official control is maintained. The three territories coöperate, mainly for purposes of administrative convenience and technical services, under a High Commission. Fears of the Kenya settler influence shown by the Africans of the two other states have thwarted attempts at any closer union.

The three territories of Central Africa also differ, perhaps even more confusingly, in constitutional status. Since 1953 they have been bound together in a Federation of a very peculiar kind. It has brought together a Colony, Southern Rhodesia, which was all but self-governing long before 1953, and two Protectorates which remain under the Colonial Office.

The distribution of land, population, immigration and wealth are shown in the following statistics:

	AREA IN SQ. MILES	POPULATION 1958 EST.	REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE 1958-9 EST. (in pounds sterling)	VOLUME OF EXTERNAL TRADE 1958 (in pounds sterling)
Kenya	224,960	Eur. 64,700 African 6,080,000 Asian 165,000 Arab 35,000 Other 5,700 6,351,000	R. 40,091,705 E. 40,426,725	94,093,380
Uganda	93,981	Eur. 9,600 African 5,695,000 Asian 58,000 Arab 2,100 Other 1,400 5,767,000	R. 21,857,216 E. 26,739,677	73,391,317
Tanganyika	362,688	Eur. 21,200 African 8,788,000 Asian 80,900 Arab 21,400 Other 4,100 8,916,000	R. 19,787,095 E. 20,975,844	77,373,062
N. Rhodesia	288,130	Eur. 72,000 African 2,250,000 Other 8,400 2,330,400	R. 15,100,772 E. 15,000,266	
S. Rhodesia	150,333	Eur. 211,000 African 2,590,900 Other 14,900 2,815,900	R. 19,127,000 E. 19,663,625	(Total for the three territo- ries given below)
Nyasaland	49,177	Eur. 8,600 African 2,720,000 Other 11,500 2,740,100	R. 5,331,802 E. 5,072,278	
Total:				
Central African Federation	487,640	Eur. 292,000 African 7,560,000 Other 35,000 7,887,000	R. 51,441,000 E. 51,300,552	293,431,397

This table tells us something about the poverty of these countries; the scantiness of population but not its patchy distribu-

tion; where immigrant groups are most numerous but not the historical and other factors which determine their political strength. A comparable table for West Africa would show populations of greater weight and density and also the absence of white settlement. But it would not reveal the contrast which explains the great problem of the eastern side—the much greater advancement of the West Africans due both to the higher indigenous cultural level of most of their people before European contact and the much longer span of that contact.

The political difficulties in East and Central Africa spring ultimately from the attitudes of mind of the three parties concerned: the settlers, the Africans and the British Government. True, there is an Asian element in East Africa, much larger than the European, but it has not yet acted as a major political influence.

First, the Europeans. They have been the subject of so much humanitarian or doctrinaire criticism that it is important to remember that they did not go to Africa, like the missionaries, for religious motives or, like the officials, for professional, romantic or patriotic reasons. And, unlike these groups, they committed themselves wholly to the unknown country, investing their lifelong energies, perhaps their whole capital, perhaps their families, in what was often a very speculative venture. The land seemed untamed and unloved. The Africans were encountered almost entirely as very unskilled labor. Language and custom were barriers. To the urgent white employer, uninstructed in anthropology, perhaps unimaginative, the Africans seemed almost sub-human in their non-comprehension—dirty, lazy and utterly unreliable. He could see, superficially, their way of life, their dark little huts of sticks and mud, their pathetic agricultural scratchings, perhaps their drunkenness and witchcraft. The farmer might suffer severe loss, perhaps of valuable animals, through what would seem an African's incredible neglect or stupidity.

Was it surprising that many settlers developed two convictions, one of the almost irremediable inferiority of the Africans and the other of their own mission to bring civilization into the millennial ignorance and savagery of Africa? Americans, who confront Negroes who have had two centuries or more of acculturation, and who need have no fear of submergence under a vast black majority, should understand the settlers' political and

social attitudes. With time these attitudes changed as the laborers became somewhat more efficient and the employers more understanding. But only in part. Settler leaders in Kenya, for instance, in the 1920s and early 1930s, would talk of the 2,000 years it had taken for Britain to graduate in civilization. In the political sphere the settlers' very understandable sense of superiority was expressed in the demand for a monopoly of elected representation, an authoritative influence over the imperial power and then the right to succeed it. The historical precedent was close at hand in South Africa.

The second party is that of the Africans. When first annexed, the tribes could not, of course, understand what had happened to them. After the initial resistance to conquest put up by some but by no means all the tribes, the great majority accepted their new rulers and responded passively to the deep changes imposed upon their lives. There was, after all, much that could be welcomed as good: the new peace and security; the new freedom to move over large areas; the new skills they were taught; above all, perhaps, the wonderful new goods, clothes, lamps, bicycles, tin roofs and the rest. Shut away from the outside world within a bilateral relationship between rulers and ruled, the fact of subjection to the white man was accepted as an inescapable new order.

But during the 1930s in West Africa and rather later on the eastern side, a sizable generation of Western-educated youth was coming of age. Africans had eaten of the tree of Western knowledge and the passivity of ignorance was shattered. They now knew that in the ruling country there was often a difference of opinion about the rights and wrongs of their treatment. They read law, history and politics. They began to find words—English words—to define the strains and pressures they had hitherto taken for granted. With the Second World War the external influences making for conscious discontent with the colonial status multiplied, while the schools in Africa turned out an increasing number who were aware of the world in which they, and indeed the Negro race as a whole, seemed to be kept in subjection and treated with indignity. This knowledge seems to act like a poison in the blood, more or less inflammatory according to temperament and circumstances. In order to find alleviation, those who suffer from it struggle for equality with other races and especially, of course, with the people who rule them. Equality of

every kind—social, economic and political—is demanded and generally demanded at once.

The third participant is the British Government, that long projection of power and influence which originates in the British electorate and finds its ultimate agency in the colonial governor and his civil service. Critics of “colonialism” tend to simplify what they condemn. They forget, firstly, that the British Government often followed up its pioneering nationals in order to control them in the interests of the indigenous peoples and, secondly, that it sometimes found it impossible to assert this control. During the 1930s British governments, extending some of the lessons learned in the increasing plans for social betterment at home, directed vigorous and expert services—medical, educational and agricultural—amongst the African tribes and fostered their local government. But though the Gold Coast and Southern Nigerian politicians were beginning to reveal the dimension and urgency of African hopes, the authorities generally failed to anticipate that full self-government would be demanded and promised before the half-century was over. In East and Central Africa the British Government showed that it could do little more than influence the varied situations intensifying the African character of Uganda and Tanganyika, partially retreating before European pressure in the Rhodesias, and unable, in spite of a long series of commissions, committees and white papers, to discover a policy to solve the Kenya problem.

Here, then, were the factors of the Central and East African situation up to some ten years ago: confident and dominant British minorities in the Rhodesias and Kenya; divided and quiescent African majorities just awakening to both discontents and hopes; and a controlling British government—humane, liberal, increasingly active in African interests, but lacking in foresight and by no means in control of all the factors.

II

The present decade has seen this situation roughly shaken. The rapid evolution of the Gold Coast into Ghana, the first British Negro colony to gain independence, accompanied by quick steps towards independence by non-African colonies, has given the native leaders in East and Central Africa an intoxicating draught of confidence. They have learned in these years to reinforce their weak position by drawing upon the practical or the

psychological support they have found in the outside world—the United Nations; the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions; the Bandung, Cairo and Accra Conferences; the sympathetic influences in the United States, India and elsewhere; and in the very existence of the Communist world with its military and ideological threat to their rulers, and its alternative system. What has been the impact of this upsurge upon the countries we are considering?

Let us look first at East Africa. In Tanganyika, Britain has quickly made large constitutional concessions this year before the pressure generated by the able African leader, Julius Nyerere. Further steps towards majority rule are being planned. The Africans had, of course, the support of the Trusteeship status, while the immigrant community was small and was much divided in race and nationality. After a long attempt to claim parity of representation, they quickly came to terms with the Africans. There will be no racial conflict here. But the British Government must have acted with secret misgivings. Tanganyika has far fewer of the qualifications for nationhood than Ghana. It is a large and poor country, with an ill-distributed population and inadequate communications, while its brief period of existence as a state under European tutelage has been divided between two rulers and interrupted by a destructive war in the territory. Its leaders must bring themselves to accept much help if they are to make an ordered and prosperous unity, still more a democracy, of such a country.

In Uganda, the dynamic and liberal governorship of Sir Andrew Cohen showed British rule in its most positive response to the new forces at work in Africa. But even he came up hard against Uganda's great obstacle to the advance of the Protectorate towards full self-government: the great pride, wealth and self-sufficiency of the Kingdom of Buganda. Its Kabaka and chiefs, tenacious of their ancient and highly developed kingdom, unique in East Africa, refuse to join in the largely elected Legislative Council through which the British Government is trying to foster unity and political experience among tribes of very diverse culture and advancement. But the policy is clear. Britain has declared Uganda to be "primarily an African State" on the road to self-government and no European settler interest complicates the future or need alarm the Africans of this compact, well-watered country. The Asians, the commercial community,

are, however, being threatened by African antagonism, shown this year in an attempted boycott of "foreign" goods, and they have grave fears for their future.

In Kenya there is the same story of recent and rapid African advance. The European settlers have lately accepted, some of them with fear and reluctance, the large increase of African members, and *elected* members, in the legislature. Equal opportunities have been opened in the Civil Service; and equal access to hotels and a host of other measures for African betterment in town and country have marked the years since the end of the Mau Mau movement. But the African members, under the uncompromising leadership of Tom Mboya, have lately been refusing any collaboration so long as European settlers still retain what the Africans regard as a numerically disproportionate position in the Legislative and Executive Councils. Mr. Mboya has drawn heavily upon external sources for support. By his activities in Accra, in the United States, and as a labor leader in close touch with Transport House in Britain and the I.C.F.T.U. headquarters in Brussels, as well as by his wide travels, he has built for himself an international status.

In April of this year the European leader, Mr. Michael Blundell, resigned from his position as Minister for Agriculture, a government nomination, and has thrown himself into the storms and cross-currents of party politics in order to try to lead his own community towards participation in a truly multi-racial government. He has advocated a number of liberal measures, including a movement away from tribal exclusiveness, African or European, in the holding of land—hitherto the "White Highlands" have been sacrosanct—and even an experiment in multi-racial secondary education. These proposals mark the abandonment of the old aims of complete white social and political superiority. Inevitably his own right wing is indignant.

Will the African leaders respond or will they reject all compromise and demand at once the absolute control which the "undiluted democracy" they claim must give to their numbers? A few days after Mr. Blundell's dramatic action the Colonial Secretary made the statement, long demanded by the Africans, that in Kenya, as in other dependencies, Britain aimed "to build a nation based on parliamentary institutions." With this ultimate prospect at last recognized, it is possible that the Africans will recognize their need, at least for a period, of coöperation

with those Europeans and Asians whose stake in the life of the Colony and whose civic and economic capacity are so much greater than their numbers. But the psychology of the Africans makes it difficult for them to achieve patience or agree to any compromise based on such a claim. The answer may soon be known.

The Africans have reason to pause. They are still deeply divided by differences of tribe and of way of life. The two main groups are concentrated in two areas distant from each other. Pastoral and partly Nilotic tribes are scattered thinly in the northern and southern fringes. The coast, divided by a dry area from the more populated highlands, has known a long Arab settlement. The larger commercial centers, especially Mombasa and Kisumu, are more Asian than European or African. While it is true that African agriculture has made great strides in the last five to ten years, largely through a campaign of betterment financed by Britain and by a policy of consolidating scattered African holdings, yet the skilled farming of the European highlands is still an all-important element in the economy. The needs of the country have far outrun its revenues. Without large financial as well as military aid from Britain the Mau Mau rebellion would have utterly ruined the country. In other words, Kenya, as a state and an economy, is a precarious structure. It is difficult in the near future to imagine the Africans in control. Even if they could supply enough competent individuals at the top, they could hardly create sufficient unity and party organization to give them the necessary steady democratic support from below. And though each year sees more Kenya-born Europeans and even more Asians who either would not or could not leave the country, there are many others who would not remain under an unstable and inefficient government but who, at great cost to themselves and to the colony, would take their skill and their capital elsewhere.

The greatest hope for the interval between the renunciation of settler ambitions and the capacity of Africans to take over the major share of power may rest with the British Government. The African leaders have always distinguished clearly between imperial power and settler power and have admitted their need of sustained help from the first. This Mr. Lennox-Boyd has now promised. By the sincerity and energy of its actions in advancing both African opportunities, and also the education to use them, the Government might retain their confidence and at the

same time safeguard the interests of the minorities. Both sides might in this period learn to cease putting race before any other consideration—an achievement well established in the West Indies.

III

The future of Kenya is cloudy enough, especially for the immigrant races. But at least there are not the materials there for bitter and enduring racial conflict. In Central Africa the Europeans are in a much stronger position to struggle for their supremacy. Their headquarters are really, as the statistics show, in Southern Rhodesia. Their community is not isolated in the heart of Negro tropical Africa, as are the Kenya settlers. They are the extension of the strongest and most solid block of European settlement in Africa. Penetrating northwards from South Africa in the last years of the nineteenth century, under the stimulus of Cecil Rhodes and his British South Africa Company, and heavily defeating the powerful Matabele tribe, they were from the first in a much stronger position, towards both the local Africans and the British Government, than the Kenya settlers. With the later development of copper still further north, thousands of Europeans, many of them Afrikaners, were drawn to the string of mines running up to the Belgian Congo. In 1923 the Company's control ended; the Rhodesians voted in a referendum against joining South Africa and obtaining from Britain virtually complete internal "self-government" as a white minority. Northern Rhodesia, with its fewer whites, remained a Protectorate under the Colonial Office.

These few thousand white men scattered about the immense areas north and south of the Zambesi felt anxious from time to time about their status and their future. Shut off from the sea by Portuguese East Africa, their economies narrowly based upon a few primary products, they considered intermittently whether unity would strengthen them.

Passing over the years of uncertainty, let us examine the motives which led to the formation of the present Federation in 1953. First, the Rhodesians, being mainly of British stock, were increasingly alienated by the Union of South Africa because of the anti-British bias of its Nationalist Party government and its repressive native policy. Second, they hoped with unity to rationalize and advance their economy and attract more settlers and

capital. Third, they felt a nationalist urge to create a new, large self-governing nation. Fourth, watching uneasily the political stirrings in Africa, and suspicious of Britain's tendency to what they regarded as premature surrenders to African nationalism, they wanted full control over their own African policy. Britain, upon her side, saw that a weak and isolated Southern Rhodesia must one day be absorbed by South Africa. Northern Rhodesia could not long escape the influence, and there would then be an extension of Afrikaner nationalism and *apartheid* almost to the equator. The alternative was to build up a large dominion, loyal to Britain and the Commonwealth, in which Britain would retain sufficient control to support the liberal elements in the Rhodesias and promote a great new experiment in racial partnership. Mainly upon British initiative, the isolated little Protectorate of Nyasaland, where, with a few European settlers, 2,400,000 Africans live poor and crowded in glorious mountains and lacustrine scenery, was added to the two Rhodesias.

The Federation was built upon an insecure foundation of compromise and conflict. The compromise was between Rhodesian ideas of partnership and those of Britain, between a distant and inconstant liberalism and the clear-cut determination of the colonists (in spite of the concessions they were obliged to make in order to get British agreement to the Federation) to maintain white supremacy for as far ahead as they could see. There was compromise, too, in retaining the status of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland as Protectorates linked with an all-but-independent Colony in an all-but-independent Federation. There was compromise in the very wording of the Federal Act which held out to Europeans the prospect of going forward to full self-government and yet made any changes dependent upon the will of all the inhabitants.

The Federal constitution is, indeed, an elaborate structure designed to give the African educated élite a limited representation in the Federal Parliament and the right to an "ordinary" vote alongside Europeans. At present this group consists of a relatively small enfranchised minority, while the great mass of the poorer and more backward Africans are checked, by the grant of a "special" vote of less representative value, from swamping the polls. The northern Africans, and especially those of Nyasaland, are fearful of permanent subordination to the European minority, while the advances of fellow Africans, and especially

of Ghana, have reinforced their desire for independence. The recent disorders in Nyasaland have tragically revealed the tensions which underlie the Federation and have aroused anxious debates in Central Africa and Britain.

At the moment the problems seem grave and all but insoluble. The Europeans of the Rhodesias cannot hand themselves and the governments and the economies they have built up to an African majority that is wholly unready for such a different responsibility. Can they succeed in their plan of at once encouraging and yet controlling the flow of educated Africans to the ranks of responsible citizenship upon Rhodes' oft-quoted dictum of "Equal rights for all *civilized* men"? Impatient African leaders, resenting any gradualism imposed upon their advance, and knowing their strength lies mainly in numbers, claim "full democracy" and encourage the intimidation of moderates who collaborate individually with the four governments. One hope lies in the remaining faith the northern Africans have in their direct contact with Britain as a distant and impartial power which has encouraged African political advance elsewhere. Although this means the continuation of a difficult division of authority within the Federation, with British public and party opinion playing upon a delicate situation, this may still be the best way of gaining a period of perhaps ten years in which the Protectorate Africans may be helped to advance in political experience, while profiting from the economic development of the Federation. But no distant observers should underrate the grave difficulties which, whether in the "all black" or the "mixed" territories of East and Central Africa, lie between them and their ordered and prosperous advance into nationhood.

CHANGE AND CONFLICT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

By Leo Silberman


AFRICA is no longer a minor if passionate theme of the Concert of Europe; it commands increasing attention in its own right. As time goes on, the course of African nationalism, and even the direction and pace of economic development, will be determined more and more by agreements and disagreements between African peoples themselves and by the balance of power struck within an African region. The newly complicated rhythms and unfamiliar instruments of inter-African affairs require the student to reach back beyond the partition of Africa to the shifts and accommodations made by the African peoples as they coped with warlike neighbors, new migrations or natural disasters. That is the purpose of this article: to explain the inter-relations of the indigenous peoples of one African region, the Northeast, and the difficulties they have in finding stable arrangements that will give them some sense of lasting security and independence.

In Northeast Africa two great peoples face one another: the Christian Amhara and other peoples loyal to the Ethiopian crown on the one side, and, on the other, the Moslem Somalis, divided by clan but culturally homogeneous. Both have a long history, remembered in song and saga, and occasionally in written records. Each is of mixed descent but today breeds an easily distinguishable physical type. Each has an unmistakable style of life which is well adapted in one case to a mountain environment, in the other to the thorn-bush grazing lands. Much draws them together, for they are twice related, through their common Semitic ancestry in southern Arabia and by intermarriage with the Hamites whom they subjugated, absorbed or decimated in the course of several centuries of successful raiding and expansion. Much divides them, including a record of formidable wars.

In Ethiopia, land tenure is such that war is the most effective way for a man to improve his lot. Among the nomadic Somali, each clan must periodically reassert its power to defend the traditional grazing area and water holes. It must keep itself in fighting trim lest sub-sections split away to attach themselves to more impressive confederacies. In this Malthusian region, then, the choice is usually between internecine warfare and the attempted

conquest of neighbors having a different religion and language.

Even the ancient world was aware of the breakup of several empires in this part of Africa. In the thirteenth century, an Ethiopian hymn glorifying a victory identified the Somali as the defeated enemy. In the sixteenth century, the Imam of Harar and his multilingual troops were close to wiping out the Christian



Ethiopians. When in the nineteenth century the Europeans came bearing gifts of ammunition to the kings of Ethiopia, the wheel of fortune turned again. Under Emperor Menelik II, the Amhara defeated all that stood in their way and added the large Somali province of Ogaden to the empire. The present Emperor, Haile Selassie I, was bequeathed a long line of triumphs: over the Egyptians in the 1870s; over the Sudanese Mahdists, elsewhere so irresistible; over the Emirate of Harar; and, most significantly, over the Italians at Adowa in 1896.

In the same period, the Somalis swept across the entire low-land area. They were no longer one among many but the only people identified with the arid zone, having driven out all competitors for grazing land and confined the Arabs to the coastal towns.

Even the colonial period brought no enduring peace. Somalia was the theater of preparation for the Italian invasion of Ethiopia. In 1936, an Italian viceroy was sitting in Addis Ababa, administering a large Italian dominion consisting of Ethiopia and the two old Italian colonies, Eritrea and Somalia. His authority was brief; by 1942 the Emperor had returned from exile. A British military administration was responsible for order in the whole area, including, of course, Egypt and the Sudan.

Today how little of this is left. North of the Kenya border, only British Somaliland remains as a British possession. Britain's authority came to an end in Eritrea and Somalia in 1950. The United Nations, asked by the victorious but disunited belligerents to "dispose" of the old Italian colonies, gave Libya her independence outright, federated Eritrea with Ethiopia and converted Somalia into an Italian Trust Territory for ten years. The Haud and the Reserved Areas were returned to Ethiopia in 1955. In the same year, British troops left the Sudan, which today is an independent republic outside the Commonwealth. As for the remaining British Somaliland with its 65,000 square miles, Mr. Lennox-Boyd, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, has charted its course for the next two years. Promised elections have already taken place, and self-government is scheduled for next year, to coincide with Italy's withdrawal from Somalia. On December 1, 1960, Italy will terminate her stewardship without regret, and the former colony will become an independent republic. But for the 60,000 Somalis living in the northeast corner of Kenya, and the small enclave of French Somaliland, which is hardly more than the port of Jibuti with 65,000 inhabitants, the peoples of the Horn will then be free again to work out their international relations as best they can.

II

Although inter-African relations have long been governed by outsiders, henceforth there is little constructive that the major powers can do in controlling international affairs within the Horn of Africa. To be sure, the United Nations carries a special respon-

sibility for the Somali area and has an intense though incoherent concern with the central issues which divide Somalis and Ethiopians. There are four principal questions:

1. Where should the international frontiers be drawn?
2. What degree of interference in one another's affairs can be tolerated, particularly where kindred peoples live on both sides of the boundaries?
3. What coöperative regional schemes can be envisaged for the peoples' mutual benefit on such matters as higher education, pest control, soil conservation and the regulation of international rivers?
4. How can regional interests be harmonized with those traditions reaching outside the continent, particularly to the Middle East? The Ethiopian Solomonian dynasty, its religion and most sacred traditions derive from Jerusalem; the Somali genealogies link the people with the House of the Prophet.

What, then, is the nature of the frontier dispute on which the United Nations has passed several resolutions without, so far, making much progress, and what is the likelihood of a compromise? What is the price of a *modus vivendi* in the Horn, assuming anyone wished to pay it?

The Italians and Somalis have always held that Wal Wal, where the incidents in 1934 were the pretext for war, is part of Somalia; the Ethiopians maintain the contrary and at present the administrative boundary runs east of these wells. More relevant than the convention which set this boundary are the underlying fears on both sides of what internal and external pressures can do in the area.

Take the Ethiopian apprehensions. All agricultural peoples, and certainly the Ethiopians, must carefully watch the nomadic tribes that move around their frontiers. Two-thirds of the Somalis in the Trust Territory are nomadic. What if internal security were suddenly to deteriorate in Somalia? The elections of several months ago were so conducted that the government party, the Somali Youth League, won 83 of 90 seats in the Legislative Assembly, but as yet no government has been formed, because of squabbles among differing clans. What if other countries in pursuit of their own ambitious or historic claims were to move in? With Egyptian garrisons in Eritrea and British Somaliland, one may imagine the nervousness that would prevail in Addis

Ababa. Radio Cairo has appealed for Moslem unity in the Horn, as elsewhere. About 65 Egyptian teachers are in Somalia—teaching English, among other things—and scholarships to Egypt for Italian and British Somalis are plentiful. The Egyptian member of the U.N. Advisory Council at Mogadishu was disturbingly active until he was killed under obscure circumstances by a Somali. Are not the Ethiopian headwaters of the Blue Nile a continuous preoccupation of any Cairo government? When the British withdraw from Somaliland, may not Egypt rush in? If Mr. Bevin, as British Foreign Secretary, could espouse a Greater Somalia including the Ethiopian Ogaden, can Colonel Nasser or his successor do less?

Now, however, look at the frontier from the Somali point of view. The total Somali-speaking population numbers less than 3,000,000 and is outnumbered five to one by Ethiopians. Since the days of Menelik, the empire has been consolidating, powerfully assisted by experts from all nations and with gifts from the United States. It has equipped itself with a navy and air force, maintains an officers' school under Indian instructors near Harar, and harbors American troops at Asmara. From the perspective of the Somalis, Ethiopia is a country to be reckoned with. And are not the disputed lands of greater value to nomadic herdsmen than to a settled people on fertile highlands?

The Somali leaders are conscious of the jealousies and internal divisions of their nomadic clans. Even Mohamed Abdallah Hassan al-Mahdi, the Mullah, who resisted the British for 20 years, never rallied more than a part of the whole. Agitation for the association of all Somalis is in part an effort to compose a force that will carry weight. So Somalia's emblem is the five-pointed star, representing the five political entities into which Somalis are split—Italian, British, Kenyan, Ethiopian and French. Yet, united in one state or not, locally the Somalis will continue to dispute over water holes and split up into small factions competing for grazing. Genealogical rivalries are cemented by sectarian disagreements; each clan has periodic scores to settle with its neighbor over stolen stock or some insult. Africa has escaped the rigid caste and class systems of other continents at the price of profound and exclusive blood loyalties.

At present Britain and Italy subsidize the budgets of their respective Somali territories to about 50 percent. Promises have been made to continue some of the aid after independence, and

the United States has made a welcome commitment, but these will not bring economic viability. Minerals are improbable, oil even when it is found needs time to develop, agriculture is limited to small pockets and the river banks. Hence the Somalis are left primarily with the sale of their strategic vantage points to foreigners—a commodity that can be a dangerous domestic irritant in a nationalistic era.

That is not all. Nomadic people are most vulnerable when their permanent grazing grounds can be cut off. To avoid this the Somalis gladly accepted British protection in 1884. Notwithstanding this, by agreement with Britain in 1897, Ethiopia obtained the Haud, the winter grazing lands of the Somalis, and the adjoining so-called Reserved Areas, one of the few places where the British Somalis could engage in agriculture. One knows with what vigilance all African peoples regard their land rights; Ethiopian law requires anyone owning land in Ethiopia to be an Ethiopian. When independent, the British Somalis will surely challenge the frontier fixed without their consent as a means of securing Ethiopian acquiescence in Anglo-Egyptian plans in the Sudan. Has not the Sudan abrogated the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1929, which distributed the Nile waters without her participation in the negotiations? And has this not met with sympathy in the Western world? If the British Somalis unite with the Italian Somalis as they intend to do, the Haud question will be added to the Somalia frontier dispute, while irredentism will mobilize the Ogaden Somalis to exploit any grievance that can be found. Thus the two frontier questions are intertwined with the demand for a Greater Somalia in accordance with the principle of self-determination. Ancient history, new freedoms and appetites, rival factions, all complicate the negotiations. Yet the collision of interests is by no means hopeless.

III

Ethiopian policy has attained a welcome flexibility. Under a 1954 agreement, legal cases involving Somalis in the Haud come before a Protectorate Court, not an Ethiopian one, and it is British liaison officers with their police who accompany the nomads back across the frontier. Nevertheless, more phlegmatic peoples than the febrile Somalis would smart under the treaty. This is an African "Polish Corridor." Each year more than a million camels—the bulk of the people's wealth—wander across the interna-

tional frontier into a foreign land. The Emperor has given instructions that the tribes be sympathetically treated, but it is one thing to decree in Addis and another to enforce such an order in the field. Meanwhile, "Somalization" is going ahead in the Ogaden, where Somali sultans are being drawn into the administration. The process is unlikely to stop there.

On the Somali side, comfort may be derived from various events of the last few months. In both the British and the Italian Somali elections of this year the pro-Egyptian party fared badly. In French Somaliland, the railhead of the principal route to Addis, Mahmoud Harbi, advocate of a Greater Somalia, has been ousted as president of the government. Among the alternatives offered by General de Gaulle in the referendum last September, the Assembly in Jibuti chose to retain the status of an overseas territory; it is thus the only French territory on the African continent which declined the opportunity to become an autonomous republic within the Community (independent Guinea excepted).

In Kenya, the two Somali associations have remained mute on the subject of Greater Somalia. Of course, they expect their status in Kenya to be raised when Somali consuls appear in Nairobi, but they also know that Somali irredentism will be resisted by white and black Kenya politicians alike. Somalis have frequently shown their disdain for the Bantu, have claimed to be Asians, and have even paid the higher Asian taxes. Yet East Africa is a natural place for them to emigrate to, either from the overcrowded Horn or from Aden, where they are limited to 7 percent of the work force in any enterprise. But while Somalis can freely wander without a passport into Ethiopia and Jibuti, they are stopped at the Kenya border. African nationalists as much as white settlers scoff at the notion of giving up any part of Northern Kenya "which may contain oil" and is as much Kenya *Lebensraum* as a Somali sphere of influence. Somalis are difficult immigrants to assimilate anywhere.

Somali irredentists must face the fact that a Greater Somalia does not in itself bring wealth and peace to the clans, but by adding poverty to poverty, grievance to grievance, may make the much larger country the more difficult to manage. Their cry for union would be rejected by most of the surrounding countries.

There are also, however, advocates of a Greater Ethiopia, who see in an Ethiopian Horn the best long-term hope of peace and economic viability for the whole area. They hold that Ethiopia is

the Somalis' natural and possibly only future hinterland, into which they are destined to penetrate deeper and deeper. Ethiopia has undeveloped wealth and requires people. She is considered credit-worthy by the World Bank. All the Somali rivers come from the Ethiopian highlands. As a multi-racial, multi-lingual state (Abyssinia means "mixed") with many religions living side by side without interference, Ethiopia could provide the Somalis with a future. A few educated Somalis share this view, though the solution is wholly improbable.

As things stand at present, the likely compromise on the outstanding issues between Ethiopians and Somalis is rather this:

Somali nationalism has won the right to a separate personality. Fired by the memories of the ancient titanic battles rather than by Egyptian propaganda, fearful that the Ethiopian will menace the nomad's personal sense of independence, animated by a traditional suspicion of low countryman for highlander, of Moslem for Christian, of the roaming herdsman for the tax assessor, of the anarchic clansman for him who pays homage to a crown, the Somali nationalist carries the day when he says: "Lesser differences than these have created demands for separate political entities in Europe."

No economic calculus can determine whether the Somalis would have greater bargaining power as part of Ethiopia or as independent contenders for foreign concessionaires and powers. All outlying areas in Africa complain of neglect in the capital, and one can imagine the grumbling of Somalis if joined to Ethiopia. Nor is it clearly desirable that Ethiopia should embrace more and more Moslem subjects. Neither a Greater Somalia nor a Greater Ethiopia will be the likely outcome, but rather an Ethiopia within her present boundary and, as her neighbor, a loose union between British and Italian Somalis. There will be difficulties enough in achieving this partial goal, embracing two-thirds of all Somalis.

The frontier problems may then slowly fall into place. The King of Norway has been asked by the parties to find a mediator. It is conceivable that the U.N. Advisory Council may have its life prolonged to act as a frontier commission to continue the present administrative frontier. The British Somalis may be relieved of their fear of being denied access to the Haud by giving that area some semi-autonomous status. The present division of sovereignty may yield to an internationalization of the grasslands. Interna-

tional officials, possibly drawn from friendly African states, might provide a less controversial administration of the Haud. The Horn, however, is not an area that likes being hurried or takes kindly to pat and permanent solutions. Too much is in flux to crystallize any one issue. It suits everybody's temperament to keep the pot simmering.

People who do not possess a script (or who reserve it for sacred purposes) incorporate their international settlements in the cake of custom. They rigorously keep to the right of a certain rock or they limit their diet so as to discourage raiding abroad. Covenants, if not openly arrived at, are at least not secret. Every step in a peace negotiation is known to everyone. Pre-literate peoples hear of inter-tribal politics continuously, partly because the terms of agreements must be constantly rehearsed in order to give effect to their injunctions. Political issues are actually more widely known and discussed than is the case in more literate, complex societies. In the Horn one feels one is encountering the quintessential "Political Man," who weighs everything in terms of group power and position. "A Somali knows everything," it is said, and it is true in the sense that all knowledge relevant to the individual or the group immediately becomes public property. Decisions are always collective. Although Ethiopians have been more ready to entrust certain matters to the Crown, yet there, too, politics intrigues everyone. So do the peoples over the border. Each sees the other as possessed of a particular role, as characters in a Greek historical epic.

The peoples of this region see one another as different and therefore as complementary. To the Ethiopian, the restless, driven, luckless Somali is a wily but friendless Odysseus of Africa getting into scrapes but miraculously surviving them. To the Somali, the Ethiopian is seen burdened like Aeneas with some aged father on his back, never sure whether he is already in the eternal city he is destined to found or still within the burning walls of Troy. These people know too much of one another not to feel a kinship or to be aware of their own Janus-headed nature. Increasingly, as contacts become more numerous, a foot is kept in both camps.

Visitors from America and Europe marvel at the freedom given to Moslems in Christian Ethiopia, an intensely theological country in which churchmen can threaten civil war on the question whether Christ is by His nature One, Two or Three. Fanatical

though Moslems may be, the majority leader of the British Somalis is a mission-educated Christian, Michael Mariano. Although Ethiopians are traditionally suspicious of foreigners (no doubt with good reason), every ministry is filled with them, and Italians play a respected role in the country.

Although the Somalis have fought bloody wars with the British and have been recently let down by what seems their failure to defend Somali interests, yet the majority party has campaigned for the inclusion of British Somaliland in the Commonwealth and wishes to bring in the Italian Somalis as well. Indeed, the Somalis can be counted on never to turn down an advantageous bargain for the sake of consistency.

IV

Enough has been said to formulate a few suggestions to those in the West who want to shape a constructive policy in Northeast Africa. The usual pleas for financial aid, scholarships and the like need not be repeated. But it is important to emphasize the need to accept the African point of view that these offerings do not incur any obligations on the recipient's part. The West's requirements for bases, for landing rights, for raw materials, are better understood in Africa than is generally realized. Nothing would therefore be more disconcerting than a sudden withdrawal. A burst of philanthropy that is not solidly based on Western interests would arouse suspicions of a deep-seated plot. The British Empire, they have heard, was acquired in a fit of absentmindedness; nothing would undermine confidence more than to dismantle it—or the American position—in a fit of exasperation. Colonialism may fade away, but the interests that brought the colonial powers to Africa remain and must be defended. But the absurd position in which the United States has seemed wholly committed to Ethiopia and Britain to the Somalis must now come to an end.

The cost of defense in this area will rise. Africa has never been cheap for the European powers, and the colonies have rarely been profitable in terms of strict accountancy. The exploitation of Africa has always been matched by a moderate exploitation of the European, and latterly the American, taxpayer. However, Africa has never been as expensive as the Middle East, and it has produced better leadership. Even the opponents of the Emperor must concede that he is a truly good man. In Mogadishu, the president

of the Somali Youth League and of the Territorial Assembly, Aden Abdullah, is a sagacious leader who has the respect even of those Somalis who at present will not follow his counsel. In British Somaliland, Michael Mariano is as moderate a statesman as could be found anywhere in Africa.

The Emperor has taken advantage of the estrangement between Egypt and the Soviet Union to announce a visit to Moscow. The visit should not come as a surprise. The Soviet mission to Ethiopia has been a large one; a Soviet information center at Addis has been permitted; and young Ethiopians, even some employees of the Ethiopian Air Lines, a T.W.A. subsidiary, have gone to Moscow. Ethiopia has always balanced rival foreign interests in an effort to neutralize them. Yugoslav engineers act as make-weight to the Italian engineers installing a hydroelectric plant on the Awash River; British firms are favored alternately with Americans; Norwegian military advisors are juxtaposed to Swedish officers. The very subtlety with which national animosities among foreigners are turned to good account shows the acuteness of Political Man in Northeast Africa. Nor could anyone be King of Kings for long or run a Somali party without the utmost dexterity.

To go to Moscow may be for the Emperor risking high stakes. But it should be remembered that unlike the Sudan, there is no powerful Communist-controlled trade-union movement, either in Somalia or in Ethiopia, and no tainted youth and women's organization. The Emperor's trip means also that Ethiopians and Somalis will take alternative sides on the East-West seesaw, neither completely committed nor anyone's pawn. There may even come about an ultimate equilibrium. For at the gates of Aden many nationalisms are jockeying for position and influence. They may cancel one another out in the Horn. Indians and Pakistanis have old trading interests. Persians, Egyptians and Iraqis can find historical precedent for interventions. The peoples of Africa themselves—Bantu, Hamites and Nilotics, now pushed out of the area—may reopen claims. The very multiplicity of nationalisms and crisscross considerations may therefore rekindle in Ethiopian and Somali a sense of kinship and challenge them to find a peaceful accommodation. At least this is as likely an outcome as the more pessimistic prognosis of a "minor Palestine" in Northeast Africa.

LABOR'S ROLE IN NEWLY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

By George C. Lodge

THE struggle for economic improvement and political freedom in which enormous sections of the world are now engaged may well be the most far-reaching effort in human history. There is one aspect of this battle which has not been widely recognized, and that is the important participation in it of organizations of workers. Peoples throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America are looking more and more to labor unions as an instrument for improving their economic, social and political conditions.

It is misleading to think of these trade or labor unions in the newly developing countries as bearing any close resemblance to labor organizations in the United States; in general, they have different origins, purposes, methods and objectives. The differences have caused much confusion. Westerners have been led to ask: Of what importance can a labor union of several thousand men be in a country of many millions which is industrially underdeveloped? To answer this, we must first examine some of the general characteristics of workers organizations in the countries in question.

In the first place, these unions were *not* born in industrial revolution as the result of an urgent and specific need of a congested mass of factory workers for improved wages and working conditions. In their origins, they do not resemble the unions of England, the United States and Europe. Generally, labor unions in the less developed parts of the world were superimposed on a basically rural society for political or ideological reasons. They have developed as rural coöperatives, social welfare organizations, political parties, semi-fraternal groups and, in a few instances, rudimentary industrial unions, spreading to the mines, oil fields, railways and textile factories.

These unions, however, were not the result of worker initiative and could not have been, given the economic and political environment in which they emerged. They did not spring from a mass movement. Rather they were held out to a not unreceptive rural society by political parties, government, reformers and intellectuals of all sorts. Many union movements, particularly in Asia

and Africa, rose on a wave of nationalism, becoming the spearhead of anti-colonial movements toward political independence. Others were impelled by humanitarian or ideological forces, and some by the belief that unions were important symbols of the modern industrial age—a requisite to admission as an equal among the industrialized nations. It is easy to see how these unions, with no firm roots in the wills of their members, could become a powerful political instrument in the hands of clever leaders, particularly as economic dislocations and social eruptions increased with the spread of nationalism and the coming of industrialization.

International Communism quickly sought to use them as instruments for the seizure of political power. In a significant number of new nations, however, the strongest anti-Communist element has come to be the trade unions. Often they have been the first organized force to realize that with Communism comes not utopia but a new and more dreadful form of colonial exploitation.

This is clearly true, for example, in India, where the free trade unions are fighting a desperate battle against the Communist-controlled All India Trade Union Congress. Last summer some of their members were shot down by police during a strike in the Communist state of Kerala. The plantation-workers' unions in Asia are another effective force against Communism. These unions in Malaya and India today have a broad base and have developed representative leadership. They are a far cry from being rootless instruments of "outside" interests. The members of the powerful Malayan plantation union, coming largely from the jungles and mountains, were exposed to Communism during the bitter guerrilla fighting that began in 1948. Many of them lost their homes and families to the Communist invaders. They know Communism for what it is and have developed strong trade unions not only to advance their economic welfare but to protect their country's independence.

II

In many countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, the most important influence on the people is organizations of workers. Mr. Nasser was quick to appreciate the political significance of labor in his attempt to achieve power in the Arab world. When the existing union leadership in various Arab countries proved reluctant to coöperate with him, he organized the International

Confederation of Arab Trade Unions as an instrument for reaching directly from Cairo to the workers of other Arab countries.

In the Sudan, an agricultural country almost one-third the size of the United States, the transport and communication system is of vital importance. After World War II the railroads, river boats, docks and hotels along the Nile were combined into a single transportation unit. It is not surprising that this unit was the target for the first unionization drive in Sudan which lasted from 1946 to 1955. Last year, when all union activity was outlawed by the Sudanese Government, there were 20,000 workers in this transportation union, which plainly exerted considerable strategic control over an industrial complex of basic significance to Sudanese economic and political development.

Going west to Tunisia, Bourguiba's Neo-Destour party could never have come to power and pressed so successfully for independence and social improvement had it not been for the strong support of organized labor. In Morocco, the National Federation of Labor emerged in the independence movement as a powerful political force. Through its attachments to the masses of the Moroccan people, it is a vital element in the political situation there today.

President Nkrumah and his Convention People's Party successfully secured the support of the labor movement in Ghana in 1954, both for domestic political reasons and to protect it from Communist influence. The career of John Tettegah illustrates the central role trade unions play in the affairs of many emerging countries of the world. As general secretary-treasurer of the Ghana Trade Union Congress, Tettegah also serves on the central committee of Ghana's ruling party. He carries great weight in labor affairs within Ghana, and in recent years has become recognized on the international scene as a spokesman for African labor.

The rise of African nationalism is well symbolized by the 29-year-old Kenya labor leader, Tom Mboya. First as a general secretary of the Kenya Federation of Labor and then as Chairman of the All-Africa People's Conference at Accra, Mboya emerged as one of the most able leaders of the African independence movement. Today he is also a member of the Legislative Council of Kenya. Mboya's rise is a good example of the new significance of workers organizations and their leaders. Born on a sisal estate in Kenya's highland area, the son of illiterate

parents, he was appointed a Nairobi city sanitary inspector in 1951, but was outraged to find his salary was a fraction of that of a European holding the same post. He joined the African Staff Association, consisting of municipal employees, and in 1952 became its president. He converted this association into a union and the same year joined a political group, the Kenya African Union. His rise to a position of importance in Africa today is due largely to the substantial support he mustered as an organizer of African workers.

Sékou Touré, who led the independence movement in Guinea, Africa's newest independent state, also got his start in politics as a labor leader. It was indeed as a labor leader that he first demonstrated his ability to command an almost religious devotion from his followers. It was his well organized labor movement which gave him the power to force independence.

In Latin America, too, we see much the same situation. In Mexico, for example, trade unions today are a powerful political force. President Lopes Mateos, former Minister of Labor, was elected with strong labor backing, and the trade union movement helps to provide popular support for the present government. The labor movement constitutes more than 25 percent of the Chamber of Deputies and has similar representation in the Senate. As the country continues to industrialize, the unions will certainly gain strength and acquire a broader base among the workers.

In Colombia, Peru and Venezuela, in Argentina and Bolivia, the trade unions are playing a key political role, constituting as they do the most important mass organizations in those countries. In Peru, the trade union movement, most of which is allied with the Aprista party, is trying to reconstruct constitutional government after the Odría dictatorship of almost a decade.

In Costa Rica, Luis Alberto Monge is presently one of the principal leaders of the opposition in the Costa Rican legislature. Monge got his start in the trade union movement, having served in recent years as president of the principal labor organization in his country and as general secretary of O.R.I.T., the I.C.F.T.U.'s (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions) regional organization in the Western Hemisphere. Together with Costa Rica's ex-President Figueres, Monge is one of the more articulate opponents of dictatorship in Latin America.

Juan Lechin, Bolivian labor leader, was one of the two princi-

pal figures in the 1952 revolution. Today he heads the opposition. While Lechin is a senator, he remains executive secretary of Bolivia's central trade union organization and head of the Federation of Mine Workers.

III

In order to understand more clearly how a labor union of a few hundred thousand—or even a few thousand—can be effective in a country of millions, let us look at India today. This is appropriate because India's labor situation exemplifies that of many Asian and African countries, and also because it has become of critical importance to the successful development of that country.

While India has a population of about 400 million people and a land mass almost half as big as that of the United States, it is a country being led today by an exceedingly small group of men and women. Like the founding fathers of our own country, these are patriots of exceptional intelligence, dedication and selflessness who are struggling against what often appear to be overwhelming odds. This group of men and women, who literally can be counted in the thousands, are very much a part of India and yet are clearly distinct from the mass of Indian people. They stand out as the only element in Indian society capable of making the tremendous exertion necessary for development. They are pulling India almost miraculously forward.

Assuming that this group of leaders numbers seven or eight thousand, I think it is also probable that those capable of supporting them in any effective way number no more than seven or eight million. In reaching this figure, we start with a total population of some 380 million, of whom 330 million live in the more than 600,000 isolated villages and have almost no contact with the main stream of Indian political and economic life. This leaves about 50 million Indians who live in urban centers. Given a literacy rate of 17 percent, the figure of eight thousand leaders with eight million capable of effectively supporting them does not appear unreasonable.

Within this context it becomes a little clearer how an active organization of say 200,000 men and women, under perhaps 25 dedicated leaders, can have a profound and lasting influence. This is especially true if, as is usually the case, their efforts are directed toward several industries such as steel, transportation,

communications or longshore operations, which are of great strategic importance to the whole nation. Thus a relative handful of people, promising progress toward broadly popular goals, can be of the utmost political and economic importance. In the developing countries, numbers do not count so much as leadership and organization.

In India there are three principal federations of worker unions, each tied to its own political party. First, there is the Indian National Trade Union Congress (I.N.T.U.C.) with about 1,200,000 members. This federation grew out of the Ahmedabad Textile Labor Association founded some 30 years ago. Gandhi himself played an important role in its early days. Many of the present leaders of the T.L.A. and I.N.T.U.C. were close friends of the Mahatma, served jail terms with him and practice religiously his creed of non-violence and peaceful understanding. The chief union in I.N.T.U.C. is still the Ahmedabad Textile Association, which is in many ways a model labor union. Its grievance procedure, community activities and relations with management would compare favorably with any union anywhere, but it must be said that it is an exceptional operation in Asia. The T.L.A., and later the I.N.T.U.C. federation, grew with the independence movement and in its early years was largely a political force, although it also did much to improve the welfare of the textile workers of Ahmedabad. After independence, I.N.T.U.C. continued to be closely associated with the Congress Party and its leaders have alternated between the union and high government posts or positions in Parliament. The present Minister of Labor, for example, Gulzarilal Nanda, was the former general secretary of the Textile Labor Association and, as such, a leading official of I.N.T.U.C.; and the present president of the Association, Khandubhai Desai, was a former Minister of Labor. There is thus a strong bond between I.N.T.U.C. and the Congress Party.

Numerically the next largest labor federation in India is the All India Trade Union Congress (A.I.T.U.C.) with about 900,000 members, which is allied to and controlled by the Communist Party. Its leaders are also the leaders of the Communist Party and, while it pretends to certain economic and social aims, it is largely a political movement, plainly directed from the Soviet Union. It is making a particular effort to gain control of the Indian steel industry which is emerging in the wilderness of Bihar and Orissa around Calcutta. Through A.I.T.U.C., the

Communists inspired a violent strike a year ago at the 50-year-old Jamshedpur steel mills of the Tata Iron and Steel Company, importing large numbers of paid organizers. They are now actively seeking to gain control of the three new government plants currently being put into operation at Durgapur, Rourkela and Bhilai, with the help of the British, Germans and Russians respectively. There is no question that control of this industry and the coal and iron mines flanking it will be a key factor in the future development of India.

The third principal federation of workers in India is the Hind Mazdoor Sabha (H.M.S.), with about 300,000 members, which is tied to the Socialist Party. This federation has a number of bright and vigorous leaders who have succeeded in building substantial strength particularly on the docks of Calcutta and Bombay, which strategically are of great importance.

India's principal labor federations are thus bound to the three main political parties and there is little likelihood that this situation will change in the foreseeable future. An aspect of this relationship is that the trade unions of India, and of many other Asian and African countries, form the most important contact between the political parties and the mass of the people. Unions are often conceived as being a combination of the Red Cross, Community Chest, Elks Clubs, an American-type trade union, a political party and in some ways a religious organization. Their functions and activities reach into every phase of urban life, including politics, housing, hospitals, labor-management bargaining, public parades, demonstrations, schools and colleges. Of these, the collective bargaining function is by no means the most important.

Although the political significance of these labor movements is what makes them especially distinctive from our point of view, their reason for being and the source of their strength lie beyond politics. They are sustained by the determined desire of the people of the developing nations for an improvement in their way of life, for a square meal where there has been starvation, for a hospital bed where there have been death and disease, for a decent house where there have been filth and squalor, for freedom and dignity where there have been domination and servility. It would be a great mistake to look on these unions as merely political tools to be played with as such. Their roots lie deep in the hearts of the people who are native to these lands. They are the

first true and wholly indigenous organizations which many of these peoples have ever known and they are prized for this reason. They are followed with dedication, and are looked to for a solution of all ills.

The Communists realize this full well and, as Vice President Nixon has noted following his trips to Africa and Latin America, they are making great efforts to win over not so much government and business officials, who may be in power today and gone tomorrow, but union leaders, who, by the very nature of their organizations, are likely to grow in influence, as industrialization progresses.

We would be seriously deluding ourselves if we did not recognize that the Communists have increased substantially their influence in the labor movements of Asia, Africa and Latin America. They are concentrating on controlling the workers in key industries throughout all of the newly developing nations. Large numbers of young labor leaders are invited to Moscow each year for a highly developed course of indoctrination. When these men return to their native lands, they are revered if for no other reason than that they have traveled far off in an airplane, an experience which very few have had. They are frequently admired and listened to when they preach that the way to quick development, the way to easy money and full bellies, is not the slow, uneven processes of democracy, but by the shorter Russian route of totalitarianism which has accomplished wonders in a few decades.

The day has long since gone when relations with other countries can be effectively carried on solely in the traditional "diplomatic" way at the usual "diplomatic" levels. The power of Africa and Asia is often not in the hands of government officials, but rather in the hands of relatively obscure native leaders who first appear on the national scene as leaders of a workers organization.

IV

What does this mean in terms of American interests?

In the first place, a visitor to India or to another country of Asia or Africa is apt to be struck by the degree to which the labor movement of the United States is admired. This respect is enhanced by the misconception abroad of the nature of this country and its economic system.

The United States is described by others, and unfortunately even by some Americans, as a "capitalist" nation. To the vast majority of the world's people this word connotes something very different from the economic system and society which have in fact evolved in the United States. George Romney, President of American Motors Corporation, wisely observed earlier this year: "Today we still talk about 'capitalism' without fully realizing this term is a hand-me-down from an Old World society and our dead and gone robber-baron era in which a few controlled and exploited the efforts of many."

To the peoples of less industrially developed countries, the word "capitalist" conjures up exploitation, imperialism and colonialism. They are reminded of their own private employers or capitalists who in many cases strongly resemble the robber barons of the last century. Many people abroad do not understand the extent to which our economy meets the need of the consumer. And few realize the social consciousness which motivates many activities of United States business, or comprehend the intricate power balance around which has grown our unique variety of collective bargaining.

Most of all, perhaps, there is misunderstanding about the role of government in the American economy. In the less developed areas of the world, and even in some areas of Western Europe, there is little awareness that government expenditures for various social insurance programs in the United States are around \$12.5 billion annually; that another \$25 billion or more is expended each year by Federal, state and local governments under various other social welfare programs, such as public welfare, public health and medical care, child welfare, aid to veterans, public housing, and education; that, in addition, contributions to private health and welfare funds are currently being made at a rate of \$8 billion a year; and that the total of \$46 billion amounts to roughly a tenth of the current gross national product.

Few Asians or Africans have any idea that the United States has an elaborate unemployment compensation system and few realize the extent of our agricultural programs and Federal power establishments. They are astounded by the figures published by Professor Galbraith of Harvard in *Foreign Affairs* last year: In the United States 20 percent of the gross national product is disposed of by the various levels of government; in India only 10 percent. Such figures lead one to wonder about the meaning of

the words "capitalism" and "socialism" as applied to the United States and India today.

Be that as it may, we are dubbed a capitalist country with all that it implies. At the same time, however, it is recognized that American workers have the highest standard of living of any workers anywhere and that in the United States there is the widest distribution of wealth. This seeming paradox is explained in the mind of, say, an Indian, an Indonesian or a Moroccan by assuming that the American trade unions have singlehandedly achieved these high standards for the American workers by wresting unparalleled benefits from "capitalist" hands.

This reasoning, added to the individual respect which many of our trade union leaders have gained in the course of their extensive travels, has meant that generally no aspect of the United States is more admired by the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America than our trade unions. This admiration provides an important avenue for the development of mutual understanding between the United States and the newly developed nations. It also provides a source of strength in the effort to organize free political and social institutions in those countries.

This fact should invigorate popular support for the Government's exchange programs which each year bring some 900 trade unionists from abroad for a three, six or nine months' stay in the United States, and permit top American union leaders to go abroad. Through these programs an African union leader can see the progress that American unions have made in eradicating discrimination; an Indonesian rubber worker can learn the basic methods and techniques of collective bargaining, union organization and industrial relations; a Venezuelan oil worker can see with his own eyes that the Communist representation of America as a land run by and for the exclusive benefit of money-hungry "capitalists" is just not so. The leaders and members of foreign workers organizations can see first hand the extent to which American labor has confounded the 100-year-old prediction of Karl Marx. Likewise, representatives of the A.F.L.-C.I.O., the United Steelworkers, the Oil Workers and other unions can understand better the problems of labor in less developed lands, can learn from them and hopefully can help them in their quest for economic improvement.

A second policy consideration relating to labor organizations abroad is the importance of our 48 labor attachés throughout

the world, and of other foreign service officers who are engaged in reporting the activities of workers organizations and establishing useful contacts with them. We need to increase the number of exceptionally competent trade unionists who are taken into the foreign service to serve abroad as labor attachés. Union experience can be extraordinarily valuable in establishing contacts and relationships in many countries of the world. Young men with an academic background in industrial relations or with governmental experience in the manpower field should also be recruited for labor work abroad. As workers organizations grow in political and economic significance, increasing importance will be attached to the work of labor officers in the Foreign Service.

Third, the rising importance of labor organizations means that American support of the International Labor Organization must keep pace with its growing responsibilities. Our participation must constantly be measured against the help the world seeks from the I.L.O., a specialized agency of the U.N., whose purpose is basically twofold:

1. Through its technical assistance program and educational activities it seeks to improve the welfare of workers throughout the world by providing, for example: vocational training, assistance in the establishment of governmental institutions such as labor departments, technical advice to assist in the development of free collective bargaining and sound labor-management relations and various programs which help developing countries make better use of their manpower resources.

2. The I.L.O. also sets international standards designed to point the way for developing nations which seek to provide a better way of life for their people. These standards cover a wide variety of subjects including social security, child labor, industrial and mine safety, forced labor, slavery and various forms of discrimination in employment.

The I.L.O. is unique among international agencies in that it is tripartite; that is, its membership consists of worker, employer and government representatives from some 80 nations. The annual International Labor Conference at Geneva often provides the only occasion during the year when union leaders—many of whom are among the most important political figures of their country—travel out of their own country or encounter Americans. The importance of this encounter and of this organization can hardly be overestimated.

It is certain that the Communists understand its importance. For they use it to the utmost to shout their claims to "a worker's paradise." Happily, it can truthfully be said that their shouts have fallen largely on unbelieving ears. They have made little headway in the I.L.O., and time and time again their totalitarian system has been shown up for what it is. This has been done most effectively not by government spokesmen but by workers, whose conviction and sincerity give their comments a persuasiveness which it is hard for a governmental representative to equal.

We have seen that the organizations of workers in the newer nations are a crucial force in the struggle for economic improvement and in many cases offer the only social and political leadership extending beyond the educated élite. If the future is to bring material improvement in a context of freedom and democracy, this force and its underlying sources must be fully realized. The United States must adjust to its significance and be prepared to make the same effort in behalf of world-wide economic progress as we have exercised in building military strength to deter aggression. To accomplish this will require not only economic assistance but a capacity to identify ourselves with the interests of those who are struggling for political rights and a better life.

TWO CENTERS OF ARAB POWER

By Frederick Harbison

THERE is some truth in the saying that anything can happen in the Middle East, and probably will. Certainly, few people would have predicted a year ago that within a short time there would be an open struggle between Arab nationalism and Communism. Whatever were Mr. Khrushchev's reasons for pressing his fortunes with Mr. Kassem at the cost of such grave danger to his relations with Mr. Nasser, his decisions had an inherent logic based on economics rather than politics. For of the two traditional centers of power in the Arab world, Iraq and Egypt, the former may seem to the Soviets by far the more attractive in the long run. This article will contrast the problems of economic development in the two countries and suggest what the differences might mean both for strategic relationships within the area and for the larger power struggle in which the Middle East is not a pawn but a queen.

In agricultural land, Iraq is potentially rich and Egypt is desperately poor. Egypt with a population in excess of 23,000,000 persons has a cultivatable land area at present of only 6,500,000 acres; Iraq, with hardly more than one-fourth of Egypt's population, has over 7,000,000 arable acres. On the basis of agricultural population, then, the area of cultivatable land per head in Iraq is 20 times that in Egypt.¹ The main problem of Egypt from the agricultural angle is space; overcrowding on the land is in itself an obstacle to an increase in output. Iraq has space to spare.

The same contrast is evident if we look at the technical possibilities of increasing the agricultural land areas of the two countries. If Egypt is successful in finding the funds (well over a billion dollars) to complete the High Dam project, she might be able to add another 2 million acres to her agricultural land area. In contrast, an expenditure in Iraq of a somewhat smaller amount on dams and irrigation works might provide between 5 and 10 million acres of new cultivatable land as well as making existing land more productive by making more water available. If Egypt were to make full technical use of fertilizers and insecticides on her already intensively cultivated land, she might be able to increase

¹ Doreen Warriner, "Land Reform and Development in the Middle East," London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1957, p. 115.

output per acre in the next five years by 25 to 30 percent. If Iraq were to make greater use of fertilizers and modern farming methods on her vast areas of poorly cultivated land, she might double or perhaps triple output per acre. To summarize, Egypt must support today four times as many people as Iraq with slightly less agricultural land than Iraq, whereas with even less new investment in dams and irrigation works and with more intensive land use than is contemplated in Egypt, Iraq could have an increase in agricultural production of three to four times that which would be technically possible in Egypt.

Egypt's comparative position is even less favorable with regard to the availability of capital for investment in economic development. Her population is increasing at a rate in excess of 2.5 percent a year. Therefore, an annual increase of national income of at least that amount will be necessary to prevent a further decline in living standards, and an increase of at least 4 percent would be needed to provide even a modest rate of economic progress. In order to achieve such an increase in national income, Egypt within the next decade must complete the High Dam or some equivalent project for increasing cultivatable land area; double or preferably triple industrial production; extend and improve her highway, railway and communications systems; invest heavily in prospecting for petroleum and mineral resources; and broaden the base and improve the quality of her educational institutions. I have estimated that the *new investment* required in specified projects in these areas would be at least 100,000,000 Egyptian pounds annually for a period of at least 10 years. This would amount to about 11 percent of the country's current national income.² (Officially the Egyptian pound is equivalent to the British pound, but sells on the European market at a 25 to 30 percent discount.)

On the average, Egypt's total savings per year have not been in excess of 10 percent of national income, and it is generally conceded that less than half of such savings are available for investment in high-priority projects such as those mentioned above.³ On top of this, Egypt is spending on the military an amount which is thought to be in excess of 75,000,000 pounds

² Cf. Frederick Harbison and Ibrahim A. Ibrahim, "Human Resources for Egyptian Enterprise" (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1958).

³ In recent years, probably 50 percent of private savings has been invested in rural or urban real estate, hoarded in gold, or maintained in bank deposits which do not generate funds for industrial or commercial development.

annually. At best Egypt can count on 15 to 20 millions each year in net revenue from the Suez Canal, and by resorting to authoritarian measures she might force another 40 to 50 millions of annual savings into new investment in strategic development projects. She still would be far short of her needs, even if military expenditures were all but eliminated. Her only solution, therefore, is to get capital from other countries or to resort to deficit financing and forced savings. If the latter course were followed, the result would be a curtailment of present consumption levels to achieve even a modest rate of economic development in the future. These hard facts have convinced most Egyptians, and particularly those in high places in the government, that it is practically and politically impossible to find an *internal solution* for the country's economic dilemma.

Iraq, in contrast, appears to have an assured flow of funds for investments in needed development projects. Prior to the 1958 Revolution, the oil revenues available for development purposes were close to 75,000,000 dinars per year (the Iraqi dinar is equivalent to the Egyptian pound at official rates of exchange). If oil production is expanded, this revenue will be increased. Thus Iraq has sufficient capital to build all the dams, irrigation works, industrial plants and educational institutions which will be required in the next decade or two. As a former Minister of Development once pointed out, there could be reason to be optimistic about Iraq's economic prospects:

The belief of Lord Salter that the living standard will be raised to twice its present status during the course of one generation is a belief of a conservative man. I personally am optimistic of quicker progress and a brilliant future for this dear country which we should coöperate to serve . . . [our] wealth is our fertile land and our abundant waters which can be regulated and exploited through the revenues of our oil riches, to raise the standard of life of every citizen.⁴

II

If we compare the two countries in terms of their human resources and social and political systems, the contrast is almost as sharp. But here the advantage lies with Egypt.

In the first place, Egypt is ethnically and culturally more uni-

⁴ Statement by Dhia'/'Ja' Afar, Minister of Development. Government of Iraq, *Law No. 54 for the Year 1956 Amending the Law of the General Programme of the Projects of the Development Board and the Minister of Development No. 43 for the Year 1955*, Baghdad, 1956, p. 5.

fied than Iraq. The Egyptian people have a racial and temperamental homogeneity which clearly distinguishes them from their neighbors. Among the masses there is little difference in build, features, psychological make-up or ways of thought.⁵ In contrast, the Iraqi population is a dispersed and heterogeneous mixture of tribes and agricultural and urban dwellers with great diversity in race, religion, tradition and outlook. In most respects Iraqi society is far more primitive than the Egyptian. It is easier, therefore, to mobilize the support of the Egyptian people for a program of social, economic and political development.

Secondly, Egypt has had a successful social and political revolution; its ruling régime is honest and comparatively stable; and it has a sense of direction. The Revolution broke the grip of the landed aristocracy on political and economic life. To be sure, the Nasser régime rules the country by force, yet it appears to command the enthusiastic support of practically all elements of the population. Although Nasser's ambitions in foreign affairs are not designed to please the West, the fact remains that he is committed to internal economic improvement, industrial development and a greater measure of social welfare and education for the people. As Dr. John S. Badeau has pointed out:

... in the perspective of history the Egyptian revolution will be to the Middle East what the French Revolution was to Europe. It, too, had its self-seeking leaders, its power cliques, its political nationalism; but it let loose forces that finally changed the pattern of social life in most of Europe. That is what the Egyptian revolution has begun to do in the Middle East and that is why it strikes fire in some form in every country.⁶

Iraq, too, has had its revolution, which swept out the previous rulers. It, too, broke the power of a reactionary landed aristocracy, and it has promised sweeping social reform. In comparison with the Nasser régime, however, Kassem's is shaky. It has as yet no clearly formulated program for economic development; there is doubt whether it has the support of all elements of the country; and it is dangerously close to outright domination by the Communists. In short, Kassem has yet to prove that he is capable of consolidating his leadership in this heterogeneous society.

Again, Egypt has a large and comparatively well-trained body of civil servants, whereas Iraq is handicapped by an acute short-

⁵ See Charles Issawi, "Egypt at Mid-Century," London: Oxford, 1954, p. 4.

⁶ John S. Badeau, "The Middle East: Conflict in Priorities," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1958, p. 240.

age of high-talent manpower in the government. Though Iraq has sent some hundreds of persons abroad for training, Egypt's civil servants with foreign training can be counted in the thousands. Indeed, Egypt has a surplus of civil servants, and she has been able to send her government experts, schoolteachers, engineers and military officers on extended technical assistance missions to neighboring states. In 1958, for example, more than 3,000 teachers reportedly were sent from Egypt to other Arab countries. Of these 600 went to Iraq, 400 to Kuwait, 200 to Jordan, and between 20 and 50 each to Sudan, Yemen, Lebanon, Tunisia, Morocco, Bahrein, Oman and other Sheikdoms.⁷ Egypt is thus an exporter of trained manpower, whereas Iraq must import it from other areas.

In the fields of social welfare, public health, rural community development, and agricultural extension services, Egypt is also far ahead of Iraq. For example, Iraq has nothing to equal Egypt's Combined Social Services Units in rural areas. As yet, the newly developed oil wealth in Iraq has had very little observable effect upon the country's diseased and poverty-stricken people. The masses have had little chance to comprehend the better economic life which technically may be in store for them. In Egypt, social progress since the Revolution is quite evident.

Further, Egypt eclipses Iraq in the field of education. The Egyptian system of primary and secondary schools is more advanced in all major respects than that of Iraq. The illiteracy rate in Egypt has fallen to less than 75 percent, whereas it is still over 90 percent in Iraq.⁸ Egypt in a few years may achieve universal compulsory education for all children of school age, whereas it may take decades for Iraq to attain this goal. Egypt has four major universities with a combined enrollment of over 75,000 students. Nearly 10,000 of these are students from neighboring Arab countries. Until a year ago, higher education in Iraq consisted only of a system of colleges with about 6,000 students attached to the various ministries of government.⁹ Iraq has been

⁷ Foster Hailey, "Arab Education Centers in Cairo," *The New York Times*, January 18, 1959, p. 28.

⁸ See "United Nations Yearbook, 1956," table 177, p. 574, for Egyptian illiteracy rate. New York: United Nations, 1957. For discussion of Iraqi illiteracy rate see Doris G. Adams, "Current Population Trends in Iraq," *Middle East Journal*, Spring 1956, p. 154-155.

⁹ For a discussion of this subject, see N. Hani, "Higher Education in Iraq," *Middle Eastern Affairs*, April 1956. The colleges are now being incorporated into a new university, now in the early stage of development. For a brief outline of initial plans of Baghdad University see Abdul Hamid Kadhim (Minister of Education), "Next Two Years Will Be Vital," *Iraq Times Annual*, 1957, p. 95.

taking measures to strengthen greatly her system of higher education, but admittedly she has a long way to go. Although Egyptian universities may be inferior by Western standards, they have some respectable faculties of engineering and science and a few good programs of study in the arts and in the social sciences. Egypt also has new institutes for public administration, vocational training and personnel management development. She has recently established a national science council and set up an atomic energy commission. Iraq has lacked the high-talent manpower to undertake any activity of this kind.

Finally, Iraq is still predominantly in the pre-industrial stage of development, whereas Egypt is quite definitely an industrializing country. Outside of the foreign-managed oil companies, Iraq has very few skilled workers, technicians or engineers. Her few new factories have had to be designed, built and initially operated by foreigners; she has only a handful of native industrial managers. Thus she is completely dependent upon foreign interests in undertaking any sizable industrial development.

By contrast, Egypt already has the high-level manpower for substantial industrialization. She has a small but impressive nucleus of industrial entrepreneurs and managers. In comparison with other Arab countries, she has a large number of scientists, engineers and technicians. She possesses some of the most modern textile factories in the world and operates them almost exclusively with Egyptian personnel. Among the so-called underdeveloped countries, moreover, Egypt is the only one which currently operates its own oil producing fields and petroleum refineries without expatriate top management. And Egyptians own, manage and operate sizable fertilizer plants, cigarette factories, metal fabrication companies, sugar refineries, chemical plants, railways, airlines and a basic iron and steel works. They also own, control and manage nearly all of the major banking and financial institutions in the country. Finally, they have taken over the management of the Suez Canal. I have been told that the present Egyptian company handles 25 percent more ship tonnage each month than the previous internationally owned and managed company, and that it does this with 28 percent fewer employees. It has more pilots than the old company ever had; it has stepped up considerably the program of canal improvement which the old company had scheduled; and its future plan for development apparently is much more ambitious than anything previously envisioned. There

is little doubt that, under Egyptian management, the canal is more efficiently operated than it was prior to its seizure in 1956.

It is true, of course, that Egypt has a shortage of competent managers and also of scientists and engineers, and this shortage will be even more acute if the 200 new enterprises now planned are brought into operation. But Egypt probably has the capacity to develop the needed trained manpower if she utilizes outside consultant services, strengthens the technical education in her universities and establishes new institutions for high-level manager training. By contrast, Iraq simply does not have at present a sufficient base, either in her educational institutions or in her few indigenous industries, to train the skilled technicians and administrators needed for modern industrial development.

III

It would be difficult, indeed, to find two countries alike in traditions and near to each other physically which show a sharper contrast in problems of economic development. Iraq has vast material resources for development but lacks the trained manpower and the political and economic institutions to achieve it. Egypt has abundant human resources, the essential capacity to develop skilled manpower, and the necessary economic and political institutions, but lacks the minimum capital and the natural resources for sustained economic growth. Iraq has sufficient capital, in the form of oil revenues, not only to finance her own development projects but also perhaps those in some other countries. Egypt can develop high-level manpower not only for herself but perhaps for some of her neighbors as well. Since Egypt cannot hope to prosper by herself, she naturally would like to combine her valuable human resources with the material riches of other countries. The union with Syria may help a little; an arrangement with oil-rich Kuwait or Iraq could accomplish a great deal more. In any case, there is a logical economic rationale for Nasser's preoccupation with Arab nationalism. Iraq, of course, does not have the same economic motive for unity with Egypt. She needs trained manpower and technical assistance, but these she can get from other countries. On the other hand, there have always been and still are elements in Iraq who for other reasons are strong advocates of Arab unity but not on Nasser's terms.

Neither Egypt nor Iraq, however, has control over her own economic destiny. The economic and political development of

both has been and will continue to be in the future strongly influenced by the interests and policies of foreign powers.

IV

The recent emergence of the U.S.S.R. as a power in the Middle East has been both a blessing and a curse for Egypt as well as for Iraq. It has been welcomed as a force to counterbalance the political and economic influence of the Western powers, but at the same time it has posed serious threats to the independence of both countries.

Until late in 1958, Egypt appeared to have much to gain and little to lose by close cooperation with the Soviet Union. Russia's desire to acquire an influential foothold in the Middle East and Egypt's need for economic aid and political support were quite compatible. When the West refused to sell armaments to Egypt in 1955, the U.S.S.R. undertook to supply them. After the nationalization of the Suez Canal when the United States and Britain stopped economic aid, froze Egypt's foreign exchange and instituted an economic blockade, the Communist bloc worked out arrangements to purchase Egyptian cotton and to ship wheat, petroleum, machinery and medicines to Nasser's hard-pressed country. In 1958 Moscow made a loan (in the form of credits equivalent to about \$175,000,000) for Egypt's industrial development. And later, when it was apparent that the West was not going to renew its old offer to finance the High Dam, the Russians stepped in with a promise of aid (estimated at the equivalent of about \$100,000,000) to get the project started. The total credits extended by the U.S.S.R. to Egypt since 1955 are probably five times the total value of all American aid under Point Four since 1945. Thus, while the West was doing everything in its power to cripple the Egyptian economy and to bring Nasser to his knees, no request to the Soviet Union for aid was refused. The U.S.S.R. likewise came forth with military, economic and technical aid in Syria. Indeed, without Soviet aid in the critical period following Suez, Egypt's economy probably would have collapsed and the union with Syria would never have taken place.

The strategy of the Soviet Union during this period was reasonably clear. First, it backed the Arab nationalism of the U.A.R. particularly where it was in conflict with Western interests. It sided with Egypt on most issues pertaining to Israel; it supported the cause of the Algerian nationalists against the French; and it

lent encouragement to Nasser's campaign to eliminate the Western influence in other African countries. Second, it did its best to force Egypt to break her economic ties with the West. The Communist bloc countries took large quantities of Egyptian cotton, and on occasions sold it at cut-rate prices in Europe, thus undermining Egypt's traditional export markets. The loans to Egypt for industrial development consisted almost entirely of credits for purchase of machinery, equipment, supplies and technical assistance in the U.S.S.R. or its designated satellites. Here the motive was to tie Egypt's industrial development to the bloc countries, and thus divert it from its traditional dependence upon American, British and French technology. Third, to supplement its economic and technical objectives, the U.S.S.R. provided free education in Russian universities for thousands of Egyptian and Syrian students. Finally, until recently the Russians offered no objection to the measures taken by the Nasser régime to suppress the local Communist Parties in both Egypt and Syria. In this way it sought to demonstrate that it would not interfere with the internal affairs of the U.A.R. In this period, the Russians had a dominating influence on the economy of Egypt. And as long as they appeared to support the cause of Arab nationalism, Nasser could afford to be quite happy about the arrangement.

Kassem's revolution in the summer of 1958 appeared at first to offer Egypt a golden opportunity to take Iraq into its fold. It was expected that some kind of union between the two countries might be achieved and that Egypt, with some assistance perhaps from the U.S.S.R., would replace Britain and the United States as the main supplier of high-level manpower and technical assistance for Iraq's government, schools and major development projects. Egypt was ready and willing to fill the vacuum. But instead the Communists moved to fill it and swept aside the advocates of closer union with the U.A.R. By February 1959 the cleavage of interest between the Kassem and Nasser régimes had burst into open verbal conflict, and basic differences between Moscow and Cairo had also come to the surface. Communism, along with so-called "Western Imperialism," was by then a deadly threat to Nasser's Arab nationalism and thus to Egypt's aspirations for economic and political development. And now Egypt has good reason to feel insecure about the continuation of the Russian economic aid upon which she has become so dependent. For in significant respects Iraq now provides a much better op-

portunity than Egypt for extension of Russian interests in the Middle East.

For relatively little cost the Soviet Union can flood Iraq with schoolteachers, engineers and industrial and governmental experts. It is in position to take over the job of educating the future generations of Iraqi engineers and administrators in Russian universities. It has an excellent chance to mold the presently underdeveloped and hence very pliable Iraqi educational system in the Communist pattern. All this it can do at little cost because Iraq has the funds needed from oil revenues to pay for dams, factories, irrigation systems, schools and university buildings. At any time, probably, the U.S.S.R. could make the ruling régime in Iraq its captive. Short of this, it may in practice exercise control over the expenditures of oil revenues for economic development which may be made by an ostensibly independent régime.

By comparison, the U.S.S.R. would seem to have little to gain from further investment in Egypt. First of all, the Nasser régime strongly resents any outside domination over its internal affairs, including that coming from Russia. The U.S.S.R. cannot hope to mold the development of the Egyptian economy by flooding the country with technical assistance, because Egypt does not need droves of foreign schoolteachers, technicians, educators and administrators, nor will she admit them. Egypt does need capital and equipment for very large projects, but if the Soviet Union hoped to maintain dominance over the Egyptian economy by filling that demand it would find it highly costly. In any case, the Soviet Union is still in position to keep Nasser on the string without offering any more aid; for by cancelling the credits already extended it could throw the country into an economic crisis. It could also embarrass him by giving either open or covert support to subversive Communist elements within Syria and Egypt. In short, now that it is in position to dominate developments in Iraq, Egypt is no longer as essential as it was formerly as a base for exercising influence on the Middle East.

V

The United States, Britain and France can no longer entertain even the hope that either Egypt or Iraq will align itself with the West. The Suez aggression in 1956, the subsequent failure of the Eisenhower Doctrine, the Kassem Revolution of 1958, and the final withdrawal of Iraq from the ill-fated Baghdad Pact are dra-

matic indications of the extent of the collapse of Western influence in both countries. Indeed, in comparison with recent Russian successes in the area, the failures of Western policy appear to be almost monumental. For practical purposes, the West is driven now to concentrate on measures designed to keep the U.A.R. and Iraq from falling under complete Soviet economic and political domination. The prospects of achieving even this limited objective are not very bright, but they are not hopeless.

Egypt now has the desire and perhaps also the prospect of freeing herself at least in part from the Soviet economic grip. In recent years she has been able to get some credits from West Germany, Japan and other countries for purchase of machinery and equipment. For example, the Germans participated in the development of the Egyptian Iron and Steel Company, and they recently agreed to help on other projects including the construction of a plant for the manufacture of trucks. Both Germany and Japan have been interested in selling their machinery and heavy equipment to Egypt, and both may be able to purchase fairly large quantities of Egyptian cotton in return. Hopefully, the U.A.R. may be able to expand its economic ties with these and other non-Bloc countries.

Another positive step was the settlement with Britain of financial claims growing out of the Suez affair, thus clearing the decks early in 1959 for resumption of normal trade and diplomatic relations between the two countries. Within the past several months, moreover, relations with the United States have shown marked improvement. By the spring of 1959, negotiations were in progress for a partial resumption of the foreign aid and technical assistance programs which were suspended after Egypt's seizure of the canal. At the same time, the United States sold the U.A.R. large quantities of wheat and other surplus agricultural commodities at bargain prices, payable in local currency. Finally, there appears to be some chance for a loan from the World Bank for major improvements in the Suez Canal.

These developments do not imply by any means that the West has become a supporter of Nasser's brand of Arab nationalism, but they do show a determination to help his régime keep out of the clutches of the Soviet bloc. In themselves, however, they fall far short of providing a Western solution for Egypt's fundamental economic problems.

In Iraq, the Western powers, and particularly the British, are

hopeful that a complete take-over by the Communists may be prevented. Iraq is still economically oriented to the West, since her petroleum installations are managed by the British and her oil is sold almost entirely in Western markets. Thus far the Kassem government has shown no inclination to nationalize the existing installations or to throw the British out of the country. On the contrary, Kassem has been putting pressure on the Iraq Petroleum Company to increase production. Unless and until the Soviet Union is able to purchase and market Iraq's oil, the ruling régime is obviously anxious to remain on friendly terms with the countries which control the present oil markets. The British, moreover, are hoping to strengthen their economic and political ties with Iraq by selling it sizable amounts of armaments.

But the West cannot by these measures solve Iraq's basic problem of economic development. Somehow the country must acquire high-level manpower and extensive technical assistance if its material resources are to be utilized effectively in raising the living standards of the people. Here, presumably, she must take what the Soviets deliver in accordance with various trade and technical assistance agreements. No one can say whether it will be better than what the Egyptians were prepared to offer.

In conclusion, it is apparent that the problems of economic development of both Egypt and Iraq are inextricably involved in the continuing political struggle between the East and West. Although "positive neutrality" may be a handy slogan for the leaders in both countries, as well as at times a good instrument for playing one foreign power off against another, it really offers no panacea for the basic problems of economic development. By now both Egypt and Iraq must have learned that there is no such thing as "stringless aid." In the long run, the economic development of the Middle East will require some kind of union which will effectively combine the quite different but obviously complementary assets not only of Egypt and Iraq but of the other Arab states as well. If this union could come about, the future might hold more promise.

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By Henry L. Roberts

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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN THE ATOMIC AGE. BY JOHN H. HERZ. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959, 360 p. \$6.00.

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ZWISCHEN BALLHAUSPLATZ UND DOWNING STREET. BY LOTHAR WIMMER. Vienna: Fromme, 1958, 404 p. Schillings 118.80.

Memoirs of an Austrian diplomat whose stations, during the years before and

after the Second World War, included London, Cairo, Tirana, Belgrade and Brussels.

THE TANKS. BY CAPTAIN B. H. LIDDELL HART. New York: Praeger, 1959, 2 v. \$15.00.

This exhaustive official history of the Royal Tank Regiment, by a leading military historian, is in effect a history of the development of the tank from the First World War through the Second.

NATIONAL STRATEGY IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTIONS. EDITED BY GEORGE B. DE HUSZAR. New York: Praeger, 1959, 282 p. \$6.00.

Addresses and discussions from the Fourth National Military-Industrial Conference held in February 1958.

THE IMPACT OF AIR POWER. BY EUGENE M. EMME. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1959, 914 p. \$12.50.

A massive volume of readings by many authors on the development of air power and its effect upon warfare and international politics.

THE SCHLIEFFEN PLAN. BY GERHARD RITTER. New York: Praeger, 1958, 195 p. \$5.50.

A translation of a leading German historian's study of the origins and significance of the Schlieffen Plan (German edition noted here October 1957).

THE UNITED NATIONS. BY LELAND M. GOODRICH. New York: Crowell, 1959, 419 p. \$7.50.

A solid and informed introduction to the origins, structure, functions and performance of the United Nations.

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS. BY PAUL REUTER. New York: Rinehart, 1958, 316 p. \$5.00.

A general survey of the origins, premises and functions of international institutions, including states as well as international organizations. The author is Professor of International Law at the University of Paris.

LA DÉFINITION DE L'AGRESSION. BY EUGÈNE ARONÉANU. Paris: Éditions Internationales, 1958, 405 p. Fr. 1800.

A monograph on the efforts in the U.N. from 1950 to 1957 to work out a definition of aggression.

EXPROPRIATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW. BY B. A. WORTLEY. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1959, 169 p. \$5.50.

An important study of expropriation, confiscation and nationalization as an urgent problem in contemporary international affairs.

THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND. BY C. WILFRED JENKS. New York: Praeger (for the London Institute of World Affairs), 1958, 456 p. \$12.50.

A study of the impact of the Second World War and its aftermath upon the scope, function and universality of international law.

DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1956. EDITED BY NOBLE FRANKLAND ASSISTED BY VERA KING. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1959, 768 p. \$13.45.

This volume in the annual Chatham House series is concerned with a year bursting with occasions for documents: the Suez crisis, the Twentieth Party Congress, the eruptions in Poland and Hungary.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

FIVE IDEAS THAT CHANGE THE WORLD. BY BARBARA WARD. New York: Norton (for the University College of Ghana), 1959, 188 p. \$3.75.

Lectures on nationalism, industrialism, colonialism, Communism, internationalism, and their impact on the contemporary world.

INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS AND BUSINESS CYCLES. BY OSKAR MORGENSTERN. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959, 591 p. \$12.00.

A massive study of the interaction of international money markets and the spread of business cycles. The periods investigated are those of 1879-1914 and 1919-1938.

THE INCOME OF NATIONS. BY PAUL STUDENSKI. New York: New York University Press, 1958, 554 p. \$25.00.

A history and analysis of national income concepts and measurements. Includes a review of estimates for 13 countries, including Canada, the U.S.S.R., Germany and France.

ECONOMIC PLANNING IN UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS: GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS. BY EDWARD S. MASON. New York: Fordham University Press, 1958, 87 p. \$2.50.

In these lectures Professor Mason is chiefly concerned with the case for and against government-initiated economic development, with illustrative observations drawn from efforts at economic planning in South and Southeast Asia.

COLONIAL PLANNING: A COMPARATIVE STUDY. BY BARBU NICULESCU. London: Allen and Unwin, 1958, 208 p. 18/. (New York: Macmillan, \$4.25.)

A comparative study of development planning in the overseas territories of Britain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands.

LA COEXISTENCE PACIFIQUE. BY FRANÇOIS PERROUX. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1958, 3 v. Fr. 2600.

This ambitious study by a French economist is an attempt to comprehend and surmount the present world conflict. In the first two volumes the author deals with the crises and contradictions confronting both the capitalist and Communist worlds, especially in regard to the demands of a rational world economy and the needs of non-industrialized societies; the third volume presents his conclusions.

TRANSATLANTISCHER AUSTAUSCH. Munich: Hueber, 1958, 172 p. DM. 2.80.

A guide to groups, organizations and agencies involved in one way or another in German-American cultural exchange.

The Second World War

THE ARMY AND ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION. BY R. ELBERTON SMITH. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of Military History, 1959, 749 p. \$5.25.

This is the fifth volume in the sub-series on the War Department in the official history of the United States Army in World War II. It tells of the War Department's role in administering and planning the nation's economic mobilization.

HISTORY OF U.S. MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II. VOLUME I: PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL. BY LIEUTENANT

COLONEL FRANK O. HOUGH AND OTHERS. Washington: U.S. Marine Corps, Historical Branch, 1958, 439 p. \$5.00.

This is the first of a projected five-volume official history of Marine Corps operations in the Second World War.

PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS. BY ALEXANDER L. GEORGE. Evanston (Ill.): Row, Peterson, 1959, 287 p. \$6.00.

A fairly technical study appraising and evaluating the inferences drawn by American analysts from German wartime propaganda.

FLYING TIGER: CHENNAULT OF CHINA. BY ROBERT LEE SCOTT, JR. Garden City: Doubleday, 1959, 285 p. \$3.95.

General Scott, who served under Chennault in China, deals here, most interestingly, with the military exploits of his commanding officer and also with the bitter political conflicts that developed with General Stilwell.

THE MARAUDERS. BY CHARLTON OGBURN, JR. New York: Harper, 1959, 307 p. \$4.50.

An excellent account of "Merrill's Marauders"—their exploits and experiences in Burma in 1944.

DER FELDZUG 1939 IN POLEN. BY NIKOLAUS VON VORMANN. Weissenburg: Prinz-Eugen-Verlag, 1958, 210 p. DM. 22.

A military account of the campaign in Poland, by a German officer who participated in the organization and planning.

WENDE IM KAVKASUS. BY ADOLF VON ERNSTHAUSEN. Neckargemünd: Vowinkel, 1958, 252 p. DM. 9.80.

A report, by a participant, of the German advance into the Caucasus in 1942.

The United States

THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS, 1958. BY RICHARD P. STEBINS. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1959, 479 p. \$6.00.

An astonishingly prompt and comprehensive survey of the international history of 1958, composed with the same skill that has characterized the earlier volumes in this series. The crises in the Middle East, the Taiwan Strait, and Germany, and the growing East-West competition in outer space provide the highlights of the 1958 narrative, which includes such late developments as Fidel Castro's victory in Cuba and the "Project Argus" experiments disclosed in March of this year.

DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 1958. EDITED BY PAUL E. ZINNER. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1959, 568 p. \$6.95.

The twentieth volume of selected documents in the series originated by the World Peace Foundation and now prepared by the Council on Foreign Relations.

WHAT WE ARE FOR. BY ARTHUR LARSON. New York: Harper, 1959, 173 p. \$2.95.

The author of "A Republican Looks at His Party" here undertakes a brief statement of positive American purposes—the type of society we strive to be, the type of world we should like to live in. A bit general and imprecise in some areas where very tough decisions may be called for.

WHAT'S WRONG WITH U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. BY C. L. SULZBERGER. New York: Harcourt, 1959, 255 p. \$4.50.

Mr. Sulzberger, diplomatic columnist for *The New York Times*, does not here attempt a general assessment of United States foreign policy but is concerned with pointing out shortcomings, blunders and misguided efforts—something he does at considerable length and with a good deal of feeling. While he argues that diagnosis serves a useful function even if no prescription is at hand, this medical analogy—that there are recognizable “ills”—may not be fully applicable to international affairs.

THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY. BY WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1959, 219 p. \$4.75.

An interesting and provocative critical analysis of American foreign policy in the twentieth century. The author's central theme of the unhappy continuity of “open-door imperial expansion” is obviously debatable, as is his interpretation of the mainsprings of Soviet policy—a highly relevant factor in any discussion of the American position.

PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, 1956. Washington: G.P.O., 1958, 1,220 p. \$7.25.

This volume contains the public messages, speeches and statements of the President from January 1 to December 31, 1956. The volume for 1957 was published in 1958.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE TREATY LAW OF THE SEA. BY HENRY REIFF. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1959, 451 p. \$8.00.

This painstaking study of American participation in multipartite agreements dealing with the use of the sea is lightened by a number of interesting asides and informative excursions.

CRISIS DIPLOMACY: A HISTORY OF U.S. INTERVENTION POLICIES AND PRACTICES. BY D. A. GRABER. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1959, 402 p. \$6.75.

An extensive study of the history of “intervention” and “non-intervention” in American foreign relations from 1789 to the present, with particular attention to the legal and moral arguments involved in this continuing issue.

ROBERT LANSING AND AMERICAN NEUTRALITY 1914–1917. BY DANIEL M. SMITH. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958, 241 p. \$5.00.

A monograph on Lansing's role in the years leading to the United States' entry into the First World War. In the author's view he played an important part that should place him among the leading American Secretaries of State.

PEACE WITHOUT VICTORY. BY LAURENCE W. MARTIN. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958, 230 p. \$4.50.

A study of the influence of certain liberal groups in Britain on the formation of Woodrow Wilson's foreign policy.

HERBERT HOOVER AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION. BY HARRIS GAYLORD WARREN. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959, 372 p. \$7.00.

An effort to evaluate the Hoover administration, particularly in its efforts to deal with the Great Depression. The picture of the administration, and of the President, does not come out very clearly, however.

EDUCATION AND MILITARY LEADERSHIP. BY GENE M. LYONS AND JOHN W. MASLAND. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959, 283 p. \$5.00.

An examination of the history, purposes and possible future of the Reserve Officers Training Corps programs.

WILLIAM NELSON CROMWELL, 1854-1948. BY ARTHUR H. DEAN. New York: Ad Press, 1958, 237 p. \$6.00.

A biography of one of the founders of the important law partnership of Sullivan and Cromwell, of which the author and John Foster Dulles, who provided a brief foreword, have been members.

Western Europe

THE SCHUMAN PLAN: A STUDY IN ECONOMIC COOPERATION, 1950-1959. BY WILLIAM DIEBOLD, JR. New York: Praeger (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1959, 750 p. \$6.50.

When Robert Schuman proposed in May 1950 that the coal and steel of France and Germany should be pooled, his statement aroused extreme hopes and fears and some incredulity. The European Coal and Steel Community that resulted has altered economic and political relations among the six participating countries and between them and the rest of the world. After examining why the Schuman Plan took hold, this book traces in some detail just what has been done about trade barriers, transportation, prices, cartels and many other matters. It examines the interplay of business, labor, governments and the organs of the new Community and appraises its strengths and weaknesses.

EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS. BY A. H. ROBERTSON. New York: Praeger (for the London Institute of World Affairs), 1959, 372 p. \$7.75.

A concise description of the structure and functions of the leading European organizations: O.E.E.C., Council of Europe, NATO, the Coal and Steel Community, Euratom and others.

EUROPAS WEG NACH POTSDAM. BY WENZEL JAKSCH. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1958, 522 p. DM. 15.80.

The author, a former member of the Socialist Party in the Sudeten region of Czechoslovakia, develops the theme that the destruction of the Hapsburg monarchy, with the consequent national and irredentist conflicts that arose, was the source of the Second World War and the ultimate movement of Soviet power into the heart of Europe.

EUROPE: FAITH AND PLAN. BY OSWALD MOSLEY. London: Euphorion, 1958, 147 p. 12/6.

Sir Oswald offers his program—a rather cranky one—for uniting Europe.

CHARLES DE GAULLE: THE CRUCIAL YEARS, 1943-1944. BY ARTHUR LAYTON FUNK. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1959, 336 p. \$5.00.

This is chiefly a study in foreign affairs: de Gaulle's emergence as leader of the Committee of National Liberation and his relations with Britain and the United States in the period leading to the liberation of France.

NEUTRALISM AND NATIONALISM IN FRANCE. BY JOHN T. MARCUS. New York: Bookman Associates, 1959, 207 p. \$4.50.

A study of the merger of neutralist and nationalist sentiments in postwar France.

ON THE GAME OF POLITICS IN FRANCE. BY NATHAN LEITES. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959, 190 p. \$4.50.

In this brief but illuminating study Mr. Leites attempts to present the major

patterns of parliamentary strategy and tactics—the ground rules—in the second phase of the Fourth French Republic from 1951 to 1958.

L'ÉGLISE DE FRANCE DEVANT LA RÉVOLUTION MARXISTE. TOME I: LES VOIES INSONDABLES 1936-1944. BY JACQUES MARTEAUX. Paris: Éditions de la Table Ronde, 1958, 660 p. Fr. 1800.

This first volume of a large, polemical but well-documented work discusses the comportment of French Catholics in face of the expansion and diffusion of Marxist ideas and programs.

L'EXODE DE MAI-JUIN 1940. BY JEAN VIDALENC. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1957, 439 p. Fr. 1600.

A solid study of the flight of the French civilian population in the disastrous months of May and June 1940.

SCANDINAVIAN DEMOCRACY. EDITED BY J. A. LAUWERYS. New York: American-Scandinavian Foundation, 1958, 437 p. \$6.00.

A symposium, based in part upon "Nordisk Demokrati" (edited by Hal Koch and Alf Ross, Copenhagen, 1949) and dealing with the operation of democratic principles in the economic and political life of the Scandinavian countries. (Published jointly by the Danish Institute, the Norwegian Office of Cultural Relations and the Swedish Institute, in coöperation with the American-Scandinavian Foundation.)

NORWAY-SWEDEN. BY RAYMOND E. LINDGREN. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959, 298 p. \$5.00.

A study of the Norwegian-Swedish union, its termination in 1905 and the subsequent efforts at Scandinavian integration.

WAGES AND ECONOMIC CONTROL IN NORWAY: 1945-1957. BY MARK W. LEISERSON. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959, 174 p. \$4.50.

A detailed analysis of wage determination since 1945 in the relatively highly controlled Norwegian economy. The author, who teaches economics at Yale, was in Norway as an official under the Marshall Plan.

THE SAVAGE CANARY. BY DAVID LAMPE. London: Cassell, 1957, 236 p. 18/.

An informal but interesting account of the resistance activities in Denmark under Nazi occupation.

ZEHN JAHRE UND ZWANZIG TAGE. BY KARL DÖNITZ. Bonn: Athenaeum, 1958, 512 p. DM. 24.

The "ten years" in these memoirs refers to the decade between the beginning of Germany's rearmament and the collapse of the Third Reich in 1945; the "20 days" covers Admiral Dönitz's brief political role at the end of the war.

DIE VERRATENE REPUBLIK. BY WILHELM HOEGNER. Munich: Isar Verlag, 1958, 397 p. DM. 27.50.

An illuminating account of the political tribulations and conflicts of the Weimar Republic. The author was in those years a member of the Social Democratic fraction in the Bavarian Landtag and in the Reichstag.

THE SPARTACIST UPRISING OF 1919 AND THE CRISIS OF THE GERMAN SOCIALIST MOVEMENT. BY ERIC WALDMAN. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1958, 248 p. \$8.00.

A monograph dealing with the origins and circumstances of the January 1919 uprising.

GERMANY AND WORLD POLITICS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. BY LUDWIG DEHIO. New York: Knopf, 1959, 141 p. \$4.00.

A welcome translation of some outstanding essays on German history and historiography (German edition noted here January 1957).

AUS EINEM SOLDATENLEBEN, 1887-1939. BY ERICH VON MANSTEIN. Bonn: Athenaenum, 1958, 359 p. DM. 20.

This is the first volume of Marshal von Manstein's memoirs. The second volume, dealing with the Second World War, "Verlorene Siege," appeared in 1955. (English translation noted here January 1959.)

HITLER DER FELDHERR. BY GERT BUCHHEIT. Rastatt: Grote, 1958, 560 p. DM. 19.80.

A detailed, critical examination of Hitler's qualities and performance as a military leader and strategist.

MACHT OHNE MANDAT. BY ERNST RICHERT. Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1958, 181 p. DM. 20.

A study of the state and party apparatus in the Soviet zone of Germany.

DAS ÖSTLICHE DEUTSCHLAND. Würzburg: Holzner, 1959, 1,013 p. DM. 48.

Chiefly an extensive series of legal, historical and economic articles dealing with the area east of the Oder-Neisse line, but also including a section on the "Sudeten question."

TO WIN THE MINDS OF MEN. BY PETER GROTHE. Palo Alto (Cal.): Pacific Books, 1958, 241 p. \$5.50.

A study of Communist propaganda and indoctrination in East Germany.

SOUVENIRS DIPLOMATIQUES: ROME-QUIRINAL, FÉVRIER 1916-FÉVRIER 1919. BY F. CHARLES-ROUX. Paris: Fayard, 1958, 377 p. Fr. 1250.

Interesting but still prudent diplomatic memoirs concerning Italy's wartime policy and Franco-Italian relations in the latter half of the First World War.

POPE JOHN XXIII COMES TO THE VATICAN. By Francis X. Murphy. New York: McBride, 1959, 242 p. \$3.95.

A brief biography, but giving some information on Angelo Roncalli's activities as a Papal diplomat.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

FRIENDS AND ENEMIES. BY ADLAI E. STEVENSON. New York: Harper, 1959, 102 p. \$2.95.

In this brief book Mr. Stevenson reports on his journey to the Soviet Union in 1958, including his interview with Khrushchev. The concluding note of "calm and final confidence" seems hardly borne out by the somber and formidable challenge he describes.

MY RUSSIAN JOURNEY. BY SANTHA RAMA RAU. New York: Harper, 1959, 300 p. \$4.50.

Although her visit to the Soviet Union was on a conventional circuit—Leningrad, Moscow, Tashkent and Samarkand—Miss Rama Rau's account is marked, as is her earlier work, by her sensitivity and her unobtrusive skill as a writer.

THE PRIVILEGE WAS MINE: A RUSSIAN PRINCESS RETURNS TO THE SOVIET UNION. BY ZINAIDA SCHAKOVSKOY. New York: Putnam, 1959, 318 p. \$4.00.

The Russian-born wife of a French diplomat reports on her return to her native land after some 40 years.

LA NOUVELLE ORIENTATION DU COMMERCE EXTÉRIEUR SOVIÉTIQUE. BY LOUIS KAWAN. Brussels: Centre National pour l'Étude des Pays à Régime Communiste, 1958, 317 p. Belgian Fr. 275.

A study of the systematic expansion in recent years of Soviet commerce into the markets of the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

THE SOVIET CULTURAL SCENE, 1956-1957. EDITED BY WALTER Z. LAQUEUR AND GEORGE LICHTHEIM. New York: Praeger, 1958, 300 p. \$3.75.

A selection of recent articles on culture and politics from the periodical *Soviet Survey*.

PATTERN FOR SOVIET YOUTH. BY RALPH TALCOTT FISHER, JR. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959, 452 p. \$6.75.

A careful and detailed study of the 12 Komsomol congresses held during the years 1918-1954.

GOD AND THE SOVIETS. BY MARCUS BACH. New York: Crowell, 1958, 214 p. \$4.00.

Personal observations, by a professor in the School of Religion at the State University of Iowa, on religion and religious beliefs in the Soviet Union today.

SOVIET SPACE SCIENCE. BY ARI SHTERNFELD. New York: Basic Books, 1959, 361 p. \$6.00.

A translation under authority of the U.S. Air Force of a prominent Soviet scientist's book, "Iskustvenniye Sputniki," discussing developments and prospects in launching satellites.

MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY. BY ANATOLE G. MAZOUR. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1958, 260 p. \$6.50.

A revised and enlarged edition of a work first published in 1939.

L'INSTITUTION CONCENTRATIONNAIRE EN RUSSIE (1930-1957). BY PAUL BARTON. Paris: Plon, 1959, 519 p. Fr. 1650.

A substantial and well-documented study of Soviet forced labor camps, a useful supplement to the earlier study by Dallin and Nicolaevsky. The volume includes a brief section, "Le Sens de Notre Combat," by David Rousset.

SEVEN ROADS TO MOSCOW. BY LIEUTENANT-COLONEL W. G. F. JACKSON. New York: Philosophical Library, 1958, 334 p. \$7.50.

An account of military invasions of Russia from the Vikings to Hitler. Some of the historical parallels drawn are hardly persuasive.

LAW IN EASTERN EUROPE. EDITED BY Z. SZIRMAI. Leyden: Sijthoff, 1958, 2 v. Florins 25. (New York: Lounz, \$7.00.)

These studies under the auspices of the University of Leyden include pieces on Soviet law (Volume I) and on that of Poland, Yugoslavia and Eastern Germany (Volume II).

IN THE SHADOW OF RUSSIA. BY NICHOLAS HALASZ. New York: Ronald, 1959, 390 p. \$5.00.

A general history of Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia in the years since 1945.

THE ABSENT COUNTRIES OF EUROPE. Berne: Osteuropa Bibliothek, 1958, 272 p.

Lectures held at the Collège de l'Europe Libre, and dealing with political, ideological, social, economic and religious problems in the Soviet orbit. (French edition, "L'Europe des Dix Pays Absents," Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1958, 258 p. Fr. 1200.)

LE DRAME DES ÉTATS SATELLITES DE L'AXE, DE 1939 À 1945. BY MAXIME MOURIN. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1957, 275 p. Fr. 900.

A study of the vicissitudes of Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Finland in their efforts to escape from their ties to Hitler.

TEREKILLE JA TAKAISIN. BY UNTO PARVILAHTI. Helsinki: Otava, 1958, 302 p. M. 900.

Reminiscences of one of the some 1,400 young Finns who volunteered for service with the German S.S. troops, covering the activities of the Finnish battalion during the years 1941-43.

WARSAW IN CHAINS. BY STEFAN KORBONSKI. New York: Macmillan, 1959, 319 p. \$6.00.

In this sequel to his earlier book, "Fighting Warsaw" (noted here April 1957), Mr. Korbonski treats, in diary form, events in Poland from the summer of 1945 to the autumn of 1947, by which time the Communists had established themselves.

THE SOVIET-YUGOSLAV CONTROVERSY, 1948-58. EDITED BY ROBERT BASS AND ELIZABETH MARBURY. New York: Prospect Books (for the East Europe Institute), 1959, 225 p. \$3.95.

A useful selection of documents dealing with the uneven course of Soviet-Yugoslav relations from the break in 1948 to the renewed bickering and hostility in 1958.

SLOVENIA IN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS. BY JOHN A. ARNEZ. Washington: Studia Slovenica, 1958, 204 p. \$3.50.

An informal survey of Slovenian political history, about half of which is concerned with recent developments and includes a discussion of the Slovenian minorities in Italy and Austria.

AMERICAN AID TO GREECE. BY C. A. MUNKMAN. New York: Praeger, 1958, 306 p. \$5.00.

An Englishman with extensive overseas experience, the author was involved in American aid to Greece which he here describes in some detail and evaluates.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

KING GEORGE VI. BY JOHN W. WHEELER-BENNETT. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1958, 891 p. \$10.00.

A good, if not very exciting official biography of a good, if not very exciting man and monarch.

THE CHARM OF POLITICS. BY R. H. S. CROSSMAN. New York: Harper, 1959, 243 p. \$4.00. (London: Hamish Hamilton, 18/.)

A collection of Mr. Crossman's *New Statesman* essays and reviews on politics and people over the last 20 years.

THE IMPERIAL IDEA AND ITS ENEMIES: A STUDY IN BRITISH POWER. BY A. P. THORNTON. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1959, 370 p. \$7.50.

An account and interpretation of changing attitudes toward the British Empire—in support and in opposition—in the last 80 years or so.

EMERGENCY POWERS AND THE PARLIAMENTARY WATCHDOG. BY JOHN EAVES, JR. London: Hansard Society, 1957, 208 p. 18/.

A close and scholarly analysis of the relations between Parliament and the Executive in Great Britain during the war years and subsequently.

L'ÉVOLUTION DU MARCHÉ MONÉTAIRE DE LONDRES (1931-1952). BY PIERRE GOETSCHIN. Morges (Switzerland): The Author, 1958, 570 p. Swiss Fr. 38.

Following a theoretical and descriptive introduction the author traces in considerable detail and with a good deal of statistical material the evolution of British monetary policy from the dropping of the gold standard through the Second World War and into the period of postwar reconstruction.

NINETEEN THIRTY-ONE: POLITICAL CRISIS. BY R. BASSETT. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1958, 464 p. \$9.50.

An excellent study that dispels a good deal of popular misinformation about a singularly confusing and bitter year of British politics.

AN ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PARLIAMENT. BY NORMAN WILDING AND PHILIP LAUNDY. New York: Praeger, 1958, 705 p. \$12.50.

An alphabetically organized reference book on the British Parliament and its proliferations in the Commonwealth.

THE COMMONWEALTH IN THE WORLD. BY J. D. B. MILLER. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958, 308 p. \$5.00.

A skillful description of the Commonwealth today, that extraordinary "concert of convenience." The author, an Australian, is Professor of Politics at the University of Leicester.

THE CABINET IN THE COMMONWEALTH. BY H. V. WISEMAN. New York: Praeger, 1959, 364 p. \$9.75.

A study of the process by which the Colonial Executive Council has been developing into a responsible cabinet in the British Colonial Territories.

CANADA: A POLITICAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY. BY EDGAR McINNIS. New York: Rinehart, 1959, 619 p. \$7.00.

A revised and enlarged edition of a study first published in 1947.

CANADA IN WORLD AFFAIRS: FROM UN TO NATO 1946-1949. BY ROBERT A. SPENCER. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs), 1959, 447 p. \$5.70.

This is the fifth volume in a welcome series covering Canada's role in international affairs.

WILLIAM LYON MACKENZIE KING: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY, 1874-1923. BY R. MACGREGOR DAWSON. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1958, 521 p. \$7.50.

This is the first volume of a biography based on the extensive papers, including letters and a detailed diary, of the late Canadian Prime Minister, who held this office for a total of 7,829 days, a record in the British Commonwealth.

PUBLIC EXPENDITURES IN AUSTRALIA. By B. U. RATCHFORD. Durham: Duke University Press (for the Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center), 1959, 320 p. \$7.50.

A detailed study of public expenditures at all levels of government, with particular attention to the years 1929-1955.

The Middle East

EGYPT IN TRANSITION. By JEAN AND SIMONNE LACOUTURE. New York: Criterion Books, 1958, 532 p. \$7.50.

An excellent description—perhaps the best available—of contemporary Egypt, its economic and social problems, its national passions, its politics and foreign relations. The original French edition appeared in 1956.

HUMAN RESOURCES FOR EGYPTIAN ENTERPRISE. By FREDERICK HARBISON AND IBRAHIM ABDELKADER IBRAHIM. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1958, 230 p. \$5.50.

An essay on labor problems in the industrialization of Egypt.

THE STORY OF THE TURKS: FROM EMPIRE TO DEMOCRACY. By RICHARD PETERS. New York: C. S. Publishing Co., 1959, 235 p. \$3.95.

Essays on Turkish history by a former German newspaperman with a number of years of experience in Turkey.

LA PÉNINSULE ARABIQUE. By JEAN-JACQUES BERREBY. Paris: Payot, 1958, 270 p. Fr. 1200.

A brief general survey of the countries and peoples of the Arabian peninsula.

IRAQ'S PEOPLE AND RESOURCES. By DORIS GOODRICH ADAMS. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958, 160 p. \$3.00.

A study, originally a dissertation, on the interplay of demography and economic development in Iraq.

WHO'S WHO ISRAEL, 1958. Edited by PERETZ DAGAN. Tel Aviv: Mamut, 1958, 584 p. (New York: Lounz, \$12.00.)

This seventh edition includes not only biographical information but also data on public bodies and economic enterprises.

South and Southeast Asia

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By Ruth Savord

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